请勿放弃埃及民主

    在华盛顿，有这样一个观点日渐盛行：埃及悲剧的延续证明，尽管埃及军队得到了美国的大力支持，但美国已经失去了在全球这个关键地区的影响力。虽然这个观点没错——因为鉴于埃及目前的局势，如今，任何外国机构都无法进行有效的干预——但它应该作为文章的前言而不是结语。而且在埃及这一阿拉伯世界人口最多的国家，目前的悲痛局势将具有深远的意义。

    很多国家都对埃及目前的局势感到恐慌、担忧和沮丧，美国只是其中之一：恐慌的是大量、不断上升的人员伤亡数量；担忧的是最近的局势让国家离稳定的经济、金融、政治和社会环境渐行渐远；沮丧的是无法给予帮助，包括全国和解的推行。

    美国感到格外恼火自然有它的理由。

    自上个世纪70年代中期安瓦尔•萨达特历史性地做出脱离苏联的决策之后，美国就一直是埃及最紧密的盟友。它每年提供超过10亿美元的援助，同时还帮助训练埃及的军队。这两个国家联合开展反恐行动。多数埃及人崇拜美国的创业精神，言论自由和法治。然而，自2011年1月解放广场民众起义以来，奥巴马总统不顾埃及政治的极端不稳定性，大力奉行政治平衡策略，还迅速改变了埃及国内的联盟。

    可以理解的是，鉴于这种初始条件，很多人认为美国应在埃及死亡暴力事件的抵制方面发挥更为有效的作用。确实，在眼下危险不断升级的时期，美国的声音可能是埃及倍感自豪的历史中唯一有效的外来理性声音。

    然而，美国总统周四高明的演讲和取消援助的威胁似乎都无关痛痒。连奥巴马也承认，更糟糕的是，各方都认为美国在耍阴谋论，包括美国的支持者前总统穆罕默德•穆尔西以及他的反对派。

    难怪很多人倾向于将这种局势看做是美国缺乏政治影响力的集中体现。但是为了继续讨论这一话题，我们有必要记住4点——因为这4点对于今后的局势尤为重要。

    首先，埃及目前的局势实际上是有利于国家（和地区）长期利益的负面表现，这是民众在经历了长期的压迫和恐惧氛围之后所表现出的实质性的政治觉醒。

    2011年1月的民众起义让埃及民众获得了很多人认为不大可能获得、甚至是难以想象的权力。事实上，多数公民的地位与国内备受压迫、没有土地的农民无异，他们通过起义转而获得了话语权以及国家未来的决策权，而这个国家之前的服务对象仅仅是少数特权人士。

    民众在2011年1月走上街头，要求结束穆巴拉克长达30年的铁拳专政。去年，首届临时军阀统治者在向民选政治领袖移交政权之际故意拖延，人们再次回到街头。他们于几周前再次起义，抗议总统没能满足人民的诉求，而且更为重要的是，他们抗议总统意欲超越法律赋予的权力等事宜。

    Increasingly, the unfolding Egyptian tragedy is seen in Washington circles as confirmation that the U.S. has lost influence in a critical part of the world, and particularly vis-à-vis a military that receives lots of American support. While correct -- given Egypt's current realities, no foreign entity has any meaningful influence these days -- this observation should serve as the beginning of the analysis rather than its conclusion. And the insights extend well beyond the sad circumstances of the Arab world's most populous country.

    The U.S. is on a long list of advanced and developing countries expressing dismay, concern, and frustration with what is happening in Egypt: dismay at the enormous and growing civilian casualties; concern that recent developments are taking the country even further away from economic, financial, political, and social stability; and frustration with the inability to help, including in promoting national reconciliation.

    The U.S. has reason to feel even more exasperated.

    Following President Anwar Sadat's historic pivot away from the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, America has been Egypt's closest ally. It provides over $1 billion of aid per year, together with training for the Egyptian military. The two countries partner in fighting terrorism. Most Egyptians admire Americans' entrepreneurship, freedom of expression, and rule of law. And, since the January 2011 popular uprising that started in Tahrir Square, President Barack Obama has struck an impressive political balancing notwithstanding Egypt's extreme political fluidity and rapidly shifting domestic alliances.

    It is understandable that, with such initial conditions, many feel that the U.S. should be playing a more effective role in countering the deadly violence in Egypt. Indeed, the U.S. may be the only effective external voice of reason during an increasingly dangerous phase in Egypt's proud history.

    Yet neither the President's wise speech on Thursday nor the threat of aid cutoff seems to have an impact. To make things worse, and as acknowledged by President Obama, the U.S. finds itself in the midst of conspiracy theories originating from all sides, including from both supporters of former President Mohamed Morsi and his opponents.

    No wonder so many are inclined to characterize the situation as highlighting America's lack of political clout. But in pursuing this narrative, it is important to remember four points -- especially as they also speak to forward-looking responses.

    First, what is happening in Egypt is the dark side of a phenomenon that could actually be in the country's (and the region's) longer-term interest -- that of a material grass-root political awakening after a prolonged period of repression and culture of fear.

    The January 2011 popular uprising enabled and empowered average Egyptians in a manner that many thought unlikely if not unthinkable. In effect, most citizens went from the equivalent of oppressed landless-peasants in a nation run to benefit a small privileged elite, to having a voice and an influence on the country's destiny.

    They took to the street in January 2011 to remove a Mubarak regime that had ruled with an iron fist for 30 years. They returned last year when the first set of transitional military rulers dragged their feet in handing off to democratically elected politicians. And they were back a few weeks ago to counter a president who was failing to deliver and, more importantly, was seeking to overreach on legal and other matters.