来自福岛的教训

    我们不断在这个星球上架设一些明知可能引发灾难性后果的系统。典型的例子就是核电站：这些装有危险浓缩物质的电站往往位于人口密集地区，而且由于核电行业的合并，核电站所有者具有很大的政治影响力。不幸的是，现在我们看到了高度集中带来的苦果。

    日本作为一个其他能源匮乏的岛国，沿着海岸线分布着不少核电站；其中两个核电站——福岛和女川核电站更是建于地震活跃带上。文件显示，日本的监管部门和经理人们将“最糟情景”视为“离群值”——即“非真实风险”。2006年，一个名为日本原子力安全委员会（Nuclear Safety Commission）的团体认识到了海啸袭击日本沿海核电站的危险，但最终给出了令人安慰的结论：“即便是非常接近海平面的核电站，反应堆周围坚实密闭的安全壳结构也能阻止海啸对核部分造成损伤，虽然核电站其他部分可能遭到损毁。不太可能出现放射性危害。”我们现在知道了那些安全壳结构事实上是多么地难当重任。

    核电行业目前由少数几家公司主导。西屋电气（Westinghouse）被东芝（Toshiba）收购了；法国公司阿海珐（Areva）主导着欧洲市场，目前在美国开展联合项目。Exelon和Entergy经营着美国大部分核电站。行业整合使得企业的规模和影响力足以游说政府减少监管，帮助它们提高运营效率——实现一个又一个季度的利润最大化。（虽然核电行业应从长计议——由于审批和规划，建设一座核电站可能需时10年，而核电站的使用年限为40-60年——但核电公司同其他企业一样难逃华尔街短期心态的影响。）

    但在这个危险的行业中，更具威胁性的集中或许在于核电机组的集中化。东京电力（Tokyo Electric）旗下有一个核电站的机组数量达到了7个；福岛第一核电站（Fukushima Daiichi）现有核电机组6个，计划新增2个。这使得它们很容易受到外接电源断电、应急电源遭水淹等“共模”故障的冲击，危险提高了6倍。假如有关部门曾以较低的经济处罚要求这些核电站分散机组，地震和海啸的威胁就能大为降低。

    不幸中的万幸？监管部门已表示将从福岛危机中汲取教训，提高核电站的安全性。3月12日，美国核学会（American Nuclear Society）点评了这些严重事件，但持续的行业风险分析让我们感到安慰：在这样的一场灾难中，“封闭放射性材料实际上可以被视为一项‘成功’，毕竟这样级别的自然灾害并未纳入最初的设计范畴。核电行业将从此次事件汲取教训，重新设计核设施，令它们未来能够更安全。”在灾难中，我们警醒自救。

    --本文作者Charles Perrow是耶鲁大学社会学名誉教授，《下一场灾难》（The Next Catastrophe）一书的作者。

    We continue to populate our planet with systems that have catastrophic potential despite the known risks. Case in point: Nuclear power plants, which house fearful concentrations of hazardous materials, are often located in densely populated areas, and whose owners wield great political clout thanks to consolidation in the nuclear power industry. Unfortunately we are now seeing the consequences of this centralization.

    Japan, an island without other energy sources, has sprinkled its coastline with nuclear power plants; two, the Fukushima and the Onagawa facilities, were built in an area known for its seismic activity. Documents show regulators and managers in Japan treated "worst case" events as outliers—not real risks. In 2006 a group called the Nuclear Safety Commission recognized the danger of tsunamis hitting Japan's coastal plants but reassuringly concluded: "Even for a nuclear plant situated very close to sea level, the robust sealed containment structure around the reactor itself would prevent any damage to the nuclear part from a tsunami, though other parts of the plant might be damaged. No radiological hazard would be likely." We now know how inadequate those containment structures proved to be.

    The nuclear industry is dominated by a handful of companies. Westinghouse was bought by Toshiba; the French company Areva dominates in Europe and is now in joint projects in the U.S., one company supplies it with a third of its electric power. Exelon (EXC) and Entergy (ETR) run most of them in the U.S. Consolidation has given companies size and influence to lobby governments for less oversight, which helps them operate more efficiently--and maximize profits quarter after quarter. (Though the industry by necessity has to think long term—due to permissions and planning it may take 10 years to build a facility that will have a 40- to 60-year life span—nuclear power companies are as beholden to Wall Street's short-term mentality as any corporation.)

    But perhaps a more threatening form of concentration in this dangerous industry is at the facility level. One of Tokyo Electric's facilities has 7 plants on one site; Fukushima Daiichi has 6 and plans to build two more there. This makes them obvious targets for a "common mode" failure such as loss of off-site power and flooding of sources of emergency power, increasing the danger six-fold. Had the facilities been required to disperse their plants, at some small economic penalty, earthquake and tsunami risks would be greatly reduced.

    The silver lining? Regulators now say they will use lessons from the disaster at Fukushima to improve nuclear plant safety. On March 12 the American Nuclear Society noted the dire events, but continuing the tradition of risk analysis in the industry reassured us: In an event like this, "containing the radioactive materials could actually be considered a 'success' given the scale of this natural disaster that had not been considered in the original design. The nuclear power industry will learn from this event, and redesign our facilities as needed to make them safer in the future." In our disasters is our salvation.

    --Charles Perrow, emeritus professor of sociology, Yale University, is the author of The Next Catastrophe.