塞浦路斯形势恶化

    连续占据媒体头条近两周之后，许多人渴望弹丸之地的塞浦路斯岛不久之后即从全球金融媒体的视线中悄然淡出，恢复从前的隐秘。要达到这种状态，针对塞浦路斯的最新救助方案必须要行得通。然而，这个方案的前景面临高度不确定性——确立了欧元区稳定局面的主要因素逐步发生了转移；同时也加剧了人们对欧洲其他小型经济体状况以及更广泛的区域经济和金融稳定性等问题的担忧。

    正如大多数读者所知，欧盟和国际货币基金组织（IMF）官员最初为塞浦路斯制定的救助计划出现了重大失误。意识到这一政策失误，经过一番罕见的（并且是毫不掩饰的）推诿责任表演之后，他们在本周一又手忙脚乱地制定了一个新的救助计划。从技术层面上说，新计划更具有可行性，但真要执行起来还是会遭遇种种考验。

    第二轮救助方案恢复了受保银行存款（即低于10万欧元的存款额）享有的惯常保障，避免了对银行系统存款“一刀切”的征税计划，转而选择了更为明智的针对特定存款实体的征税方式。同时，在资本结构上，新方案提出的责任分担分配更符合常识，包括让债券持有人和其他优先债权人承担严重亏损。

    鉴于塞浦路斯当前的严重局势，加之官方债权人不愿作出承诺让纳税人再次承担新一轮大规模融资的负担，新的救助方案显示了另外一个显著且极不寻常的特征——即对非受保银行存款统一实行比例相当高的扣减。部分初步迹象表明，在某间问题最为严重的银行，这些存款的扣减率可能高达80%，另一间银行的扣减率则为40%。

    至于官员们需要两轮磋商来制定出对某个国家的救助方案，这种事情并非闻所未闻。这种情形在过去已出现若干次，包括1995年对墨西哥以及1999年对韩国的救助。这次的不同寻常之处在于，第二轮方案紧随第一轮，接踵而至。究其原因，除了设计不足之外，还有普遍的救助疲劳以及越来越严重的协调问题等等，凸显了必须予以密切监控的四大不确定性。

    第一，随着政府重新开放银行业务（定于28日重开），塞浦路斯救援计划将迎来考验。保持救助计划实施过程的有序、透明和持续性至关重要。不过说白了，在银行挤兑风潮和不断扩大的街头抗议不断冲击人们视觉的情况下，这个摇摇欲坠的救助方案最终可能还是行不通。

    这样就涉及到第二种不确定性：政府是否能够保持一整套资产管制措施，阻止人们将资金撤离塞浦路斯；同时，还不能让普遍存在的物资匮乏、囤积居奇以及黑市交易扼杀了原本就在苦苦挣扎的经济，这一点同样至关重要。

    要设计和实施一系列功能完善的资本管制措施是有难度的。重要的是，塞浦路斯政府还需传递这么一个信息：这些管制措施只是暂时性的、可以撤销的。作为单一货币欧元区的一份子， 塞浦路斯无法通过货币贬值来重新调整价格，以便激励、限制伴随资本管制措施的必然漏损。

    Many are hoping that, after dominating the headlines for almost two weeks now, the tiny island of Cyprus will soon return to virtual obscurity in the global financial media. For this to happen, the latest country rescue package needs to hold. Yet prospects are highly uncertain -- confirming a gradual shift in power in Europe and fueling concerns for the wellbeing of other small European economies, as well as the broader economic and financial stability of the region.

    As most readers know, officials from Europe and the IMF badly bungled the first attempt at rescuing Cyprus. Realizing the policy slippage, and after a rather unusual (and quite public) blame game, they scrambled and came up on Monday with a new package. While technically more plausible, it faces considerable implementation challenges.

    The second rescue restored the usual safeguards enjoyed by insured bank deposits (i.e., those below EUR 100,000). It eschewed a rather blunt generalized approach to the banking system, opting instead for a more sensible entity-specific one. And it incorporated more common sense in allocating burden sharing on the capital structure, including imposing severe losses on bond holders and other senior creditors.

    In light of the severity of the Cypriot situation, and given official creditors' hesitation to commit their taxpayers to another large financing, the new rescue involved another notable, and highly unusual feature -- that of very significant haircuts on uninsured bank deposits. Partial initial indications suggest that these could be as high as 80% for the most problematic bank, and 40% for another.

    It is not unheard of for officials to need two rounds to rescue a country. Indeed, it was the case for several cases in the past, including Mexico in 1995 and Korea in 1999. What is unusual is that, this time around, the second round came so quickly after the first. The reasons for this speak to more than inadequate design, generalized bailout fatigue, and mounting coordination problems. They also highlight four areas of major uncertainties that warrant close monitoring.

    The first test for the Cypriot rescue will come as soon as the government reopens the country's banks (currently scheduled for tomorrow). It is critical that this process be orderly, transparent and sustained. Put bluntly, the already shaky rescue package will not survive persistent images of bank runs and widening street protests.

    This speaks to the second uncertainty: whether the government is able to maintain a set of capital controls that dissuades people from pulling their money out of the country while at the same time, and this is critical, not totally choking an already-struggling economy via widespread shortages, hoarding, and black markets.

    Well-functioning capital controls are difficult to design and implement. Importantly, the Cypriot government needs to convey that these controls are both temporary and reversible. And this is very hard to do when, being part of the single currency eurozone, it cannot depreciate its currency as a means of realigning price incentives and limiting the inevitable leakages that accompany capital controls.