改变中国医疗服务的新势力

    刚刚早上八点，当年由西方传教士创建、目前依然是中国最大的医疗中心的仁济医院（Renji Hospital）就已经人满为患。医院候诊区挤满了焦急等待就诊的患者。首先，他们得在一块巨大的霓虹广告牌下面排长队取号，上面列着了医生们的科室信息。然后，患者们还要排起蜿蜒的队伍交费，最后还得排更长的队伍，等着到油漆脱落的诊室里就诊。中国基础医疗系统匮乏，这样的情景日复一日，每天都在上演。中国的医疗服务虽然便宜，但尚处于起步阶段：如果你患上任何一种疾病，小到感冒大到癌症，都必须去急诊室接受治疗。

    而在距离仁济医院急诊室不到100码的一栋现代化大楼里，我们可以瞥见未来中国的医疗服务。这里是贵宾特需门诊，也就是所谓的VIP医院。在VIP大楼里，患者不需要排队，而是可以坐在舒适的真皮沙发上，看着宽屏电视等着预约的医生。不同于仁济医院普通门诊区的嘈杂喧嚣，VIP门诊区噪声低到几乎可以忽略不计。身穿洁白制服的护士会陪同患者走进私人诊室。人们在仁济医院很难看上的专家，在这里却可以预约——但要支付预约费用。VIP医院的医生每次会诊的费用是60美元甚至更高，而这在马路对面可以看50次医生。

    为了帮助支付这样的VIP待遇（和治疗），越来越多的中国消费者开始选择附加健康保险——这纯粹是美国人的理念。而讽刺的是，虽然中国对各种理财服务的需求急剧增加，但据麦肯锡公司（McKinsey & Co）统计，外国公司在中国银行与保险市场所占的份额仅有2%。国有保险公司在中国市场占据着主导地位，以至于因为收入下滑，纽约人寿保险公司（New York Life）在去年不得不放弃自己在中国的合资公司，转而把它出售给日本的三井住友保险公司（Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance）

    但来自美国康涅狄格州布洛姆菲尔德的信诺集团（Cigna）却正在悄悄赢得中国消费者的青睐。很大程度上这是因为它颠覆了其他美国保险公司在中国的传统做法。信诺于2003年进入中国市场，但它选择的合作伙伴并不是当地的保险公司，而是一家领先的零售——银行中国招商银行（China Merchants Bank）。招商银行以灵活应对消费者的手段而著称。招商信诺（信诺与招商银行的合资企业——译注）并没有招聘大批成本相对较高的销售人员，而是进行创意营销，成立了配备最新数据挖掘技术的电话营销中心，推出由电影明星代言的电视广告，同时进行在线和社交媒体营销，借此逐渐在中国市场站稳了脚跟。销售人员所产生的巨额日常管理费用令许多公司背上了沉重负担。去年，招商信诺在中国的收入达到了3.31亿美元，比上一年增加了32%（虽然与信诺集团290亿美元的总销售额相比仍微不足道）。经过十年的经营，这家公司刚刚在中国售出了第100万份保单。仅仅经过三年，公司就实现了收支平衡，目前已经能够稳定盈利。

    By 8 a.m., Renji Hospital, founded in 1848 by Western missionaries and still one of China's best medical centers, is already in a state of chaos. A veritable sea of patients is crammed into the reception area, waiting impatiently to see a doctor. They first line up under giant neon boards that list physicians' specialties to collect a number on a waiting list, then join another snaking line at a cashier's window, and finally shuffle into even longer queues to wait for a doctor to see them in examination rooms with chipping paint. This scene is played out daily across China, which has a limited primary health care system. Medical services are cheap but rudimentary: If you have any malady, from a bad cold to cancer, you must go to the emergency room to seek medical treatment.

    But in a modern building less than 100 yards from the main Renji emergency ward is a glimpse at China's future. It is the guibin texu, known more commonly by its English translation: VIP hospital. In the VIP building, patients don't line up but wait for appointments on leather sofas, entertained by widescreen TVs. Instead of the shouting heard at Renji's main hospital, the noise level in the VIP section remains an understated murmur. Patients are escorted into private examination rooms by nurses in crisp white uniforms. The specialists who are so very hard to see at Renji are now suddenly available by appointment -- for a price. The physicians at the VIP hospital charge $60 or more for a consultation, 50 times what patients pay across the road.

    To help pay for such VIP treatment (and treatments), a growing number of Chinese consumers are turning to supplemental health insurance -- a thoroughly American concept. The irony is that despite soaring demand for various financial services, foreign firms have just 2% of the banking and insurance market, according to McKinsey & Co. State-owned insurance companies dominate the market to such extent that last year New York Life abandoned its China joint venture, selling out to Japanese firm Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance because of slumping earnings.

    But one U.S. firm, Bloomfield, Conn.-based Cigna (CI), is quietly winning over Chinese consumers, largely by defying conventional wisdom about how an American insurer should operate in China. Cigna entered the China market in 2003, partnering not with a local insurer but with a leading retail lender, China Merchants Bank, which is known for its deft handling of consumers. Rather than deploying an army of relatively expensive salesmen, which has burdened many other firms with a huge overhead, the Cigna joint venture has instead deployed innovative marketing, call centers equipped with the latest data-mining techniques, television commercials featuring a movie star pitchman, and online and social media sales to gain a growing foothold in the Chinese market. Last year Cigna's joint venture in China had revenues of $331 million, up 32% from the year before (though still a small fraction of the company's overall $29 billion in sales). After a decade of operation, the firm just sold its 1 millionth policy in China. The business broke even after just three years and is now solidly in the black.