油价跌跌不休，ISIS冉冉升起

自从巴黎和圣贝纳迪诺先后遭受恐怖袭击后，美国总统大选的核心议题就从经济问题转变为反恐和国际关系议题。

由于中东地区的地缘政治对石油开采的依存度很高，因而，经济与恐怖主义、包括与ISIS崛起之间的关系，要比乍看上去深刻得多。

在最近美国共和党的党内候选人辩论期间，前阿肯色州州长麦克•赫卡比认为，要想在中东地区打败美国的敌人们，能源开采行业可谓是一个关键因素。“在能源方面，我们不仅要挑战俄罗斯，还要挑战伊朗和沙特。”

此外他还表示：“我们还需要开采我们的天然气和生物能，向全世界出口能源，让俄罗斯、伊朗和沙特没钱制造和购买武器，让美国成为全世界最大的能源出口国。”

他的逻辑是可以理解的。如果美国的能源业能在全球市场上攫取一定份额，必将在一定程度上削弱伊朗和俄罗斯等国的实力。但仔细推敲便可发现，赫卡比的这一论点是似是而非的。的确，液压破裂技术的进步，导致了美国能源供给的大幅提高，这是导致2014年末以来国际油价突然下跌的主要原因之一。但考虑到ISIS的蔓延之势，很难说中东现在对于美国来说已经变得更安全了。

After the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, the presidential race has shifted its focus, understandably, from the economy to terrorism and international relations.

But given how the the geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East are so dependent on the business of oil extraction, economics and terrorism, including the rise of ISIS, may be more connected than they may seem at first blush.

Indeed, during last week’s undercard Republican debate, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee argued that a key to defeating American adversaries in the Middle East is the energy extraction industry. “We ought to be challenging not only Russia but the Iranians and the Saudis on the point of energy,” he said. Huckabee continued:

We need to be going after our natural gas and biofuels and become the energy exporter to the world, and take the weaponry out of the hands of the Russians, the Iranians, and the Saudis by taking their money away, and let America become the number one energy exporter to the entire world.

There’s some understandable logic here. If America’s energy industry is able to take global market share, that will chip away at the main source of power for countries like Iran and Russia. But upon closer examination, the argument reveals itself as specious. In fact, the huge increase in American supply as the result of advances in fracking technology has been one of the driving forces behind the sudden fall in oil prices that began in late 2014. And it’s hard to argue, given ISIS, that the Middle East has become any safer for the U.S.

实际上，国际油价的下跌与ISIS的崛起有着相当奇怪的关联。2014年初，ISIS占据了叙利亚和伊拉克的几座主要城市，同时全球石油库存开始激增。虽然ISIS的崛起和中东地区的总体失稳是多种复杂力量搏弈的结果，但其中一个主要因素，无疑是各方都想通过控制该地区的石油来发挥影响力。

我们甚至可以说，由于美国在2015年成功将单日石油产量翻番至930万桶，导致这个矛盾在该地区更加激化了，从而使ISIS获得了在该地区站稳脚跟的机会。

科威特海湾科技大学国际关系学副教授穆罕默德•努鲁扎曼研究了中东政治在ISIS的崛起中所起的作用。他认为，卡塔尔等国之所以一开始就扮演了“阿拉伯之春”运动的推手角色，部分原因就是为了推翻卡扎菲这样的领导人，从而在利比亚等产油国安插更适合本国经济利益的领导人。而后卡扎菲时代的利比亚也的确向卡塔尔的油气行业打开了大门，使它在开发本国油气资源上扮演了更重要角色。

In fact, the decline in the price of oil and the rise of ISIS correlate strongly. In early 2014, ISIS began capturing major cities in Syria and Iraq at the same time that global stockpiles of oil began increasing unsustainably. And though the rise of ISIS and general instability in the Middle East is the result of multifarious, complex forces, the desire to exert power through controlling the flow of oil from that region is undoubtedly a major factor.

One could even argue that the the United States success in nearly doubling its production of oil to 9.3 million barrels per day in 2015 has helped to exacerbate the very same tensions that have given ISIS an opportunity to gain a foothold in the region.

Dr. Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Gulf University for Science and Thechology and Quwait, has studied the role of Middle East politics in the rise of ISIS. He argues that countries like Qatar initially pounced on the Arab Spring movement in part as a means to topple leaders like Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi with the hope of installing leaders more congenial to its own economic interests. A post-Gaddafi Libya opened the door for the Qatari oil and gas industries to take a larger role in developing that countries resources.

