摩根大通最好一分为三

    美国最大的银行摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）正在经受监管机构史无前例的大审查，同时面临包括营销欺诈、贿赂、操纵市场和风险管理重大失误等多项指控。或许，摩根大通现在是时候考虑一下变通战略，尽力做到让监管机构满意，同时推动市值提升并为未来打下一个稳固的基础。

    目前摩根大通正在考虑出售一些类似学生贷款这样的非核心资产，但这丝毫不会让监管机构感到满意，也不会增加价值。这家银行的CEO杰米•戴蒙需要认识到的一点是：真正的问题并不在于它管理的资产规模，而是业务部门程度不同的风险。

    要解决这一问题，摩根大通应考虑将业务重组分为三大块，每块业务都分拆成一个独立的公司，由现有股东以及通过IPO参与进来的新股东共同持有。这三块业务将由摩根大通现有五个部门的各项业务组成，分别为：

    • 传统银行（由存款业务，消费、企业和按揭贷款业务构成）

    • 投资银行和资产管理（由咨询服务、筹资、做市和伴随交易、个人及机构资产管理构成）

    • 自营交易（由部门自有资本进行的所有交易活动，相对于做市相关交易活动）

    这三块业务的风险/回报特点迥异，对银行资产负债表有着非常不同的需求。传统银行业务需要计提较高的贷款准备金，相对不受市场波动影响，提供可预期的低回报（低风险/低回报)；投资银行和资产管理业务所需的自有资本不多（临时做市需求除外），提供高回报，但容易受市况波动影响（中等风险/高回报）；而自营交易业务需要大量资本，高风险，但如果押注正确，可以提供超高回报（高风险/高回报）。

    这三块业务如果分别上市交易，就可以根据它们各自的风险和回报特点进行估值，生成更准确的估值。更重要的是，将传统银行、投资银行和自营交易分拆成立为三家独立自负盈亏的公司有望极大地满足政府监管机构，而且在我看来，还能促进更佳的风险管理。另外，三家公司的估值之和可能还会高于整一家公司，因为分拆后业务之间不再有利益输送，每项业务都是自负盈亏。

    尽管利润创纪录，但摩根大通的估值一直以来都低于同行，当前股价动态市盈率约为8.3倍，明显低于美国银行（Bank of America）、富国银行（Well Fargo）等其他大银行10.2倍或更高的市盈率。这当然是因为摩根大通面临诸多法律难题，还有一边倒的负面舆论。另一个可能的因素是戴蒙与美国监管机构关系进展，特别是在多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）法案这个问题上。

    敏锐的观察者会意识到，这样的一分为三正是1934年格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案（Glass-Steagall Act of 1934）的再现。格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案强制分离投资银行和商业银行业务，以期控制银行内部风险，这正是2008年之后的市场环境所需要的。摩根大通可能是美国最大的银行，它或许比其他银行更好地抵御了此次金融危机，但这不能让它免受当前现实状况的影响，行动是当务之急。

    As the nation's largest bank undergoes an unprecedented onslaught of regulatory scrutiny and fends off charges or investigations of fraudulent marketing practices, bribery, market manipulation, and gross mismanagement of risk, perhaps it is time for JPMorgan Chase to consider strategic alternatives that could satisfy regulators, increase its market value, and lay a secure foundation for the future.

    While the bank is currently contemplating offloading some non-core assets, such as its student loan business, that will do little to appease regulators or add value. What the bank's CEO Jamie Dimon needs to realize is that the real problem does not lie in the actual sizeof the assets it manages, but in the varying risk profiles across its divisions.

    To address this, JPM should consider reorganizing its business into three broad divisions and spinning off each of the divisions into a separate company, shares of which would be held both by existing shareholders as well as new ones through IPOs. The three divisions, which would comprise parts of the existing five divisions of the bank, should be:

    • Traditional Banking (consisting of deposits and consumer, corporate, and mortgage lending)

    Investment Banking and Asset Management (consisting of advisory services, capital raising, market-making and accompanying trading, and asset management for individuals and institutions)

    • Proprietary Trading (consisting of all trading activities with the division's own capital as opposed to the trading activities involved in market making)

    These three business lines have very distinct risk profiles, very distinct returns, and very different demands on a bank's balance sheet. Traditional banking requires high capital reserves against loans but is relatively immune to market volatility and provides predictable, if modest, returns (LOW RISK/LOW REWARD); investment banking and asset management require little proprietary capital (except temporarily for market making) and provide high returns but can fluctuate somewhat in response to market conditions (MODEST RISK/HIGH REWARD); and proprietary trading requires vast amounts of capital and is highly risky but can provide oversize returns if the bets are good (HIGH RISK/HIGH REWARD).

    Each of these divisions then, if traded separately in the market, can be valued based on their appetite for risk and desire for returns, yielding more accurate valuations. More importantly, separating out traditional banking, investment banking, and proprietary trading into standalone companies with their own balance sheets will go a long way in assuaging government regulators and, in my assessment, promoting better risk management. This in turn is likely to lead to a higher valuation for the sum of the parts compared to the whole because of a lack of profit-bleed between the businesses and greater accountability within each publicly traded division.

    JPMorgan (JPM) has long been undervalued relative to its peers, trading currently in the range of 8.3 times forward P/E versus 10.2 or more for other large banks like Bank of America (BAC) and Well Fargo (WFC), despite its record profits. That is no doubt due to the many legal troubles that the bank is facing, not to mention the bad press that the bank has sustained, and even perhaps due to the antagonistic relationship that Dimon has had with US regulators, particularly over Dodd-Frank.

    A sharp observer will recognize that such a spin-off into three divisions would be a voluntary re-creation of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1934, which mandated the separation of investment and commercial banking with the aim of controlling risk within banks, but that is precisely what is needed in the post-2008 environment. JPM may be the nation's largest bank and it may have weathered the financial crisis better than others, but that does not make it immune to the reality it is facing now, and action is imperative.