2016，欧洲的麻烦多着呢！

2016年，欧洲国家的选举日程也许不算密集，经济也许会持续增长，但这一年欧洲绝不可能风平浪静。欧洲大陆或许不会像1914年那样成为引爆世界大战的火药桶，但必须比以往更努力捍卫过去60年取得的成就，如果想获得新进展无疑要付出更多努力。

以下是未来12个月可能会导致欧洲形势恶化的一些潜在威胁：

英国退出欧盟

眼下还没多少人熟悉英国退出欧盟的缩写词Brexit，但在2016年6月以前，想必会听得耳朵出老茧。因为英国可能最早2016年年中举行全民公投决定是否离开欧盟。照理来说，英国应该举国讨论将如何保持和欧元区的关系，英国一向反对欧盟一体化深入，而欧元区又确实需要英国的支持，有那么短暂的一瞬间确实是这么讨论的。可惜，理性讨论迅速沦为一场比嗓门大赛，大呼小叫的重点变成了英国应不应该制止波兰、罗马尼亚等地的移民流入英国，占用本国福利。正如伦敦智库欧洲改革中心副主任西蒙•蒂尔福德指出的，如果英国人投票决定退出欧盟，“理由会是，在许多选民心目中，欧盟成员的身份已经等同于移民问题失控”，相应地，各政党也发觉与其努力解决住房不足和公共服务太铺张等社会问题，还不如归咎于移民来得省事。

实用主义者会安慰自己，即便英国公投决定离开欧盟，英国和其他欧洲国家还很需要彼此的，这种共识应该会保证退欧在贸易和投资方面的负面影响降到最小。但欧盟最重要的经济成就——单一市场的规模将一夜之间锐减16%。没有了欧盟金融中心伦敦，欧洲经济体仿佛没了头部的躯干，整个金融市场也会受到影响。同时，这也将是欧盟自1957年成立以来首次出现成员国退出，欧盟内部一些有分裂倾向的势力会受到鼓舞，主张分裂者的观点是，打破现有的政治框架才有机会幸福（估计英国的苏格兰、西班牙的加泰罗尼亚和比利时的法兰德斯都会带头）。接下来的政局动荡可能会影响经济增长多年。

疲于紧缩与改革

即使没有英国推波助澜，试图分裂欧元区，也是欧盟经济核心的势力也一直很强大。不过，只要欧洲央行继续以无限流动性抑制系统性风险，就能避免出现最糟糕的情况。欧盟国家的经济应该能继续增长，失业率继续下降。

只可惜，潜在的问题不会自生自灭：希腊还乱作一团，走着前苏联国家的老路，债权国假装希腊并没有破产，希腊假装改革。葡萄牙与西班牙分别于2015年10月和上周末举行了大选，两场都否决了2011年和2012年达成国际救助协议时承诺的财政紧缩政策，但没选出任何明确的替代方案。作为2016年欧元区唯一举行国内大选的成员国，爱尔兰很可能也这么干。在葡萄牙，三个政党联合执政的左翼政府上台，但在银行救助未见成效（下文会详述）的压力下，政党联盟已然危如累卵。西班牙目前只有两种的选择：一是由现任首相马里亚诺•拉霍伊领导下的少数党组建一个腐败丑闻缠身的“跛脚鸭”政府；二是霍伊之外的左翼和右翼成立大联合政府，但注定会因为内部矛盾重重而饱受困扰。无论走哪条路，2015年经济增速在欧元区独占鳌头的西班牙，看来都不可能继续保持了。

恐怖主义威胁继续逼近

巴黎恐怖袭击的余波将继续影响全欧洲经济，如果恐怖分子再次发动影响巨大的袭击，将对欧洲造成更大的冲击。2013年，联盟入境旅游业创造了4500亿美元产值，假如类似巴黎的主要旅游目的地成为恐怖组织“伊斯兰国”及其同情者固定的打击目标，欧盟的旅游业将遭到重创。

如果欧盟成员国的安全需求增加（同时也是防止穆斯林移民大量涌入），越来越多的国家会恢复国境边检，联盟内部的跨境贸易也可能受损。同欧元和单一市场一样，允许在欧盟成员国境内自由穿行的申根协议是支撑现代欧洲的基石。虽然欧盟的政治家极力否认，但申根协议的命运现在很大程度上就看不靠谱的土耳其能不能挡住叙利亚、阿富汗等其他地区的难民。2015年同情心泛滥的德国主动接受了100万移民，2016年很可能不会了。

