萨博死而无怨

    萨博汽车（Saab Automobiles）申请破产的消息一如既往地引发震动，人们先是捶胸顿足，随后开始相互攻击、指责。

    萨博这个拥有悠久历史的传奇品牌居然也因为财务问题被送上断头台，这让许多汽车业的传统主义者深感沮丧。一个精品汽车品牌的消失就好比一个物种的灭绝，我们再也见不到它们的身影了。萨博也将一去不回还。

    许多人把萨博失败的主要责任归咎于通用汽车（General Motors）。通用1990年收购了萨博的半数股权，10年前又吃进了剩下的50%。

    有评论人士指出，通用根本就不了解萨博。他们没有准确地理解萨博的历史和遗产，强行将它并入通用的生产体系，导致品牌完整性遭到弱化，同时在财务和管理上也没能给予足够的支持。

    事实上，我认为要不是通用汽车20年前将萨博收入旗下，萨博可能早就淡出人们的视野了。原因很简单：萨博这个品牌太小了，在当前的模式下没法生存。像梅赛德斯奔驰（Mercedes-Benz）和宝马（BMW）等德系车，年产量可达百万辆，但萨博的年销量却从来没有超过14万辆。就连沃尔沃（Volvo）的产量都能达到它的两三倍。低产量是十分致命的，因为汽车行业是一个靠规模经济称王的产业。萨博一要分摊新车型研发的成本，二要面临越来越严格的安全性和排放技术标准，这就对公司财力提出了巨大的要求。除非它的年销量能达到几十万辆，否则这两个目标都是不可能实现的。

    萨博的未来同样很黯淡。由于它的吸引力非常狭隘，因此这个品牌注定做不大。虽说萨博的车主可能并不介意别人叫他们“怪人”，说不定还甘之如饴。但只要说起开萨博的人，人们脑海中总会出现一群穿灯心绒夹克和地球牌旅游鞋的英伦教授范儿的大叔——可见它的客户群并不广泛。其它的欧洲品牌则在扩展品牌吸引力上表现得更出色，尤其是奥迪（Audi）。

    除此之外，萨博还背负着另一个“不可承受之重”——它得养活一大帮高薪低能的瑞典工人。据《汽车新闻》（Automotive News）报道，在上世纪90年代执掌过萨博的戴夫•赫尔曼曾经说道：“健康漂亮的小伙子们都可以从医生那里弄来一份证明，然后骑着摩托，载着女朋友去湖边或什么地方。日常旷工率高达18%。”另外公司的生产率也十分低下，质量也惨不忍睹。在咨询公司J.D. Power历年发布的汽车初始质量排名中，萨博历来排名接近垫底。

    这些因素结合起来，使得萨博在很快难以继续生存，只能求助于通用。为了解决这些问题，通用向萨博安插了美国管理人员，将一些产能转移到了德国，零部件则采取了向欧宝（Opel）采购或共同生产等方法。后来萨博打了几个漂亮的翻身仗，推出了可能是该品牌有史以来最好的9-3轿车。

    The news that Saab Automobiles filed for bankruptcy has spurred the usual round of breast-beating, finger-pointing, and name calling.

    Automotive traditionalists are understandably upset that a brand with a long and storied history like Saab has wound up on the financial chopping block. The disappearance of a boutique automaker is like the extinction of a species -- its like will never be seen again. Saab will be as dead as the dodo.

    Most of the blame for Saab's failure is being laid at the feet of General Motors, which bought a half-interest in Saab in 1990 and then the rest of it a decade ago.

    GM, the critics say, didn't understand Saab. They weren't properly appreciative of its history and heritage, diluted its brand integrity by merging it into GM's production system, and failed to support it financially or managerially.

    In fact, I would argue that Saab would have expired years ago had not GM taken it under its wing two decades ago. The reason is simple: Saab was simply too small to survive in its current configuration. At a time when German luxury makers like Mercedes-Benz and BMW make more than one million cars a year, Saab never sold more than 140,000 cars a year. Even Volvo made two or three times that many cars. Low production is fatal, because the auto industry is all about economies of scale. Trying to amortize the expenses of new model engineering, not to mention increasingly stringent safety and emissions technology, requires accounting gymnastics that are all but impossible unless volumes reach the hundreds of thousands.

    The future was bleak. Saab was destined to remain small because its appeal was so narrow. While its owners may have reveled in being described as "quirky," their image never extended much beyond that of the corduroy jacket, Earth shoe wearing English professor -- not a broad base from which to build. Other European brands -- notably Audi -- did a better job of expanding their appeal.

    Saab bore another burden that was unbearably heavy: its base in high-wage, low output Sweden. As Dave Herman, who ran Saab in the 1990s, was quoted as saying, most recently in Automotive News: "Beautiful, healthy young people could get a doctor's certificate and then hop on their motorcycle with their gal and go off to a lake somewhere. The daily absenteeism rate was 18%." On days when Saab employees came to work, productivity was poor and quality abysmal. Saabs historically ranked near the bottom of J.D. Power's initial quality ratings.

    The combination of factors would have soon made it difficult for Saab to remain a viable proposition without GM's help. GM tried to ameliorate its problems by installing American managers, moving some production to Germany, and integrating its parts buying and engineering with Opel. It had some notable successes. It developed what was probably the best 9-3 ever.