与巨人共舞
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2003年6月2日加州桑尼维尔消息 2006年2月13日加州桑尼维尔消息 这两个标题听起来非常相似——“小企业与大公司合作，开拓更大的市场”——但最终却导致了两种截然不同的结果。我们公司2003年与惠普公司（HP）签订的协议没有创造任何收入，但2006年与思科公司（Cisco）的合作却为我们带来了数千万美元的销售额，并帮助Opsware公司成为数据中心软件领域难以企及的领导者。为什么一份合约大获成功，而另一份却一败涂地呢？ 一家拥有绝佳产品的初创企业时常面临的挑战是：把产品摆到足够多的客户面前，说服他们购买。在理论上，与惠普、EMC或沃达丰（Vodafone）这样的公司达成合作协议，让它们向其客户销售你的产品，是覆盖市场、促使销售速度成倍提升的好办法。但在实践中，大多数“大卫-歌利亚”(David-Goliath)式的分销协议都类似于我们在2003年与惠普公司的合作：它们都是不错的公关手法，但也就仅此而已。以下是这类合作通常的演变路径： • 分销协议大张旗鼓地公布于众，公司内外都抱有极高的期望。 • 歌利亚需要你调整产品，同时在培训和其他方面给予其大量帮助才会愿意试着推销你的产品。 • 歌利亚在产品功能和支持方面的要求让你们公司业已超负荷运转的员工团队疲于应对。 • 你缺乏足够的理由指派专人去支持歌利亚，因为你根本就不确定这样做能创造新的收入。 • 歌利亚一套产品也没有卖出去，甚至有可能出现更糟糕的一幕：歌利亚与你们公司自身的销售团队相互竞相，争夺你们原本有望以更高的利润率直接赢得的客户。 • 双方的“合作关系”无疾而终，不仅破坏了你与歌利亚的关系，还在公司内部留下了苦涩的回忆。 一些初创企业往往应为没有哪一个合作伙伴能够完全依靠自己的力量完成产品的分销，从而抵挡不住“以量取胜”的诱惑，与尽可能多的分销伙伴签约。尽管过度覆盖市场的策略或许能带来暂时的慰藉，但这样做在实践中只会成倍增加企业所面临的挑战。比没有分销伙伴更糟糕的情形是试图管理多个效率低下、在市场上相互竞争的分销伙伴，疲于应付它们的种种要求。 |
SUNNYVALE, Calif., June 2, 2003 HP and Opsware Inc. Join Forces to Deliver Enhanced Automation for HP's Utility Data Center SUNNYVALE, Calif., Feb. 13, 2006 Opsware Announces Worldwide Distribution Agreement with Cisco These two headlines sound pretty similar—"Small company partners with giant company to reach a bigger market"—but they led to two very different outcomes. Our 2003 deal with HP (HPQ) didn't generate a single dollar in revenue, whereas our 2006 agreement with Cisco (CSCO) drove tens of millions of dollars in sales and helped to make Opsware the uncatchable leader in data center software. Why did one succeed spectacularly while the other never took off? As a startup with the best product, your challenge is often getting it in front of enough customers and getting them to buy. In theory, striking a deal to have an HP or an EMC (EMC) or a Vodafone (VOD) sell your product to their customers is the way to cover the market and exponentially increase sales velocity. In practice, however, most "David-Goliath" distribution deals turn out like our 2003 HP deal: great PR, but not much else. Here's the way it typically plays out: • The deal is announced with great fanfare and high internal and external expectations. • Goliath needs product changes, training and lots of help to even attempt to sell your product. • Goliath deluges your already overloaded people with feature and support requests. • You can't justify assigning dedicated people to support Goliath because you can't bank on any new revenue. • Goliath sells nothing, or even worse, ends up competing against your sales team for customers you would have won directly at a higher margin. • The "partnership" quietly withers away, leaving a damaged relationship with Goliath and a bad taste inside the company. The temptation for some startups is try to "make it up in volume"—sign as many distribution partners as possible on the basis that none of them is likely to deliver much on their own. While that degree of over-coverage might feel temporarily reassuring, it only multiplies the challenges exponentially in practice. The only thing worse than having no partners is trying to manage multiple ineffective partners competing with each other in the market and drowning the company with their demands. |