随着“阿拉伯之春”在叙利亚的蔓延，卡塔尔和沙特阿拉伯也将叙利亚的内乱视为推翻阿萨德政权的良机——原因在于，阿萨德本人是一个阿拉维派穆斯林，但他领导下的叙利亚人民大多数是和卡塔尔人和沙特人一样的逊尼派——此外，他们还可以借机削弱敌对能源出口国伊朗和俄罗斯的经济利益，而这两个国家恰好一直长期支持着阿萨德政权。

正如《外交》杂志所指出的，卷入叙利亚内战的主要交战方——伊朗、沙特、卡塔尔、俄罗斯和美国，无一不是能源出口国，并且这五国都非常关注中东地区未来的能源开采，也非常关注中东石油将如何运至对油气需求极大的欧洲市场。据该杂志描述，一直以来，卡塔尔都在寻找一种廉价的方式，试图将该国的天然气运到欧洲，而这个目标将使它与俄罗斯形成直接竞争：

“2009年，卡塔尔提议修建一座天然气管道，经沙特阿拉伯、约旦、叙利亚至土耳其，该项目预计耗资几十亿美元，将大大降低长期的天然气运输成本。但叙利亚总统巴沙尔•阿萨德拒绝签署这项协议，原因是俄罗斯不想看到它在欧洲天然气市场的地位受到挑战，而给阿萨德施加了很大压力。

与此同时，伊朗也闻到了机会。伊朗也有大量的天然气储量，但由于缺乏可以助推出口的基础设施，伊朗提议修建一座由伊朗经伊拉克至叙利亚的天然气管道，使伊朗的天然气可以经拉塔基亚等叙利亚港口出口至地中海。俄罗斯或许是认为跟伊朗打交道比较容易（因为伊朗和卡塔尔不同，没有美军基地），有把握控制欧洲从伊朗、里海地区和中亚进口的天然气，因此，俄罗斯显然没有对这个项目从中作梗。伊朗—伊拉克—叙利亚天然气管道项目于2011年对外宣布，各方于2012年签署了文件。管道的建设原定于2016年峻工，但‘阿拉伯之春’和叙利亚内战已经严重影响了工期。”

As the Arab Spring spread to Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia saw the unrest as an opportunity to unseat Bashar al-Assad, an Alowite Muslim leading a country that is majority Sunni (like Qatar and Saudi Arabia), while at the same time undercutting the economic interests of rival energy exporters Iran and Russia, which have long backed the Assad regime.

As Mitchell Orenstein and George Romer point out in Foreign Affairs, the major belligerents in the Syrian civil war—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and the United States—are all energy exporters concerned with the future of energy extraction and how it will reach an oil-and-gas-hungry European market. They describe how Qatar has long searched for an inexpensive way to ship its natural gas to Europe, a goal that puts it in direct competition with Russia:

In 2009, Qatar proposed to build a pipeline to send its gas northwest via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to Turkey, an investment of billions of dollars up front that would reduce transportation costs over the long term. However, Syrian President Bashar al Assad refused to sign the plan; Russia, which did not want to see its position in European gas markets undermined, put him under intense pressure not to.

At the same time, Iran, sensing an opportunity, and lacking export infrastructure for its own massive gas reserves, proposed an alternative Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline that would pump Iranian gas from the same field out via Syrian ports such as Latakia and under the Mediterranean. Moscow apparently blessed this project, possibly believing that Russia would have an easier time dealing with Iran (unlike Qatar, not home to a U.S. base) to control gas imports to Europe from Iran, the Caspian Sea region, and Central Asia. The announcement of the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline deal came in 2011. The parties signed the documents in July 2012. Construction was slated to be finished in 2016, but the Arab Spring and ensuing chaos in Syria interfered.

现在大家应该知道中东这个大赌局上的筹码是什么了——通过向欧洲供应天然气而带来的权力。这就更能解释受到经济衰退拖累的俄罗斯，为什么要在已经向乌克兰冲突投入大量资源的情况下，还要在中东开辟第二战场。同时，我们也明白了为什么像卡塔尔和沙特这样的国家，宁可冒着点燃逊尼派极端主义者怒火的风险，也要支持反对阿萨德的运动。

这些复杂的角力，也说明了为什么美国能源出口行业的业绩上涨，反过来却给美国在海外造成了麻烦。因为在全球能源价格下降的背景下，有些国家正在拼命抢占能源出口市场份额，希望有朝一日飙升的油气价格能给他们的权力背书。（财富中文网）

译者：朴成奎

When one understands the stakes of the game being played—the power that results from supplying natural gas to Europe—it makes more sense why a recession-racked Russia, already expending resources on the conflict in the Ukraine—would decide to begin fighting a second front in the Middle East. It also makes sense why countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia would risk stoking the flames of Sunni extremism in their support of anti-Assad movements.

And these dynamics show why the strength of the U.S. energy exploration industry can actually cause headaches for the United States abroad, as countries that could once count on sky-high oil and gas prices to underwrite their power scramble for market share in a world of cheap energy.