悬崖边的欧洲

    不妨先来看看市场。上周，1,000万美元希腊债务的年保费突破了140万美元，而10年期希腊债券的收益率达到令人难以置信的15%。爱尔兰和葡萄牙的公司债息差也创下了新高。

    投资者逃离希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙，导致了欧元区现有的一个问题。去年欧盟一直在救助弱国以及大到不能成功的银行(too-big-to-succeed banks)，而没有解决导致弱国出现问题的首要因素——生产率问题。

    但由于欧洲央行不遗余力的抗通胀努力，欧元/美元现距离2008年全球经济即将迸裂前创下的历史高点已不到10%。欧元涨得越高，滞重的欧洲经济承受的压力就越大。这种状况能持续多久？

    对凯恩斯箴言的最新曲解是，市场的非理性状态或许能持续至欧洲弱国或其银行业债务偿付问题出现后。当投资者最终搞明白时，下跌可能是无情的。

    “我们现在正从悬崖上探出头去，”Guggenheim Partners的首席投资官斯考特•迈纳德表示。他预计随着投资者最终认清欧洲问题的严重性，欧元/美元将从最近的1.46美元 (见上图) 跌至平价，甚至更低。“如果你把所有数据加起来，就会发现逃无可逃。”

    令人不快的计算始于银行业。如果次贷危机在欧洲重演，欧洲银行业具有强大的政治影响力——但财力不足，透明度不高，若出现主权债务违约的最糟情形，将受严重冲击。

    欧洲三个弱国仅占欧盟年经济产值5%。但欧洲银行业持有1,470亿美元希腊主权债券以及1,150亿美元爱尔兰和葡萄牙债券，其中1,080亿美元债券由这三国之外的欧盟成员国银行持有。

    总之，相比美国，在欧洲维持银行业健康对于经济增长更具重要性。根据经合组织(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 估算，银行业承担着欧元区信贷融资量的74%。而在房利美(Fannie Mae)的按揭贷款中，银行业占比仅24%。

    “问题始于资本金不足以及千丝万缕的关联，一个局部问题很容易演变成系统性问题，”位于布鲁塞尔的欧洲政策研究中心(Center for European Policy Studies)主任丹尼尔•格罗斯表示，“但很难给出一个数字来说明有多糟。”

    今春监管部门的再次压力测试未能提振人们对银行业的信心，此次测试未包括主权债务违约情景。对于银行业真实状况的担忧可能导致一旦主权债务危机爆发，就会演变成地区性问题，并进而在整个欧洲大陆蔓延。

    迄今为止，欧洲央行及欧洲政客们所采取的措施仅足以维持局势不失控。一旦储户信心丧失，弱国仍将面临巨大风险。

    导致去年秋季爱尔兰只能接受不得人心的救助计划的正是海外储户挤提。据迈纳德估算，截至2月份，爱尔兰银行业的非居民存款已较上年同期锐减49%。

    迄今为止，葡萄牙银行业尚未有挤提迹象。但格罗斯担心一旦资金开始撤离希腊，将会发生的情况——更不消说经济规模大于另外两个受助国的西班牙了。随着欧洲央行加息，失业率高达20%的经济将更显滞重，银行业的亏损可能扩大。

    “我认为希腊、爱尔兰或葡萄牙要解决问题，就必须削减债务，”迈纳德表示。如果是这样的话，他补充说，“我们预计未来18-24个月欧洲将出现大范围的信贷紧缩。”

    美元也将上涨，信不信由你。

    Not that you'd know the difference to look at the market. The annual cost of insuring $10 million of Greek debt soared past $1.4 million this week, and the yield on 10-year Greek bonds hit an eye-watering 15%. Credit spreads hit new highs in Ireland and Portugal too.

    Investor flight from Greece, Ireland and Portugal has the makings of an existential problem for the euro zone. The European Union has spent the past year bailing out weak states and their too-big-to-succeed banks, without addressing the productivity problems that laid the weaker states low in the first place.

    Yet the euro, thanks to the inflation-squashing vigor of the European Central Bank, is now trading within 10% of the all-time high it hit against the dollar in 2008, just before the global economy came apart at the seams. The higher the euro goes, the more stress on laboring European economies. How long can this go on?

    In an ugly new twist on Keynes' aphorism, it is starting to look like the market can stay irrational longer than Europe's weaker states – or their banks -- can stay solvent. When investors finally catch on, the fall could be brutal.

    "We're peering over the precipice right now," says Scott Minerd, chief investment officer at Guggenheim Partners. He is betting the euro will fall from a recent $1.46 (see chart, right) toward parity with the dollar or even beyond, as investors finally divine the extent of Europe's problems: "There is just no way out when you start to add up all the numbers."

    The unhappy math starts with the banks. In a replay of the subprime crisis here, the banks in Europe are politically powerful -- but financially weak, largely opaque and highly exposed to the worst case scenario, in this case a sovereign default.

    The three weak European states account for just 5% of annual European Union economic output. But EU banks hold $147 billion of Greek sovereign bonds and $115 billion of Irish and Portuguese debt – including $108 billion of bonds held by EU banks outside those countries.

    And if anything, keeping the banks healthy over there is more important to growth than it is here. Banks are responsible for 74% of credit extension in the euro area, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates. That compares with just 24% in the land of Fannie Mae mortgages.

    "The problems start with weak capitalization and a lot of interconnectedness, which means problems in one place can easily become systemic," says Daniel Gros, director of the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels. "But it's hard to put a number on exactly how bad it is."

    Confidence in the banks hasn't been helped by regulators' failure to include a sovereign default in the stress tests they are running again this spring. Fears about what the banks really look like could kindle a flare-up of the sovereign debt crisis into a regional headache into a Continent-wide contagion.

    So far, the ECB and European politicians have done just enough to keep the pot simmering without rolling into full boil. But the weak states remain vulnerable to a loss of confidence by depositors.

    It is an international bank run that pushed Ireland into its unpopular bailout last fall. Deposits held at Irish banks by nonresidents plunged 49% from a year ago through February, Minerd estimates.

    So far, there is no evidence of a run on Portuguese banks. But Gros worries what might happen if funds start fleeing from Greece -- let alone Spain, which is much bigger than any of the bailout three. Its banks could face rising losses as the ECB raises rates, punishing an economy already laboring, if you will, under 20% unemployment.

    "I don't really see a solution in Greece or Ireland or Portugal that doesn't involve haircutting the debt," Minerd says. As that plays out, he adds, "We are looking at a massive credit crunch in Europe over the next 18 to 24 months."

    The dollar, believe it or not, also rises.