利比亚战乱越陷越深

叙利亚的内战正不断恶化，欧盟各国用尽了一切办法，就是想避免派出地面部队参与叙利亚国内的多方混战。但要是伊斯兰国胆敢将触角伸向通往南欧的门户——利比亚，欧盟各国也得努力避免在利比亚战乱中越陷越深。利比亚出产的石油与天然气对欧洲（特别是意大利）经济至关重要。

倘若伊斯兰国让从埃及到阿尔及利亚的整个地中海南岸都不得安宁，欧洲最恐怖的噩梦就会出现，动荡会掀起新一轮涌向欧洲的难民、移民和（夹在其中的）伊斯兰教圣战士大潮。对欧盟而言，干预利比亚风险极高，特别是如果欧盟国家长期滞留当地试图建立稳定的国家政权。可话说回来，不干预利比亚的风险也不会低到哪里去。

银行复苏仍待时日

2016年，欧盟银行业新法规《欧洲银行复苏与清算指令》将正式实施，喜欢看戏的要有眼福了。从1月1日起，欧盟监管机构（对大部分欧洲银行来说就是欧洲央行）会动用新规赋予的权力，关闭资不抵债的银行和资本不足的银行，必要时援助高级债券持有人和大储户。这意味着，监管机构将从经营状况良好的银行中揪出僵尸银行。但如此清理必然意味着财富在不同阶级之间急剧转移，卷起欧洲国家政府不希望看到的政治风暴，攻于算计的监管者也会害怕政治权力因此受限。

从最近一些案例来看，前景不太妙。葡萄牙政府已经选择由纳税人买单的救助计划，不让小储户蒙受损失。储户购买投资产品时从不会仔细阅读条款，以为是存款（有保险），事实上却是次级债（并无保险）。

同样的好戏2015年秋季也在意大利上演。当时，四家本土银行重组引起抗议后，意大利总理马泰奥•伦齐介入此事并保护小投资者。罗马智库Policy Sonar的创始人弗朗西斯科•加列蒂认为，伦齐将市场混乱归咎于意大利央行和股市监管机构Consob，这种策略无异于承认银行过去有犯罪行为，此外又授权豁免，有意诋毁国家监管机构的形象。加列蒂评价，这么做“非但没有（给市场）注入信心，还适得其反。”

在目睹这些乱局后，原本就对建立欧元区存款保险制度不太上心的德国再次叫停计划。尽管如此，对欧元区边缘国家银行的担忧仍然像高悬着的达摩克里斯之剑。按照存款保险制度要求，存款的安全程度与银行投资的资产质量密切相关。在意大利，银行业的不良贷款规模已经超过GDP的20%，银行还持有价值4000亿欧元债券，发行方则是慢慢走向破产深渊的意大利政府。（财富中文网）

译者：Pessy

校对：夏林

The electoral calendar may be light and the economy may be growing, but there’s no chance of 2016 being a quiet year for Europe. It may not be a 1914-style powder-keg, but the continent is going to have to work harder than ever to defend—let alone build on—its achievements of the last 60 years. Here are just a few things that could go badly wrong in the next 12 months.

Brexit

An unfamiliar word today, you’ll be sick of the sound of it by June. The U.K. will hold a referendum, possibly as early as the middle of 2016, on whether to leave the E.U. It should be (and in fleeting moments of sanity it is) a discussion on what kind of relationship Britain—which opposes deeper E.U. integration—should have with a Eurozone that needs it to survive. Instead, it has been reduced to a shouting match over whether London should be able to stop immigrants from Poland, Romania, and elsewhere claiming welfare benefits. As Simon Tilford from the Center for European Reform argues, if Britain votes to leave the E.U., it will be “because membership has become synonymous in many voters’ minds with uncontrolled immigration,” and that in turn has happened because political parties have found it easier to blame immigrants for social problems, such as inadequate housing and overstretched public services, than to address the problems themselves.

Pragmatists console themselves with the thought that, even if the U.K. votes to leave, it and the rest of Europe need each other so much that common sense will keep disruptions to trade and investment to a minimum. But the Single Market, the E.U.’s most important economic achievement, would shrink by 16% overnight. European financial markets would be disrupted by the severing of London, the E.U.’s financial head, from its economic body on the Continent. And the sight of a country leaving the E.U. for the first time since its founding in 1957 would embolden forces all over the Union who think that breaking up existing political structures is their best chance for happiness (think Scotland, Catalonia, and Flanders for starters). The ensuing instability could hurt growth prospects for years.

