超本地化网站到底怎么办

    大家听说过EveryBlock或Village Soup吗？Backfence呢？每个以社区为重点的初创公司开张没多久就关门大吉了。此外，许多所谓的超本地化网站也进行过尝试，但都以失败告终。就连美国在线公司(AOL)旗下的Patch新闻网也碰到了难以逾越的障碍。它们的困境引出了一个问题：为什么超本地化生意这么难做？

    理论上不应该这样，至少在新闻层面上。地方小报纸的持续衰落似乎为Patch新闻网这样的企业提供了一个巨大的机会——据说，许多当地居民仍然希望随时了解家门口正在发生的事情。然而，自美国在线公司CEO蒂姆•阿姆斯特朗于2009年以估计约700万美元的价格收购Patch新闻网以来，后者一直难以实现盈利。2011年，Patch新闻网获得2,000万美元营收；一位前员工告诉《财富》杂志( Fortune)，在Patch新闻网旗下的863家网站中，那时仅有12家实现了盈利。向前快进两年：阿姆斯特朗本月宣布，900家Patch新闻站点中将有400家关闭或合并，从而将导致500名员工失去工作。老天。

    某种程度上，Patch新闻网和此前其他超本地化尝试的问题都与它们迅速扩张的方式有关。“它们没来得及完善产品就开始全方位出击了。现在回想起来，这不是一个理想的做法，”一位前美国在线公司高管去年对《财富》杂志说。说句公道话，如阿姆斯特朗所言，三分之一的Patch新闻站点已经成功了，还有三分之一很可能将扭亏为盈。如果Patch新闻网不负阿姆斯特朗的承诺，到年底基本上实现盈利的话，它肯定将要经历一番激烈挣扎和重大战略调整，比如邀请博客贡献内容，全面削减预算等等。

    事实上，更好的方式听起来基础得可笑，但非常重要：先做好核心产品，然后再谋求成长。Patch新闻网先发展，再解决问题，尔后处理急躁扩张所造成的不良后果。此外，不同地域将以不同方式使用一款产品，在一个市场备受追捧的内容往往不受另一市场青睐。新的超本地化初创公司应该汲取Patch新闻网的前车之鉴。

    Nextdoor公司CEO尼拉夫•托利亚坦言：“一旦开始把编辑团队分散在数百个，乃至数千个不同的站点，怎么说呢，我实在想不出一个行之有效的例子。”托利亚钦佩Patch新闻网的努力，但对于如何推动公司成长这个问题，他有不同看法。Nextdoor公司于2011年10月推出之前，托利亚和他的团队先进行了长达一年的试点，检验其以社区为中心的社交网络创意，学习这些网络的应用之道，同时对功能作出相应地调整。Nextdoor公司的首批测试平台之一是门洛帕克市一个拥有150家住户的社区——这家公司认为，于所有社区而言，这个数字是一个最佳容量点。但更多的测试得出了相反的结论，每个社交网络的家庭数量在500至3,000家之间。

    Ever heard of EveryBlock or Village Soup? What about Backfence? Each community-focused venture launched, then folded. Many more so-called hyperlocal sites have also tried and failed. Even AOL's Patch news sites have had trouble sticking. Their struggles beg the question: Why is hyperlocal so hard?

    It shouldn't be in theory, at least where news is concerned. The ongoing decline of small, local newspapers presents what seems like a significant opportunity for ventures like Patch. (Arguably, many local residents still want to stay informed on nearby goings-on.) And yet the company that AOL (AOL) CEO Tim Armstrong acquired for an estimated $7 million back in 2009 has since struggled to reach profitability. In 2011, Patch made $20 million in revenues; a former employee told Fortune that just 12 of the 863 Patch sites then were profitable. Fast-forward two years: Armstrong announced this month that 400 of Patch's 900 sites would either be shuttered or partnered off, resulting in 500 employees losing their jobs. Ouch.

    Part of Patch's problem, and other previous hyperlocal efforts, has to do with way it rapidly expanded. "They went all in before they perfected the product, and in retrospect, that wasn't ideal," a former AOL executive told Fortune last year. To be fair, Armstrong has said one-third of Patch sites are already successful, while the other third will likely turn a profit. If Patch becomes largely profitable by the end of year, which Armstrong has pledged, it will have done so amid serious struggles and major changes in strategy, from having bloggers contribute content to trimming budgets across the board.

    Indeed, the better approach sounds ridiculously basic but important: get the core product right first, then grow from there. Patch grew first, problem-solved later, then dealt with the fallout caused by its brash expansion. Also, different geographic areas will use a product differently, with popular content in one market being less read in another. New hyperlocal startups should be taking note of Patch's failures.

    "When you start to fragment editorial into hundreds if not thousands of different sites, well, I can't think of an example that's worked," admits Nirav Tolia, CEO of Nextdoor, who admires Patch's efforts but differs on how to grow a company. Prior to Nextdoor's launch in October 2011, Tolia and his team spent a year in a pilot phase, testing out their idea of neighborhood-focused social networks, learning how they were used, and tweaking features accordingly. One of Nextdoor's first testbeds was a Menlo Park neighborhood with 150 households, a number the company believed would be the average sweet spot for all neighborhoods. But more testing proved otherwise, with each network ranging between 500 and 3,000 homes.