StubHub: 一个金点子的解剖

    通过高科技赚钱是杰夫•弗勒的主业。现年38岁的弗勒是旧金山门票转让、交换网站StubHub.com的联合创始人。2007年，弗勒将公司作价3.1亿美元卖给购物网站易趣（Ebay）。尝到甜头之后，他的二次出击是Spreecast.com，这家社交视频网站试图在网上实现面对面的亲密交谈。下面就是他的故事：我的父亲（扎卡里）是美国电话电报公司（AT&T）的电器工程师，我的母亲（劳拉）在曼哈顿的女装设计师寄卖店上班。那家店是我外祖父的产业，后来交给我母亲打理。父亲退休之后开了一家商业房地产保安公司，所以我们家有创业精神的血脉。

    1996年我从宾夕法尼亚大学（University of Pennsylvania）毕业后的第一份工作是在黑石集团（Blackstone Group），那是纽约的一家大型金融服务公司。我以为，进入投行就能学会如何对公司估值。黑石主要涉足传统的制造业，那是杠杆收购的乐园，只是我对这些不感兴趣。我在分析师的工作中增长了见识，但最终决定在高科技的相关行业寻找机会。

    90年代晚期，互联网正风生水起，浏览器公司网景（Netscape）、雅虎（Yahoo）和易趣都刚刚新鲜出炉。我决定搬到旧金山，加入专注于科技行业的私募股权公司Thomas Weisel Partners。此后，由于对商业和技术的兴趣，我决定自己创业。在我看来，进商学院深造是实现这个转变的好途径，不济可以建立关系网，课余时间还可以为我的创业公司设计商业计划。于是我在1999年成为斯坦福大学（Stanford）商学院的研究生。

    我起初不能确定自己的目标，这时我认识了同学埃里克•贝克，他也在金融机构工作过。我们讨论共同的创业兴趣，交换意见，探讨那些急需改变的行业。埃里克的父亲拥有NBA湖人队（Lakers）的季票，我父亲则有职棒大联盟扬基队（Yankees）的季票。大量的赛事、影院和音乐会的门票都没有投入使用，而转售门票的票务中介市场高度分散，于是我们看到了商机。

    不过这个行业名声不佳，人们觉得从黄牛党手里买票就会挨宰。但我们认为在网上买卖门票还是有机会。我为此写出一个商业计划，参加斯坦福的商业计划大赛并成为入选决赛的六个计划之一。但我们决定开办公司，不想让别人占得先机，于是退出了比赛。

    我们开始找关系，向音乐和体育行业的高管兜售我们的想法，最后成功地拉到了投资。到2000年8月，我们已经为StubHub筹集了60万美元的种子基金。我们就是票务方面的易趣。卖家根据市场需求定价，可以偏离票面价值。我们则按百分比对每次交易收费：买家交10%，卖家交15%。最初的60万美元足够让我们推出测试版，进入市场，学习和尝试各种新想法。种子基金来自家人和朋友，但下一步的筹款就很艰难了。

    公司在2000年3月成立，恰逢互联网泡沫破碎之后。我们的第二轮筹资遭到很多人的拒绝。最终我们会晤的天使投资人、风投公司和其它人士超过50家。

    我离开学校去管理公司，担任首席执行官。埃里克留在学校继续攻读学位，2001年毕业后成为公司总裁。这是公司的第二年，雇员20到30人，下一年就增加到快乐60人。等到我们在2007年向易趣出售公司时，雇员已经多达350到400人。

    2004年，埃里克和我对公司的前景产生了分歧。他看重和职业运动联盟的合作，想利用他们的品牌来树立我们自己的品牌。而我觉得我们应该专注于自己建立品牌，于是我们决定分道扬镳。他作为联合创始人保留股份，但要离开公司。我们在2005年实现正的现金流，收入约5,000万美元。公司迅速成长，炙手可热，但我们仍然面临挑战。

    有10到15个州的法律明文规定了对门票转售的价格限制，在票面价值上附加固定数额或者百分比作为限定。公司收到数封各州总检察长的来信，暗示我们可能违规。我们辩称公司并非卖家，用户才是卖家。最终，总检察长们并没有对公司提起诉讼。但我们还雇用了说客，成功地促使纽约、佛罗里达和宾州改变了相关法律。