Austerity and Reform Fatigue

Even without the contribution of the U.K., the forces acting to pull apart the Eurozone, the E.U.’s economic heart, are still as strong as ever. As long as the European Central Bank continues to smother systemic risks with unlimited liquidity, the worst should be avoided, the economy should continue to grow, and unemployment should continue to fall.

But the underlying problems are not going away: Greece is still a mess; in a reworking of the old Soviet paradigm, the creditors pretend it’s solvent, and the country pretends to reform. In Portugal in October, and Spain last weekend, general elections rejected the austerity imposed by bailouts in 2011 and 2012, but failed to vote for anything coherent to replace it. Ireland, the only Eurozone member to have national elections next year, is set to do likewise. In Portugal, a three-party left-wing coalition has taken power but is already cracking under the pressure of a botched bank bailout (more on that below). In Spain, the only workable options seem to be a minority government under Mariano Rajoy, a corruption-tainted lame duck, or a “Grand Coalition” of left and right without him that would be beset by huge internal contradictions. Either way, a continuation of the rapid growth that made Spain’s economy the Eurozone’s best performer this year seems unlikely.

Terrorism

The aftershocks of the Paris attacks will continue to work through Europe’s economy, and will be amplified if terrorists pull off another high-impact attack. Inbound tourism, which generated $450 billion for the E.U. economy in 2013, will suffer badly if major destinations like Paris become routine soft targets for Islamic State and its sympathizers. Cross-border trade could also suffer if heightened demands for security (coupled with alarm at large inflows of Muslim migrants) causes any more internal borders to be revived. The Schengen Agreement on free movement within the E.U. is, along with the euro and the Single Market, a pillar of modern Europe. And although E.U. politicians fiercely deny it, it is now largely dependent for its survival on an unpredictable Turkey holding back refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. A euphoric surge of compassion in Germany helped absorb a million migrants this year. It’s highly unlikely that that will be repeated next year.

Libya

E.U. countries are doing their damnedest not to commit ground troops to a multi-sided civil war in Syria that is only getting worse. But they will struggle to avoid getting sucked into Libya if Islamic State expands its toe-hold on southern Europe’s doorstep. Its oil and gas is crucial to Europe’s economy (especially Italy’s). And Europe’s worst nightmare would be for Islamic State to destabilize the southern Mediterranean coast from Egypt to Algeria, causing yet another new wave of refugees, migrants, and (smuggled in amongst them) jihadists. An intervention would be fraught with risk, especially if E.U. countries stay around long enough to try to rebuild a stable state and government. But then, the risks of not intervening hardly seem lower.

Banks

Lovers of drama will be delighted that 2016 will be the year when the new E.U. Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive comes into force. As of January 1, regulators (that’s the ECB for most of the banks that matter) will get sweeping new powers to close down insolvent or undercapitalized banks, ‘bailing in’ even senior bondholders and large depositors if need be. It’s meant to weed out the zombie banks from the healthy ones. But clean-ups like this invariably mean brutal transfers of wealth from one class to another, causing the kind of political storm hated by governments and feared by gray-suited regulatory bean-counters with limited political authority.

Recent test cases don’t augur well. In Portugal this week, the government opted for yet another taxpayer-funded bailout rather than impose losses on retail savers who didn’t read the small print of investment products that they thought were deposits (and thus insured), but turned out to be subordinated debt (which weren’t). A similar drama played out in Italy during the fall, when furor over the restructuring of four local banks led Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to step in to protect small investors. Francesco Galleotti of the Rome-based think-tank Policy Sonar says Renzi’s tactic of blaming the Bank of Italy and stock market regulator Consob for the mess amounted to an admission of criminal wrongdoing at the banks in the past, coupled with a grant of immunity and willful damage to the image of the country’s regulators. “Rather than instilling confidence, it’s done the opposite,” he says.

After looking on aghast at this mess, Germany has again halted what was in any case only half-hearted work on the creation of a Eurozone-wide deposit insurance scheme. As such, question marks will remain suspended like Swords of Damocles over the heads of banks in the periphery of the Eurozone. Deposits will only be as safe as the assets that the banks invest in. In Italy’s case, that means non-performing loans equivalent to over 20% of GDP, and another €400 billion tied up in bonds issued by a government that is on a slow, grinding path to bankruptcy.