中日经济形势不容乐观

    眼下，日本股市正获得“大开印钞机”政策带来的提振。此前美联储（Federal Reserve）正是运用了同样的政策，给华尔街大笔砸钱。此外，美联储为美国的失败银行家间接支付的奖金更是高达数万亿美元。与此同时，包括保罗•克鲁格曼【美联储主席伯南克在普林斯顿大学（Princeton）的同事】在内的一大批高级经济学家继续劝日本人大开印钞机，实现经济繁荣。好像印刷更多美元和日元的货币政策已经成为治愈一个国家经济弊病的灵丹妙药。

    克鲁格曼的专业研究领域之一当然就是所谓的“流动性陷阱”。流动性陷阱发生在债券收益率降至极低水平使得市场将债券当现金用的时候。他曾撰文指出，日本房地产泡沫破裂后，日本“失去的十年”（或者是20年，具体取决于谁来回答这个问题）正是一个长期性的流动性陷阱。就像经历了几代杀虫剂存活下来的蟑螂一样，在流动性陷阱中，市场已经对进一步的现金注入变得无动于衷，似乎已经免疫。根据凯恩斯主义经济学，央行的功能是通过追加或收回流动性（即在公开市场购买或出售债券）来管理利率。因此，在流动性陷阱中，政府的政策是无法拉动经济增长的。

    克鲁格曼认为，日本政府目前还没有向其金融系统注入足够多的现金。上个月的选举之后，安倍政府地位得到巩固，克鲁格曼和他的凯恩斯主义拥趸得以坐观一个真正的、进行中的社会实验：安倍经济学通过开动印钞机是否能够拯救日本经济？还是说，日本经济还会继续掉队？

    要知道，不是每个人都认为日本经济跟不上趟了。一些观察家指出，大多数日本人在“失去的十年或二十年里”都保住了自己的工作。以生活质量、外贸和汇率衡量，日本的过去一二十年并没有“失去”。这也必须透过日本的文化价值观和日本人的期望去看待：相比在企业的晋升空间，日本人更重视就业稳定。

    无论如何，安倍晋三眼下很受欢迎，而且再次获选担任首相。他正尽全力大开日本印钞机，而日本股市则因此节节高升，就像梅西百货（Macy's）感恩节大游行时飘在空中的巨大充气气球。安倍晋三赢得选举可以为日本急需的经济改革提供政治稳定的保障，但现在他的所作所为和美国的定量宽松政策如出一辙——把钱免费塞进银行家的口袋里。这项政策眼下应该能有效地提振股票市场，但最终会有失效的那天。

    但是，亚洲其他地方也无法为我们提供慰藉。亚洲经济增速自2010年以来已经下降近半，亚洲其他地区政策制定者基本上已经无计可施。

    如果你还对中国经济形势持乐观态度，现在是时候开始转变立场了。

    中国一直是亚洲地区经济增长的主要驱动力，去年在整个亚洲的GDP中占比近38%。现在中国政府承认中国经济增长陷入低迷期，公开预测经济增速在7%左右，远远低于三年前的两位数增幅。

    在过去大举扩张的年份里，中国的固定资本形成增速惊人。但很多都只是为了推高GDP的面子工程、形象工程，导致这个国家到处充斥着闲置的机场、烂尾的道路工程和写字楼， 以及为这些没有收入的项目所提供的银行贷款。

    中国的银行已经成为有目共睹的定时炸弹。他们的资产已经达到中国GDP的270%。这些“资产”中巨大比例已经让债权人损失惨重，它们被用于为做摆设的道路和桥梁、隧道和机场项目做担保。整个金融体系的流动性不断流失之际，大型固定资产项目投资下降，中国的银行面临着一场潜在的危机。

    Right now, Japan's equity markets are being buoyed by the same "Print-And-Spend" policy that the Federal Reserve used to pay off Wall Street, emanating from the same ivory tower that paid untold trillions in bonuses to America's failed bankers. Meanwhile, a motley crew of high-level economists including Ben Bernanke's Princeton colleague Paul Krugman continue to exhort the Japanese to "Print! Print! Print!" their way to prosperity. As if printing more dollars and yens was some restorative, magical monetary panacea to cure a nation's economic ills.

    One of Krugman's areas of expertise is, of course, the "liquidity trap." This is when bond yields sink so low, the market treats them like cash. He has written that Japan's "lost decade," the 10 (or 20, depending on who you ask) years following the collapse of Japan's real estate bubble, was an extended liquidity trap. Like cockroaches dosed for generations with insecticides, in a liquidity trap the markets become immune to further cash injections. In Keynesian economics, the central bank's job is to manage interest rates by adding or withdrawing liquidity -- buying or selling bonds in the open market. Thus, in the liquidity trap government policy is incapable of stimulating economic growth.

    Krugman has argued that Japan's government hasn't thrown enough cash into the system. With the Abe government firmly in place after last month's elections, Krugman and his Keynesian buds have a ringside seat at a real live social experiment: Will Abe-nomics, with its tsunami of banknotes, bail out Japan, or will the economy continue to lag?

    Mind you, not everyone thinks Japan is lagging. Some observers point out that most Japanese kept their jobs during the "lost decades," and that measured by standard of living, foreign trade, and the strength of the currency, Japan's decades weren't "lost" at all. This must also be seen through the lens of cultural values and expectations: The Japanese value stability of employment more than the ability to climb the corporate ladder.

    Anyway, for the time being Shinzo Abe, the well-liked -- and re-elected -- Prime Minister, is printing Yen for all he's worth, and Japan's stock market is inflating like a giant balloon at the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade. Abe's winning the election could provide the political stability for much-needed economic reforms, but for now he's mirroring America's experiment in putting free money in bankers' pockets. This policy should work well for their equity markets -- until it doesn't.

    But don't look anywhere else in Asia for comfort. The rest of Asia's policymakers are well and truly out of ammo as Asian economic growth has been nearly cut in half since 2010.

    And if you weren't worried about China, now would be a good time to start.

    China has been the main driver of growth in the region, accounting for nearly 38% of all Asian GDP last year. Now the Chinese government is acknowledging that growth is in a downturn, publicly forecasting growth in the 7% range -- well below the double digits of only three years ago.

    China's fixed capital formation grew like Topsy during the expansion years. But many of these were empty make-work projects designed only to inflate GDP, leaving the country awash in unused airports, unfinished roads and office buildings -- and in bank loans for these projects with no revenues.

    China's banks are a loudly ticking time bomb. Their assets are bloated to an estimated 270% of GDP. A huge percentage of those "assets" are already in creditor limbo, having secured roads and bridges and tunnels and airports to Nowhere. China's banks face a potential crisis as investment in major fixed asset projects declines amid eroding liquidity throughout the financial system.