收购赔钱，惠普CEO替董事会喊冤

    英美纳税人如果希望今年过节期间（甚至一直到明年）多花点钱，他们或许会很高兴了解到，因为惠普（Hewlett-Packard）收购软件公司Autonomy现在已经弄得一团糟，他们的这个愿望有可能会实现。

    上周，惠普要求美国证券交易委员会（SEC）和英国严重诈骗调查局（Serious Fraud Office）立案调查在2011年10月惠普收购Autonomy之前，后者是否存在不当会计行为。美国联邦调查局（FBI）和美国证券交易委员会早已经开始动用纳税人的资源。

    2011年11月21日，惠普CEO梅格•惠特曼曾宣称Autonomy公司在惠普“2012年发展计划中列于优先位置的第1、第2和第3”。除了新任董事拉尔夫•维特沃斯，这一届董事会当时都看好这桩并购。2012年11月20日，惠特曼宣布对这桩2011年的收购交易减记88亿美元，减记幅度高达85%。

    上周的惠普季度分析师电话会议犹如一场梦魇，惠特曼启动防御，竭力维护备受抨击的董事会。无论是在电话会议上，还是在随后接受消费者新闻与财经电视频道（CNBC）和Marketplace的采访中，惠特曼都拿出上法庭的架势来应对，用标准的套话来回应对董事会的指责。不是科技套话，而是公司治理套话。套话的核心词是什么？“依赖”。

    “听到这个消息，我们很失望，”惠特曼告诉消费者新闻与财经电视频道，但“担任董事会职务只能这么干。你得依赖管理层的建议和（经审计的）财务数据，”她说。“我当时投票赞成这桩收购，但我们就是干这个的。”她的谨慎措辞将董事会描绘成受害者，董事会遭到指责时通常都会用这样的方式来保护自己。

董事会到底是干什么的？

    但依赖管理层必须有一个限度。特别是在大型交易和并购中，董事会需要考虑其他意见，仔细权衡其他选择。在这桩交易于2011年10月完成前，惠普董事长瑞•莱恩曾出现在《信息周刊》（Information Week）的一次会议上。“Autonomy是唯一的答案，”他说。“他们是独一无二的。”

    不久后，甲骨文（Oracle）发布新闻稿披露了此前与Autonomy创始人迈克•林奇的协商谈判：“甲骨文拒绝出价，因为Autonomy当前60亿美元的市值太高了，”一份新闻稿称。（惠普出价103亿美元。）

    当时其他的估值意见与甲骨文更为接近。“这样的出价似乎不太理性，”Peel Hunt分析师保罗•莫兰德告诉《金融时报》(Financial Times)，称惠普支付的79%溢价“不可思议，被收购公司今年上半年的利润增长仅6%。”据消费者新闻与财经电视频道报道，2011年7月甚至在惠普还没有宣布这桩收购交易前，卖空者吉姆•查诺斯就发布了一份详细的报告，对Autonomy的账簿、信息披露和未来股价走势表示了担忧。

    即便是惠普管理层，也并不是一致支持这桩交易。事实上，CFO凯希•莱斯加克就曾坚决反对这桩收购，惠特曼后来任命她负责惠普的并购尽职调查。据《财富》杂志记者詹姆斯•班得勒和多瑞斯•博克的文章，莱斯加克曾告诉董事会：“我认为这家公司太贵了，”，还说“收购不符合公司的最佳利益。”

    U.S. and UK taxpayers looking to spend some extra dollars on behalf of corporations during the holidays (and into next year) will be pleased to know that Hewlett-Packard's bungled acquisition of software firm Autonomy has made that possible.

    Last week, HP asked both the SEC and the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office to open investigations into possible accounting improprieties that may have occurred at Autonomy prior to HP's purchase of the firm in October 2011. Taxpayer resources at both the FBI and SEC are already at work.

    On November 21, 2011, CEO Meg Whitman had touted Autonomy as HP's "priority #1, 2 and 3 for 2012." The entire current HP board, excluding new board member Ralph Whitworth, blessed the purchase. On November 20, 2012, Whitman announced an 85%, $8.8 billion write-down of the 2011 acquisition.

    As last week's HP (HPQ) quarterly analyst call unfolded like a bad dream, Whitman set the beleaguered board's defense in motion. On the call and in follow up interviews on CNBC and Marketplace, Whitman fashioned her court-ready responses to questions on the board's culpability in a geek code. Not technology geek, but governance geek. The code word in this case? "Rely."

    "We are disappointed by the news," Whitman told CNBC. But "that is what you do when you are on a board. You rely on the recommendations of management and the [audited] financials," she said. "I voted for this deal but we are where we are." Her carefully crafted words cast the board as the victim, wrapping it in a protective shield that directors most often use when they are sued.

Where was the board?

    But reliance on management has its limits. Particularly in large transactions and M&A situations, boards need to take into account other views and carefully weigh alternatives. Before the deal closed in October 2011, HP chair Ray Lane appeared at an Information Week gathering. "Autonomy was the only answer," he said. "They are unique."

    Not long after, Oracle issued press releases describing its earlier talks with Autonomy founder Mike Lynch: "Oracle refused to make an offer because Autonomy's current market value of $6 billion was way too high," one of the releases stated. (HP had offered $10.3 billion.)

    Other views on the valuation were closer to Oracle's. "This bid seems to defy logic," Peel Hunt analyst Paul Morland told the Financial Times, characterizing the 79% premium HP paid as "an 'amazing' premium for a company whose earnings grew by just 6 per cent in the first half of the year." And in July 2011, before HP even announced the acquisition, short seller Jim Chanos issued a detailed report citing concerns about Autonomy's books, disclosures, and future trajectory, according to CNBC.

    But even HP management was not unanimously supportive of the deal. In fact, CFO Cathy Lesjak, who Whitman later appointed to oversee M&A due diligence at HP, took a firm stand against the acquisition. According to Fortune'sJames Bandler and Doris Burke, Lesjak told the board, "I think it's too expensive," and, "This is not in the best interests of the company."