给“舆论风暴”中Uber的发展建议

优步的战略在美国管用，原封不动地照搬到国外则未必行。

优步（Uber）最近透露，该公司在中国市场的亏损额度每年超过10亿美元。这对于任何一家公司来说都是一笔巨款，更何况是一家成立不到十年的公司。虽然亏损数额令人咂舌，不过，优步却表示，它在中国市场的亏损并没有什么好担心的。

优步创始人、首席执行官特拉维斯•卡兰尼克也表示，优步在中国的形势明显好于主要本土竞争对手——滴滴快的。而且他相信，通过利用其他地区的盈利向中国市场提供补贴，优步是能挺过早期在中国市场的这段艰难历程的。

我本人则认为，优步在中国的发展并不乐观。我认为，优步在中国的巨亏，是该公司在全球战略上存在深层问题的表象，暴露出优步在战略上存在一些严重缺陷。

当企业在海外扩展时，经常会面临陌生的文化、政治和经济环境，从而给这套在母国行之有效的业务模式带来额外的、不可预见的压力。同时，他们还面临着更了解当地情况的本土竞争对手。

没有一家科技公司比优步更剧烈地经历了这些困难。在不到七年的时间里，优步已经从北美扩展到了每一片有人居住的大陆上——包括欧洲、亚洲、南美洲、非洲和澳洲。有一阵子，优步几乎是以每天进入一个新城市的速度在扩张。最近，优步甚至还在泰国和印度等地开辟了人力车和摩托车的叫车服务。可以说，优步在产品和地缘上的扩展速度是史无前例的。

那么，如此迅速的全球扩张给优步带来了怎样的效益？可以说，效益要比期望低得多，而困难却比期望多得多……而且这不仅仅是在中国市场。让我们详细来看。

优步光是在美国本土就遇到了不少困难。优步的传统战略，是首先迅速攻入一个新阵地，把法律和监管后果留在以后解决。优步的支持者往往会称赞它的创新性、便捷性、迅速性、以及（没有猛增的）价格，但同时也有不少批评者指出，优步的运营方式应该被谴责，因为它的叫车服务明显违反了当地的法律法规。好在优步在美国的很多城市都较好地搞定了当地政客和监管机构。

优步首先坚称自己是一家软件公司，它只是在交通服务的供应者（出租车司机）与消费者（乘客）之间建立了一道联系。因此，优步认为应该完全由它的承包商（出租车司机）来承担守法合规的责任，而不是由优步来担责。

比如，优步曾在纽约出庭应诉，捍卫自己运营电子叫车服务的权力，与传统出租车公司进行针尖对麦芒的交锋，并且最终获得胜诉。而且优步还在迈阿密、旧金山和圣路易斯等多座城市进行了成功的游说，使这些城市按照其诉求修改了相关法律。

但在美国以外，优步就没有如此幸运了。除了在中国的亏损被广泛报道，优步在欧洲的发展也举步维艰。

这家年轻的科技公司在全球扩张的过程中犯了一个经典的错误：它天真地以为，那套令它在美国市场成功斩获龙头老大地位的业务模式和营销模式，套用到其他国家也能一样顺利。它严重低估了在经济、政治和文化环境都全然不同的国家运营时可能遭遇的挑战。

比如，说到政治环境的差异，优步那种百无禁忌的“先进入，再请求原谅（而不是允许）”的套路，更适用于英美法系国家。在美国和英国等英美法系国家，法律法规往往更加灵活，更注重司法解释。因此，优步在为其业务的合法性进行辩护的时候，也就能够取得更好的结果。

而在中国、法国、德国、西班牙以及欧洲大部，即所谓的大陆法系国家里，优步的这种进入方式是比较困难的。大陆法系是在罗马法的基础上建立的，主要基于法理、核心原则和法典。因此，大陆法系国家的法律往往更为死板，司法系统的职能更偏重于对法律的执行而非解读。因此，这些国家对于优步“打法律擦边球”的运营方式采取较为反对的立场，也就是意料之中的事了。

