索罗斯误读了中国经济

传奇投资家乔治•索罗斯于近日发布了针对中国的新一轮警告。他表示，这个全球第二大经济体正面临着类似于2008年美国金融危机那样的灾难。该言论进一步强调了他之前的论断：中国经济硬着陆不可避免。索罗斯所说的当然有一定道理，但中国经济未必像他预测的那样劫数难逃。

我得承认，我的观点不是那么客观公正，作为一名生活在中国的居民，我就处在索罗斯等人所说的“下沉的船”上。如果船真的沉了，我肯定会受到损失。索罗斯最近提供的数据毋庸置疑。中国上个月的信贷增长超出了预计。整体债务水平已经达到了历史高点。GDP的增速正在下滑。对，某些行业的生产能力还严重过剩。然而，我不同意索罗斯关于中国经济将在短期内硬着陆的观点，也不认为中国的债务问题与美国2008年的情况类似。

首先，中国信贷总量占GDP的比重约为240%，只比美国的233%高一点。这与日本的400%和英国的252%仍有较大差距。把这240%GDP的债务拆开来看，我们可以发现政府、家庭和非金融类公司分别贡献了56%、40%和144%。中国非金融类公司贡献了如此高的比例，证明中国倚靠的是非直接融资，而不是直接融资。这也是由于中国的股市和债券市场只有30年的历史，发展还很不完善。

与此同时，中国政府和家庭的债务水平要远低于美国。正如我们所知，2008年的金融危机很大程度上是由一般美国家庭的过度杠杆借贷引发的。如今，中国有着全世界最高的储蓄率50%，而美国只有16%。中国积累了超过120万亿人民币的金融资产，其中55万亿人民币为银行存款，相对容易转化为现金。所以，一般中国家庭的资产负债比美国健康得多。他们有足够的储备和信心经受住金融风暴。

索罗斯和许多其他不看好中国的人一样，他们常说的是，投资者的资金越来越多地撤离中国，这是中国即将变糟的信号。然而我们有必要说明，资金外流进一步加大了投资者对于人民币走弱的预期。而美国联邦储蓄委员会（U.S. Federal Reserve ）并没有在1月和3月的会议后增加利率，这让投资者改变了预测。中国最近已经出现了资本净流入。该国的外汇储备也很多，达到了3.3万亿美元，其中还不包括0.85亿美元的主权基金。与此同时，中国的活期存款账户也有盈余。尽管中国的不良贷款率最近增加到了2%，但与中国1997年的25%相比还不值一提。不良贷款占GDP的比重为7%至14%，而在1997年这一比例为35%至40%。中国的资本充足率为13.5%，存款准备金率（RRR）为17.5%。由此可见，中国的银行业比1997年健康得多。

此外，中国仍然有发展空间。中国的人均GDP仅有8,000美元，美国是5.4万美元。中国的城镇化比例为56%，美国则接近80%。在我看来，这表明中国的经济还没有释放全部潜力。发展原理告诉我们，经济增长的驱动力是人力资本、金融资本、效率和创新。中国的发展重心已经从追求速度转为了追求质量。即便如此，GDP增速也已经达到了政府的新标准6.5%，对于大多数国家而言，这个数字也是望尘莫及。

然而，尽管我对中国的经济抱有一定的乐观态度，但我并不会忽视政府正在推行的结构改革的困难程度。这需要决心、勇气和具体行动，例如解雇劳动力明显过剩的行业（如煤炭、钢铁和运输）的500万名员工，改革国有企业，扭转投资边际收益递减的趋势。这些改革会触动利益既得者，可能会导致短期的社会混乱。然而一味地预言末日，却不把数据放在特定背景下考虑，这样没有任何建设性，也解决不了问题。利用恐吓战术削弱全球第二大经济体，这种做法除了做空的对冲基金外，没有人能够从中获益。

最后，我相信中国经济硬着陆的概率很低。即便出现硬着陆的情况，我认为中国有足够的缓冲来重整旗鼓。(财富中文网)

芮萌是中欧国际商学院（China Europe International Business School）的金融和会计学教授。

译者：严匡正

Legendary investor George Soros recently deliverednew warnings on China, saying that the world’s second largest economy is facing a financial crisis similar to the U.S. in 2008. His remarks double down on his earlier comment that a hard landing for China is inevitable. Soros definitely has a point, but China’s economy is not as doomed as hesuggests.

