银行会计奇迹：摩根大通和解交易推升利润

    别为摩根大通（JPMorgan）喊冤：上周五宣布的最新和解方案事实上可能使这家公司的利润提升11亿美元。

    当然，确切的数字尚不确定。而且，利润提升效应可能将延续至未来一年左右。摩根大通为自己在楼市泡沫期间的违规行为支付罚金，结果反而受益，这是银行会计的又一大奇迹。

    怎么会这样呢？让我们来算算帐。

    上周五宣布的51亿美元和解交易分为两部分。第一部分是因为两年多前监管机构代表房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）对摩根大通和其他银行提起的一宗案件达成和解。监管机构在这起案件中指控，摩根大通和其他银行承销的按揭债券中包含的一些贷款实际风险超出了这些银行披露的水平。房地美、房利美与其他投资者购买了这些债券，蒙受了损失。摩根大通及其于2008年收购的贝尔斯登（Bear Stearns）和华盛顿互惠银行（Washington Mutual）被指控应该为这些债券造成的一些损失承担部分责任，摩根大通同意为此支付40亿美元达成和解。

    看起来还不错。因为这个数额远低于房利美和房地美在这些债券上的损失。但房利美和房地美也负有一些责任。而且，这个数额也接近其他就类似指控达成的和解金额。

    这次达成的交易还包括另外一笔和解金，事关摩根大通和贝尔斯登在美国楼市泡沫破裂前转给房利美和房地美担保的按揭贷款。那些贷款中有很多也不符合标准，最终构成违约。在这些损失中究竟有多少应该由房利美和房地美承担，又有多少应该由摩根大通和其他银行承担？围绕这两个问题，房利美和房地美一直与摩根大通和其他银行争执不下。摩根大通解决2000年至2008年之间所有这些有争议的回购成本为：11亿美元

    这看起来是一笔非常划算的交易。远远低于其他银行支付的数额。举例来说，今年早些时候，美国银行（Bank of America）就上述同时期房利美所担保贷款引发的争议达成和解，支付了104亿美元，包括支付近70亿美元的贷款。此前，美国银行已经与房利美达成了14亿美元的和解。10月初，富国银行（Wells Fargo）支付了9亿美元和解金，但这还只是房地美担保的按揭贷款交易。它还需与规模更大的房利美达成和解。

    然而，能证明这笔交易非常划算的可能还莫过于摩根大通自己。9月末，摩根大通还在估计，与房利美和房地美就其回购责任达成和解需要花费22亿美元。这就是那11亿美元收益的出处。

    一旦银行估算出损失，就必须为此进行拨备。这些资金会进入准备金池，同时记入支出项目。但如果银行最终不需要动用所有的损失准备金，就可以回拨准备金。剩余的准备金将全部变成银行的税前利润。

    目前，尚不清楚摩根大通是否会立即将整整11亿美元记入利润。摩根大通拒绝置评。

    这项准备金只覆盖房利美和房地美的回购指控。另外，40亿美元和解金来自于摩根大通的法律准备金，该行在上季度将法律准备金调高到了230亿美元。但房利美和房地美的准备金也覆盖金融危机后的回购指控。不过，事实表明，这个时期的贷款问题较金融危机前少了很多。去年，摩根大通的回购指控中仅8%是2008年之后的按揭贷款。

    Don't cry for JPMorgan: The latest settlement announced on Friday could actually boost its profits by $1.1 billion.

    The exact amount isn't certain. And the bottom line boost is likely to stretch over the next year or so. But the fact that JPMorgan (JPM) is able to see any gain from the penalties it's shelling out for its misdeeds during the housing bubble is another milestone in the miracle of bank accounting.

    How so? Sharpen your pencil.

    There were two parts to Friday's $5.1 billion deal. The first part was to settle a lawsuit regulators brought on behalf of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac more than two years ago, against JPMorgan and other banks. The suits alleged that JPMorgan and others underwrote mortgage bonds that contained loans that were riskier than the banks let on. Fannie and Freddie bought the bonds, along with other investors, and lost money. JPMorgan is paying $4 billion to settle the claim that it, along with Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, which JPMorgan bought in 2008, are in part responsible for some of the losses on the bonds.

    That seems about right. The amount was far less than what Fannie and Freddie lost on the soured deals. But Fannie and Freddie share some responsibility as well. What's more, the amount was in line with what other banks have been paying to settle similar lawsuits.

    But wrapped into the deal was also a payment that had to do with the mortgage loans that JPMorgan and Bear Stearns passed to Fannie and Freddie to insure in the run-up to the housing bust. Many of those loans weren't up to snuff either and ended up in default. Fannie and Freddie have been battling with JPMorgan and other banks over how much of those losses the government guarantors should swallow, and how much should be sent back to the banks. The cost of resolving all those disputed repurchase claims from 2000 to 2008 for JPMorgan: $1.1 billion.

    That appears to be an exceptionally good deal. It's much less than other banks have paid. For instance, earlier this year, Bank of America (BAC) paid $10.4 billion, including a payment for nearly $7 billion in loans, to settle its disputes over loans that Fannie guaranteed in the same time period. That was on top of a $1.4 billion settlement it had already reached with Fannie. In early October, Wells Fargo paid $900 million, but that deal only covered mortgages insured by Freddie. It still needs to settle with the larger Fannie.

    But perhaps the best evidence that the deal was particularly sweet for the bank comes from JPMorgan itself. As recently as the end of September, JPMorgan estimated that a settlement with Fannie and Freddie over its repurchase liability could cost the bank $2.2 billion. And that's where the $1.1 billion gain could come from.

    When banks make an estimate of losses, they have to set aside money for that. It goes into something called a reserve and banks have to take a charge when they set it up. But if a bank doesn't end up needing all the money it has put aside for a loss, it's supposed to dissolve the reserve. Any cash remaining goes straight to the bank's pre-tax profits.

    It's not clear JPMorgan will immediately add the full $1.1 billion to its bottom line. JPMorgan declined to comment.

    The reserve only covers Fannie and Freddie repurchase claims. The $4 billion portion of the settlement comes from JPMorgan's legal reserve, which last quarter the bank upped to $23 billion. But the Fannie and Freddie reserve also covers repurchase claims that came after the financial crisis. Those loans, though, have proven less problematic than loans made before the crisis. In the past year, just 8% of all of JPMorgan's repurchase claims were on mortgages that were made after 2008.