给埃及新统治者的9条建议

    仅仅两年半的时间里，埃及开始了第三次基本上无计划的政府过渡。第四次可能将在数月后爆发（希望届时的规划能够更加有序）。

    无论从字面理解，还是从形势判断，这场政府过渡对埃及这个有着悠久和自豪历史的国家而言都是一个棘手的复杂阶段，而它影响的远不止既渴望撷取改革丰硕果实、又不愿陷入国内冲突的8,500万埃及人。

    未来几周，埃及人将要花大力气举行总统和议会选举、修改宪法、巩固国家制度。事实上，这些都是迫切需要进行的工作。要持久有序地脱离军队控制、恢复民主统治，所有这些工作都是必要的，但还不够。

    这一次，为了提高统治过渡的成功率，埃及武装力量（现掌控埃及）和政治家们（再次成为统治权切换的接收方）可能会欣然考虑以下9点建议。这些见解是根据埃及的新旧历史和国际经验而提出的。

    孤立地看，在还未到来的另一场微妙和极具危险性的过渡中，这里的每一条见解都将给埃及带来潜在的利益。而这些见解的潜在累积效应更重要。实际上，这些见解的集合效果远大于单个的累加，而今天的埃及正需要利用所有可能的资源，以成功驾驭这个仍然充满挑战、不确定性以及潜在危险的短期前景。

    统治公信力不能再靠上天赐予，它需要每天努力地争取。

    古埃及时期，执政精英们面对的真正困难是如何获得权力。一旦拥有了权力，整个国家机器（以及当时繁荣昌盛的特权阶级和裙带资本主义）会从根本上进入维持现状的状态，无论执政者们表现如何都将一如既往地运作。

    但今非昔比。

    如今，埃及的统治者们，不论是平民还是军队，都需要极频繁地努力去争取、维护大多数公民的信任。他们现在面对的公民曾在压迫以及恐怖文化下生活了太久，现在终于有资格、有权力去影响国家的命运。事实上，民众当家作主的感觉在埃及很少能如此清晰可见。

    Egypt is navigating its third, largely unplanned government transition in just two and a half years. A fourth one is likely to be months away (and hopefully better planned).

    Almost by definition, and certainly by force of circumstances, this is an inherently tricky phase in the country's proud and long history; and its consequences extend well beyond the 85 million Egyptians eager both to harvest the fruits of their inspiring revolution and to avoid a slide into civil conflict.

    In the coming weeks, a lot of effort will be focused on -- indeed, should urgently be devoted to -- holding presidential and parliamentary elections, revising the constitution, and strengthening the country's institutions. All this is all necessary for a durable and orderly transition away from military and back to democratic rule; but it is not sufficient.

    To enhance the probability of success this time around, Egypt's armed forces (now in charge of the country) and the politicians (again set to receive the governing handoff) may wish to consider the following nine insights. These are drawn from the country's history, old and recent, as well as international experience.

    On a standalone basis, each insight would offer Egypt potential benefits during yet another delicate and potentially precarious transition. Their would-be cumulative impact is even more important. Indeed, the collective gain could well be much larger than the sum of the individual parts. And today's Egypt needs to secure every possible advantage to successfully navigate what is still a challenging, uncertain and potentially hazardous short-term outlook.

    Governance credibility is no longer bestowed; it needs to be earned every single day.

    In the old Egypt, the really hard part for governing elites was to gain power. Once achieved, the whole apparatus of state (and the vested interests and crony capitalism that flourished then) was essentially wired to maintain the status quo, and do so regardless of performance.

    Not so in the new Egypt.

    Today, the country's rulers -- whether civilian or military -- need to earn and retain the trust of the majority of citizens on a high frequency basis. They are now dealing with citizens who, having lived for far too long under repression and a culture of fear, are empowered and entitled to influence their country's destiny. Indeed, the feeling of popular ownership has rarely been so visible and pronounced.