Let me acknowledge that my views are not entirely unbiased because as someone who lives in China I am aboard what some, like Soros, say is a sinking ship; if the ship goes down I will definitely be hurt. The statistics Soros recently gave are undeniable facts. China’s new credit increased by more than expected last month. The overall debt level has reached historic highs. GDP growth is slowing down. And yes, there is a serious overcapacity issue for certain industries. However, I do not agree with Soros’ gloomy prediction of a hard landing for China’s economy in the near future or the debt being comparable to what happened in the U.S. in 2008.

First, China’s credit-to-GDP ratio is about 240%, only slightly higher than the 233% level in the U.S. That’s still far lower than Japan’s 400% and the U.K.’s 252% levels. If we break down China’s 240%credit-to-GDP ratio, government, households, and non-financial corporations respectively contribute 56%, 40%, and 144%. China’s non-financial corporations’ high leverage ratio indicates that the country is relying on indirect rather than direct financing due to its under-developed stock and bond markets, which have only been around for the last30 years.

Meanwhile, the leverage level for government and households is much lower than that in the U.S. Aswe have learned, the 2008 financial crisis waslargely triggered by the over-leveraging of the average American household. Today, China remains the country with the world’s highest saving rate at50%, compared to 16% in the U.S. The country has accumulated more than 120 trillion renminbi of financial assets. Of that amount, 55 trillionrenminbi is in bank deposits, which is relatively easy to convert into cash. So the average Chinese household’s balance sheet is much healthier than that in the U.S. It provides enough reserves and confidence to weather an economic storm.

Soros, and many others who are bearish on China, often point to an increase in investors’ capital leaving China as signs of the country’s impending doom. What’s important to note, however, is that the outflow of capital accelerated on investors’expectations that the value of China’s currency would weaken. Investors’ outlook changed when the U.S. Federal Reserve did not announce interest rate hikes after meetings in January and March. China has recently seen net capital inflow. The foreign reserve is still at very high levels, $3.3 trillion, which does not include the sovereign fund of $0.85 trillion. At the same time, there is still a surplus in the current account. And despite the non-performing loan ratio recently increasing to 2%, it still looks trivial compared to the 25% China had in 1997. Theshare of non-performing loans relative to GDPrangesbetween 7% to 14%, compared to 35% to 40% in 1997. The current capital adequacy ratio is 13.5%. And the required reserve rate (RRR) is 17.5%.Therefore, China’s banking sector is much healthier than it was in 1997.

Additionally, there is still room for China to grow. The country’s GDP per capita is only $8,000, while in the U.S. it is $54,000. The urbanization ratio in China is 56%, while in the U.S. it’s close to 80%. To me, that suggests China’s economy has not reached its full potential. The development theory tells us that the driving forces behind economic growth are human capital, financial capital, and efficiency and innovation. China has shifted its priority to qualityof growth away from the previous pursuit of speed. Even the GDP growth rate has reached its new normal of 6.5%, a figure that is still impossible for most countries to achieve.

Yet despite my slightly optimistic assessment of China’s economy, I am not turning a blind eye to the toughness of the government’s ongoing structural reforms. They require determination, braveness, and concrete actions, such as laying off more than five million workers from industries in which there is obvious overcapacity (like coal, steel and shipping), reforming state-owned enterprises,and reversing the trend of diminishing marginal return from investments. These reforms are steppingon the toes of interest groups, which can cause short-term societal confusion. But doomsday predictions, which do not put the numbers into context, are not constructive and do not make the problems go away. Using scare tactics to weaken the world’s second largest economic engine does not benefit anyone except for the hedge fund with a short position.

In the end, I believe the chances of a hard landing for China are remote. And even if there is a hard landing, I think China has enough of a cushion to recover.

Oliver Rui is a professor of finance and accounting at China Europe International Business School (CEIBS).