    另一个挑战来自票务巨头Ticketmaster，他们看不惯我们以及我们的商业模式。他们宣称，转售门票的活动侵犯了他们与演出地点或艺术家的合同权利。但在我掌管公司期间，他们从未付诸法律，只是发来投诉信。

    Making money through technology is Jeff Fluhr's stock-in-trade. Fluhr, 38, was the co-founder of San Francisco's StubHub.com, an online ticket marketplace where fans buy and sell from each other. Fluhr sold it to eBay in 2007 for $310 million. Now he's trying for an encore with the launch of Spreecast.com, a social video platform designed to bring the intimacy of face-to-face conversations online. Here's his story:

    After I graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1996, my first job was at the Blackstone Group (BX), a large financial services firm in New York. I decided that going into investment banking would be a great way to learn how to evaluate companies. Blackstone dealt with old-school manufacturing businesses, which were good for leveraged buyouts, but it wasn't interesting to me. I was an analyst and learned a lot, but decided to look for something that was more in the technology world.

    In the late 1990s the Internet was coming into its own. Netscape, Yahoo (YHOO, Fortune 500), and eBay (EBAY, Fortune 500) started, and I decided to move to San Francisco to work for Thomas Weisel Partners, a private equity firm that worked with tech companies. After a while, with my interest in business and technology, I decided to start a company of my own. I thought going to business school would be a great way to pivot, network with people, and have time to develop a business plan for a startup. So in 1999 I enrolled in Stanford's graduate school of business.

    I wasn't sure what I wanted to do, but I met Eric Baker, another student who'd also worked at financial institutions. We talked about our mutual interest in starting a company and different ideas about industries that were ripe for change. Eric's dad was a season ticket holder for the Lakers, and my dad for the Yankees. We talked about the large quantity of tickets for sporting events, theater events, and concerts that weren't used, and the fragmented market of ticket brokers who resold those tickets.

    It was a stigmatized business, with the perception that you'd get scammed if you bought a ticket from a scalper. But we thought there might be an opportunity for buying and selling tickets online. I wrote the idea up as a business plan for Stanford's business plan competition, and we were chosen as one of the six finalists. But we pulled out because we decided to start the company and didn't want competition before we got going.

    We started networking, talked to executives in the music and sports industries, and found investors. By August 2000 we had raised $600,000 of seed capital for StubHub. It would be an eBay for tickets. Sellers would set the price, more or less than a ticket's face value, depending on market demand. We'd take a percentage on every transaction -- 10% from the buyer and 15% from the seller. That first $600,000 was enough to get us to our beta product, get into the market, and learn and test different features. The seed money came from family and friends, but the next level was more difficult.

    We had incorporated in March 2000, and right after that the dotcom bubble burst. As we went to raise our second round of funding, a lot of people said no. So we had to meet with more than 50 angel investors, venture capital firms, and others.

    Eric stayed at Stanford to get his degree, but I left to become CEO and run the company. When he graduated in 2001, he joined as president. We had about 20 to 30 employees our second year, 60 people the next. By the time we sold to eBay in 2007, there were 350 to 400 employees.

    In 2004, Eric and I had a difference in vision. He wanted to focus on partnerships with leagues, using their brands to build our brand. I felt we should concentrate on building our own brand, so both of us decided to part ways. He kept his share as co-founder and left the company. We got to cash flow positive in 2005, and revenue was about $50 million. We became a hot company growing rapidly, but there were still challenges.

    Ten or 15 states had laws that restricted the amount you could charge to resell a ticket, either citing a fixed dollar amount over face value or a cap on the percentage over face value. We got letters from a few state attorneys general implying that we might not be in compliance. We argued that we weren't the sellers of the tickets, the users were. No attorney general ever filed a claim against the company. We actually hired some lobbyists and were successful in changing the laws in states like New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania.

    Another challenge was Ticketmaster, which didn't like us or our business model. They said we were infringing on their contracts with venues or performing artists by reselling tickets. They never took legal action during my time but sent letters of complaint.