还有非常重要的一点，就是优步并没有充分认识到美国与其他国家在文化上的细微差异，因此在这些国家里没有得到“民心”。美国是一个高度个人主义的社会，鼓励个体保持个性，追求个人利益。而在亚洲以及法国、西班牙等部分欧洲国家，对集体和谐和社会秩序的重视往往超过个人成就。这些国家往往更重视其他人，更重视人际关系、亲情和团结友爱。因此，由于优步往往采取激进的进入策略，且对地方当局不够重视，并且没有在本地培养出真诚和信任的社会关系，因此消费者对其不够信任，也就没有什么好奇怪的了。

由于错误解读了所在国的政治和文化环境，加之采取了有瑕疵的全球扩张策略，因而优步不仅在中国亏损了10亿美金，它在很多其他国家，面对滴滴快的之类的本土竞争对手，也表现出了明显的劣势。比如，它在法国、德国、西班牙、荷兰和比利时的部分地区都遭到了“封杀”，理由是故意无视和违反当地法律，致使司机和乘客遭遇危险。而且，优步还在多个国家遭到了强烈抵制——多地发生了针对优步的抗议、骚乱；优步还与激愤的工会组织发生了激烈冲突。此外还有无休止的用户投诉。

那么，优步如何才能避免这些问题？

首先，这家年轻有为的公司应该认识到，中国、印度和欧洲等市场的经济潜力虽然已经成熟，但它们与美国有着方方面面的巨大差异。优步应仔细检讨自己的政策和策略，看看它们是否适合各个所在国。

其次，不管有多耗费时间，优步都应该先向有权机构争得运营许可，并藉此表达它对现有制度和规矩的尊重，如果这样的话，优步的运营可能会更顺利些。

第三，优步应该投入一些时间与精力，与代表出租车司机的工会组织建立良好的关系，而不是通过激进的进入策略，挑起本地工会的敌对反应。

另外，通过合作模式来规避各国的独有风险，也有助于优步免于遭受很多政治和社会面的抵制，同时也有助于在文化上亲近本地消费者群体。而且这也有助于令优步成为本地市场上的一个更加强大的竞争者。

虽然本文的标题说的是优步在中国遇到的问题，但优步在全球遇到的问题远远不止于中国。而且对于其他正在走全球化道路的企业来说，无论规模大小，无论从事什么行业，优步暴露出的问题存在共性。这也再次表明，在当今全球化的市场中，充分了解各国的政治、文化和经济环境，并相应地对企业的业务战略做出调整，具有何等重要的意义。（财富中文网）

本文作者罗伯特•萨鲁曼是纽约大学斯特恩商学院国际管理学副教授，也是《全球视野：企业如何避免全球化陷阱》一书的作者。

译者：朴成奎

What made the startup successful in the U.S. won’t work elsewhere.

Uber recently revealed that it is losing more than $1 billion per year in China. This is a colossal sum of money for any company, let alone one that has been in business for less than a decade. Despite the eye-popping headline number, Uber claims that its losses in China are nothing to be concerned about. According to its chief executive and founder Travis Kalanick, Uber is in a much better market position than its chief Chinese rival, Didi Kuadi, and he believes Uber can weather its early stumbles there by subsidizing losses with profits from other operations.

I am not so sure I take such a rosy view of Uber’s plight in China. I think they are symptomatic of deeper-seated global strategy problems and that they reveal some serious strategic flaws.

When companies expand abroad, they face unfamiliar cultural, political, and economic environments that put additional, unforeseen pressures on their domestic business models. They also face competitors who understand the local environment far better than they do.

No technology company has experienced these difficulties more acutely than Uber. In fewer than seven years, Uber has managed to expand from North America to every populated continent – Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and Australia. At one point Uber was entering one new city per day. And if that weren’t enough, Uber recently expanded its offerings in markets like Thailand and India with a rickshaw and motorbike service. That kind of growth in product and geographic scope is unprecedented.

So what does Uber have to show for all of this global expansion? Much less than it had hoped, and much more difficulty than it had anticipated, …and not just in China. Let’s take a closer look.

