摩根大通会因“伦敦鲸”而“洗大澡”吗？

    摩根大通可能会跃入“澡盆”。有人想知道，该行会不会因为“伦敦鲸”交易亏损而在接下来的业绩报告中来个“洗大澡”(big bath)呢？所谓的“洗大澡”是一个会计术语，是指为了让后期业绩更好看而夸大当期亏损的会计手段。

    本周二，杰米•戴蒙再次在国会就摩根大通旗下风险管理部门在仅一个多月的时间里造成20亿美元巨额亏损一事作证，不过这次是在众议院金融服务委员会（House Financial Services Committee）前作证。

    和上次听证会类似，摩根大通首席执行官这次也不大可能就损失可能扩大的程度透露更多信息。不过很多人认为相关损失已经大幅扩大。问题是，当该行在一个多月后公布第二财季业绩时，它会不会采取保守做法并宣布相关的最终交易亏损可能很大？或者，反之的话，它会不会尽量去淡化“伦敦鲸”所在的首席投资办公室造成的这笔亏损？

    银行在公布交易业绩方面通常会有一定的回旋余地。根据市值计价会计准则，它们应对所有股票、债券以及衍生产品根据当前市场价格进行估值。有个问题是，有些投资资产并不经常交易。这样一来，银行就可以按照自己的判断来对这部分资产进行估值。摩根大通这些亏损交易的标的资产据称是复杂而流动性较低的衍生品。因此，如果该行采取灵活的估值方法，戴蒙能轻而易举地予以辩护。

    对摩根大通来说，当期尽量夸大交易损失，即在账务处理上“洗个大澡”是有好处的。该行历史上就有过对亏损估算采取保守做法的先例。比如说，摩根大通曾对其表内有政府担保的部分逾期抵押贷款进行了账面亏损处理。尽管这些贷款几乎算是万无一失，就算出现亏损也能从政府那得到补偿。而其他银行就没有对类似这样的贷款做账面亏损处理。

    如果摩根大通对“伦敦鲸”所做的交易也采取类似的保守估计，即对相关投资失策可能给该行造成的损失按预估区间高端计入当期，而如果这些交易产生的实际损失又并不像该行预计得那么糟糕的话，摩根大通的后期盈利则将获得提振。确实，戴蒙在之前提到交易损失时所表现出的直言不讳已经使一些人感到吃惊了。有人已经质疑，为什么他一开始就没有试图隐瞒这些亏损呢？

    不过，想要淡化这些亏损的话，摩根大通手里也有利器。上周，戴蒙透露该行首席投资办公室的投资组合中有70亿美元的未实现收益。该行可以抛售投资组合中的一部分获利头寸从而降低首席投资办公室造成的亏损。低于预期的总体亏损额有利于消除投资者对该行首席投资办公室的忧虑情绪。在未来一段时间内，分析师、投资者和监管层都很可能会密切关注该行首席投资办公室。

    JPMorgan Chase (JPM) could be headed for the tub. Some are wondering if the bank could take a so-called big bath - an accounting term for exaggerating losses in order to benefit later - on the London Whale's trading red ink.

    Jamie Dimon is testifying in front of Congress again on Tuesday, this time for the House Financial Services Committee, about how a unit of his bank that is charged with risk management was able to lose $2 billion in a little over a month.

    As with last week's hearing, JPMorgan's CEO is not likely to say more about how big the loss could get - though many think it has mushroomed. The question is whether JPMorgan will choose to be conservative when it reports its second quarter earnings about a month from now and say the trading loss could end up being large or instead try to make the red ink in the chief investment office, which is where the London Whale works, look as small as possible.

    Banks have a certain amount of leeway when reporting trading results. They are supposed to use so-called mark-to-market accounting, under which they would value all stocks, bonds and derivatives at current market prices. The problem is that some investments don't trade regularly. In those instances, banks can use their own judgment. JPMorgan's losing trades were reportedly in complex, illiquid derivatives, so Dimon could easily defend a more flexible approach to assigning value.

    There might be an advantage for JPMorgan to make the trading losses look as big as possible, taking a so-called big bath. JPMorgan has a history of being conservative about losses. For instance, JPMorgan has recorded losses on its books on some delinquent mortgage loans that are backed by government guarantees, even though it's almost certain to get its money back on those loans from Uncle Sam. Other banks have not taken a loss on similar loans.

    If JPMorgan were to take a conservative estimate on the London Whale's trades, recording the high-end of the range of what the misstep could cost the bank, JPMorgan could get an earnings boost later if the trades don't turn out to be as disastrous as the bank predicts. Indeed, Dimon has surprised some people about how vocal he has been about the trading losses. Some have questioned why he didn't try to bury the losses from the start.

    Nonetheless, JPMorgan has a number of different levers it could pull if it wants to make the loss as small as possible. Last week, Dimon said that the bank's chief investment office has $7 billion in unrealized gains in its portfolio. The bank could sell off some of those profitable positions to limit the losses in its CIO unit. A smaller than expected overall loss in that unit could quell some fears about the CIO office, which is likely to be under intense focus from analysts, investors and regulators for some time.