汉堡王：船大难掉头

    麦当劳（McDonald's）的高达1,000亿美元的总市值并不是天上掉下来的。除了本世纪最初几年，麦当劳的高管们一直尽职地担当着管家的角色，替股东们妥善地管理着他们的资本。而与他们相比，汉堡王（Burger King）的领导层在这方面的表现则相去甚远。虽然公司近期取得了些许的发展，但这对于提高公司信誉也无济于事。

    汉堡王这块招牌一直被许多企业作为敛财的工具，比如1989年至2002年，公司的东家有皮尔斯伯里公司（Pillsbury）、大都会公司（Grand Met）和迪阿吉奥公司（Diageo）。2002年至2006年期间，美国德太投资有限公司（TPG Capital）等私募股权公司也开始插手汉堡王，希望从中分一杯羹。2006年至2010年，私募股权公司希望能在汉堡王上市时从中套现。结果，由于这家快餐连锁公司缺乏最基本的发展动力，最终公司易手，3G资本公司（3G Capital）成为新东家。

    如今，3G资本计划将汉堡王在纽约证交所重新上市。经过一系列复杂交易后，目前3G资本拥有汉堡王71%的股份，剩余股份则由投资公司Justice Holdings持有。Justice Holdings公司是投资家比尔•阿克曼及其对冲基金潘兴广场资产管理公司（Pershing Square Capital）旗下的一家专项收购公司。

    笔者认为，过去几年，公司历任东家，包括现在的3G资本在内，为了给母公司股东带来快速的回报，不惜透支公司的资本品牌。汉堡王面临的问题是实实在在的，以至于其整个业务链显得“太大而无法修复”，至少这些问题在短期内难以解决。据笔者计算，之前获得汉堡王所有权的两家私募股权公司，从汉堡王套取了至少10亿美元。而这笔钱本原本可以用来改善公司和对手的竞争形势。如今，汉堡王已经很难跟上竞争对手的步伐。

    麦当劳是汉堡王最不想面对的竞争对手。2002年至2011年期间，麦当劳仅美国业务的资本支出便在50至60亿美元之间。虽然麦当劳的运营系统仍在不断改良，而且确实有许多店铺需要改建，但与汉堡王不同，麦当劳已经制定了可行的方案，而且，其运营体系向来不缺少资金支持。

    然而，尽管汉堡王一直受到各种问题的困扰，接管公司刚刚18个月的3G资本仍然声称，汉堡王已经东山再起。要知道，3G资本并未投入任何资金用于改善汉堡王的经营，问题怎么可能得到解决呢？

    读者朋友们不妨自问一下，如果有意忽略，有多少问题最终自行得到了解决？肯定不会太多。而3G资本公司不仅未在汉堡王投入任何资金，去年，它反而从公司卷走了2.95亿美元。另外，从公司的基本表现来看，所谓公司东山再起的证据，是指同店销售连续四个月出现正向增长，而实际上，当时恰逢餐饮业最火爆的时节。但是在此之前，公司的销售额已经连续三年呈负增长趋势。

    餐饮业快速服务类产品所面临的竞争，其激烈程度绝对超过其他大部分行业。因为消费者的口味在不断变化，而进入市场的门槛却又很低。过去十年，快餐业经历的巨大变革充分说明了这一点。在消费者体验方面，各个阶段的要求大幅提高。为了抢占市场份额，许多公司都进行了必要的投资，比如墨西哥Chipotle餐厅的“流水线式”订餐服务，星巴克（Starbucks）的“视觉与感官”策略，以及达美乐（Domino）的在线订餐体验等。

    McDonald's has a market capitalization of $100 billion for a reason. With the exception of a few years in the early 2000's, McDonald's executives have been very good stewards of their shareholders' capital. Sadly, the same cannot be said for Burger King's leadership over the past 10 years and the latest developments will do little, in our view, to enhance the company's reputation.

    The Burger King brand has been a cash cow that has lined the coffers of several different firms such as Pillsbury, Grand Met, and Diageo from 1989 through 2002. Private equity firm TPG Capital and others got in on the act from 2002 through 2006. From 2006 through 2010, PE firms tried to cash out while the company was public but, ultimately, the chain failed to gain fundamental momentum and 3G Capital took it over.

    Now, 3G plans to list Burger King on the New York Stock Exchange, in a complex deal that will result in the private equity firm owning 71% of Burger King with the rest owned by Justice Holdings, a special purpose acquisition company owned in part by financier Bill Ackman and his hedge fund, Pershing Square Capital.

    Our view is that the overriding motivation of several owners throughout the years, and now 3G Capital, has been to starve the brand of capital in order to pay parent shareholders nice and quickly. Burger King's issues may be so substantial that the chain may be "too big to fix", at least in the near term. By our reckoning, the last two private equity firms that have taken ownership of the company have deprived it of $1 billion or more in capital that could have been used to improve the company's relative standing versus its competitors, many of whom Burger King now struggles to keep up with.

    The least favorable comparison for Burger King is McDonald's. Between 2002 and 2011, McDonald's (MCD) has spent between $5 billion and $6 billion in capital expenditures on its U.S. business alone. While McDonald's system is still in the process of being upgraded and does include some stores in need of remodeling, a plan is in place and the system has not been starved of capital as Burger King's has.

    However, despite the continuous issues that have dogged the chain, its owners of 18 months have claimed that Burger King is back. Somehow, having invested no capital into fixing the business, its problems have been resolved.

    Ask yourself how many of your own problems you've solved by ignoring them. Not many. Not only has 3G Capital not invested any capital in the company, it sucked $295 million out of the business last year. The evidence for the company being back, in terms of its fundamental performance, is four months of positive same-store sales during the most favorable weather the restaurant industry has seen in years. Before this recent period, comps were negative for three years.

    There are very few industries that are more competitive than the quick service segment of the restaurant industry. Consumer tastes are constantly changing and barriers to entry are low. The dramatic changes that have taken place within the industry over the past ten years underscore that point. The bar has been risen in terms of the consumer experience at every stage of the process; Chipotle's (CMG) "assembly-line" ordering, Starbucks' (SBUX) look and feel, and Domino's online ordering experience are three examples of companies making the necessary investment to capture share.