Uber has faced its fair share of difficulty in the US. Uber’s traditional approach has been to enter quickly and stake a claim to a new territory first, leaving the legal and regulatory ramifications for later. Though proponents laud its innovativeness, convenience, speed, and (non-surge) prices, detractors suggest that Uber is operating in a morally reprehensible way by running an illegal taxi service that clearly violates local regulations. To its credit, Uber has largely been able to placate regulators and politicians in various US cities. For starters, it maintains that it is a software company that merely connects suppliers (taxi drivers) with customers (fares). As such, it argues that the onus of regulatory compliance falls squarely on its contractors (the taxi drivers) and not on Uber. It has prevailed in courts in New York, for example, defending its right to operate an electronic taxi hailing service and compete head-to-head against traditional yellow cabs. It has also convinced politicians in various US cities—e.g., Miami, San Francisco, and St. Louis—to change existing laws in its favor.

But Uber has not been so lucky outside the US. Beyond its well-documented troubles in China, it is also struggling in Europe. The young tech company has committed a classic globalization mistake: it naively assumed that its business model and market approach, which ultimately solidified its market-leading position in the U.S., could translate just as seamlessly to other countries. It severely underestimated the challenges of operating in countries that embody totally different economic, political, and cultural environments.

For example, when it comes to political differences, Uber’s devil-may-care approach of asking for forgiveness (instead of for permission) works better in countries with legal systems based in common law. In common law countries like the US and the UK, laws and regulations are more flexible and subject to judicial interpretation. Uber is therefore afforded greater latitude when arguing the legality of its case in the courts of law. Such an entry approach is difficult, however, in civil law countries like China, France, Germany, Spain, and much of continental Europe. Civil law systems have their foundation in Roman Law and are based on doctrine, core principles, and codified rules. As a result, laws are more rigid and the role of the judicial system is to enforce, rather than interpret, the law. In that sense, an adversarial stance toward Uber’s less-than-by-the-book adherence to the law should have been expected.

Critically, Uber also failed to properly acknowledge the subtle and nuanced cultural differences between the US and foreign countries, thereby failing to win in the court of public opinion. The US has a particularly strong emphasis on individualist principles: individuals are encouraged to take chances to assert their individuality and pursue their individual self-interests. But in Asia, and in European countries like France and Spain, group harmony and societal order are stressed over individual achievement. There is a greater concern for others, a greater emphasis placed on personal relationships, and a greater sense of kinship and solidarity built into each country’s social compact. It is therefore not surprising that local consumers are skeptical of Uber’s aggressive entry tactics, lack of consideration for local authorities, and inability to foster genuine and trusting local relationships.

As a consequence of misreading political and cultural environments and adopting a flawed approach to global expansion, not only is Uber losing more than $1 billion in China, but it is at a distinct disadvantage to local companies like Didi Kuadi in many of the foreign markets it operates. It has been banned from operating in parts of France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. It has been accused of willfully ignoring and breaking the law, placing both drivers and riders in peril. And its presence in various countries has generated an incredible backlash – protests, riots, clashes with angry labor unions, and an endless litany of customer complaints.

So how could Uber have avoided this mess? First, the young, talented, and well-endowed company should have recognized that China, India, and Europe, though rife with economic potential, differ in meaningful ways from the US. It should have taken a careful look at its practices and policies to consider whether they were appropriate to each specific country. Uber would have fared better asking for permission to operate from the proper authorities and thus conveying its respect for established regulations and institutions, no matter how time consuming it may seem. It also should have invested time in building relationships with the various unions that represent taxi drivers rather than foment hostile reactions with aggressive entry tactics. Harnessing a cooperative approach that aims to anticipate country-specific risks would have helped Uber avoid much of the political – and popular – backlash it received. It would have helped curry cultural favor with the local consumer base. And it would have helped make Uber a more formidable competitor in the local market.

Although the headline was about Uber’s China problem, Uber’s global problems extend well beyond China. Moreover, the tale of Uber is one that is not uncommon for globalizing companies, big or small, new economy or old. And it highlights how important it is, now more than ever, to understand the political, cultural, and economic environments in the global marketplace and to tailor business strategies accordingly.

Robert Salomon is an associate professor of international management at NYU Stern School of Business and author of Global Vision: How Companies Can Overcome the Pitfalls of Globalization.