出售风云：我们如何把公司卖给惠普
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只要鼓起全部勇气，我们就决不会失败。 — 威廉•莎士比亚，《麦克白》 这是探讨战略性业务开发之重要性的系列文章的结局篇（前四部分参见 I, II ，III and IV）。 在前一部分中，我描述了在自动化软件供应商Opsware每年我们都会抛开琐事，与董事会一起对公司的现状进行战略评估。2005年11月，我们的结论是继续独立运营，但到了2007年初，我们的评估结论却大相径庭。公司业务强劲，然而达到每季度的预期绝非易事，公司的成长和所达到的市场领先地位也并没有在股票市场上给我们带来回报。我们走到了这样一个决策的时间节点：投入更多资金进行研发和销售拓展，还是尝试出售公司。我们决定走后一条路，但必须为股东赢得足够高的售价。 大戏上演：2007年5月 二月份，我们照常与主要企业信息技术公司举行业务更新会晤，他们的收购兴趣导致了数次后续会谈。关键是找到某家公司，让它开价。5月22日，我们向董事会汇报进展。代号为“1号公司”的某个企业刚刚提出每股11美元的收购价。那是38%的溢价——不错，但还不够好。我们再一次讨论：如果继续运营我们面临什么样机会、风险，而股东价值如何体现。反复讨论的焦点就是：我们该还价多少？ 最终的决定向所有有意竞购公司的人发出了强烈信号：我们告诉1号公司，董事会拒绝了每股11美元的报价，而且不会认真考虑任何14美元以下的报价。这样我们也等于告诉其它和我们进行后续会谈的公司【普惠（HP）和其它几家公司】，我们已经收到收购要约，但不会贱卖公司，正可谓是一箭双雕。但14美元的价格有高达75%的溢价，1号公司、普惠和其它所有人都选择了退出。我们则发出信函要求所有公司退回或销毁我们与之共享的公司材料。退出的黄粱美梦看来就是美梦而已了。我们将继续又一个季度的艰苦跋涉。 然而差不多一个月之后，1号公司率先服软，将收购价增加到每股13.25美元。太棒了！接近我们的心理价位了！我们重新召集董事会，实事求是地严肃讨论，是继续运营还是在这个价格附近出售公司。我们的分析表明，只有收入年增长75%以上，才能实现15美元的股价。这个目标很难实现：当时华尔街的一致预测也不过28%。 除了考虑上行空间，我们还讨论了独立运营的风险。（请注意第6条，宏观经济放缓：我们完全没有想到几个月之后这个风险就会如此巨大而真实。） |
But screw your courage to the sticking-place, and we'll not fail. — William Shakespeare, Macbeth This is the final post in a series dealing with the importance of strategic business development (Here are Parts I, II, III and IV). In my last post, I described how, at Opsware, we would step back from the fray about once a year to go through a strategic review of our situation with the board. In November 2005, our conclusion was to keep on building an independent company, but in early 2007 another review led us to a different conclusion. Our business was strong, but meeting quarterly expectations was difficult and the market wasn't rewarding us for the growth and leading market position we had achieved. We were at a decision point: Plow even more money into R&D and sales expansion or explore a sale. We decided to explore a sale, but only if we could achieve a top-dollar price for our shareholders. The dance begins: May 2007 Our February update meetings with the major enterprise IT players had piqued their interest and led to several follow-ups. The key was to get someone to set an initial price. On May 22, we went back to the Opsware board with an update. A company we'll call Company 1 had just offered to buy the company for $11/share. That was a 38% premium—good, but not exceptional. Once again, we discussed the opportunities, risks and shareholder value implications of continuing in the business. We debated long and hard: What was our number? We decided to send a strong message to anyone considering us as a target: We told Company 1 that the Board had rejected its $11/share offer and would not give serious consideration to any new offer below $14/share. For good measure, we took the opportunity to notify the other companies who'd followed up with us (HP and several others) that we'd received an offer but were not interested in discussing any deal below $14. Since that was a 75% premium over our current price, Company 1, HP and everyone else told us they were out. We sent all of them letters requesting the return or destruction of any information we had shared. Those brief dreams of exit seemed to be just that—dreams. We went back to the slog of making yet another quarter. Then, almost a month later, the CEO of Company 1 came back offering $13.25/share. Yes! We were getting close to our magic number! We reconvened the board for a serious, fact-based discussion of staying the course versus selling in this price range. Our analysis suggested we would have to grow revenues at least 75% annually to exceed $15/share. That seemed impossible—Wall Street consensus was 28%. In addition to upside opportunities, we discussed the risks of staying standalone. (Note #6, macroeconomic slowdown: We had no idea how real a risk that would turn out to be just months later.) |
