Uber为何无法占领中国市场?不了解中国是主因
今年3月我曾指出,就利用中国叫车市场而言,Uber的位置很不利。该公司每年在中国亏损10亿美元,还要和本地企业滴滴出行(原为滴滴快的)争夺市场份额,后者处于盈利状态而且人脉广泛。因此,上周一听说Uber在两年亏损逾20亿美元之后同意将中国业务转让给滴滴时,我并不感到意外。 转让中国业务后,Uber将获得滴滴20%的股份以及10亿美元的权益投资。虽然财务和运营方面的其他细节尚未完全公布,但Uber中国被滴滴纳入旗下清楚地表明Uber已经放弃了征服中国叫车市场的宏伟目标。 Uber首席执行官特拉维斯•卡兰尼克此前曾表示,他并不担心Uber在中国的亏损以及缓慢起步。但Uber的股东持相反意见。Uber在中国遇到的困难似乎没完没了,这让股东们越发不安,因而对卡兰尼克施压,要求他减少损失并将注意力转向别处。 Uber的惨败印证了通用电气CEO杰弗里·伊梅尔特2012年说过的话:“中国市场很大,但很艰难。”确实,中国在文化、政治和经济上都和美国不同,是一个极为复杂的市场。亚马逊、谷歌、eBay、雅虎和Facebook等大型美国科技公司都在开拓中国市场时遇到了困难。尽管卡拉尼克在公开场合说过相反的话,但Uber的经历表明它也不例外。 在《全球视野:企业如何避免全球化陷阱》这本书中,我以美国公司为例,描述了西方企业在中国遇到的普遍问题。和西方国家相比,中国的基础设施、金融市场和银行系统都不够发达。因此,西方企业很难像在自己的国家那样经营其中国业务。西方经理人发现,中国的政治结构、法律体系以及监管规则既复杂又令人困惑。同时,中国人把私人关系和做生意混为一体,美国公司对此很陌生,因为它们习惯于把和客户以及员工的关系更多地作为商业往来处理。最后,中国消费者的口味和西方消费者截然不同,这让外国公司感到很难调整自己的产品和服务来满足中国消费者的特定需要。 可惜的是,Uber未能逾越这些障碍,惨痛教训让它明白,在中国扩张业务所蕴含的风险甚至能让精心布置的商业计划遭遇滑铁卢。要在中国这样的市场取得成功,企业制定的方案就得在风险和预期回报之间求得平衡。对许多西方企业来说,中国的风险远高于其价值,而且有许多西方公司干脆选择敬而远之。对那些迫切希望进入中国市场的企业来说,关键在于谨慎行事。 Uber明白缓慢推进以及对关系进行投资的重要性。卡兰尼克经常到中国来,目的就是培养政治人脉并建立庞大的司机网络。但对涉足中国市场的西方公司来说,找到合适的本地业务伙伴也很关键。中国公司一般都能更好地把握文化、经济和政治环境,而且可以帮助外国企业应付它们面临的所有风险。 Uber的失误就在这里,它想独自面对这个有风险而又复杂的市场。从一开始就和滴滴这样的公司合作或许能在一定程度上降低Uber的成本,甚至有可能避免被迫成为中国公司小合伙人的尴尬场面。(财富中文网) 作者是纽约大学斯特恩商学院国际管理学副教授。 译者:Charlie 校对:詹妮 |
Back in March, I suggested that Uber was poorly positioned to capitalize on China’s ride-hailing market. Uber was losing $1 billion a year in China and battling a profitable and well-connected local competitor in Didi Chuxing (formerly Didi Kuaidi) for market share. Therefore, I was unsurprised to learn last Monday that after two years and more than $2 billion in cash losses, Uber agreed to sell its Chinese business to Didi. In exchange for its China operations, Uber will receive a 20% minority stake in Didi and a $1 billion equity investment from the Chinese firm. Although additional financial and operational details are still emerging, the sale of Uber China to Didi is a clear indication that Uber has given up on its ambition to conquer the Chinese ride-sharing market. Uber CEO Travis Kalanick had previously suggested that he was not worried about the company’s losses and slow start in China, yet Uber’s shareholders felt otherwise. Increasingly troubled by Uber’s seemingly interminable difficulties in China, they pressured Kalanick to cut his losses and move on. Uber’s extraordinary failure reinforces General Electric -0.03% CEO Jeffrey Immelt’s statement from 2012: “China is big, but it is hard.” Indeed, China is an incredibly complex market that differs culturally, politically, and economically from the United States. Large U.S. technology companies like Amazon 0.11% , Google -0.06% , eBay -0.76% , Yahoo 0.64% , and Facebook 0.09% have struggled to make inroads in China. And despite Kalanick’s public statements otherwise, Uber’s experience demonstrates that it was no exception. In my book, Global Vision: How Companies Can Overcome the Pitfalls of Globalization, I describe many of the struggles that American companies specifically, and Western companies generally, have experienced in China. China’s infrastructure, financial markets, and banking system are underdeveloped relative to those in the West, making it difficult for Western firms to operate in China as they do at home. Western managers find China’s political structure, legal system, and regulatory rules complex and vexing. Also, the Chinese practice of intermingling personal and business relationships is foreign to U.S. companies accustomed to more transactional relationships with their customers and employees. Finally, Chinese consumer tastes are so different from Westerners’ that foreign companies find it challenging to adapt their products and services to meet the specific needs of Chinese customers. Unfortunately, Uber was not able to overcome these obstacles, learning the hard way that the risks inherent in expanding to China can sink even the best-laid business plans. To succeed in countries like China, companies need to develop strategies that balance these risks with anticipated rewards. For many Western firms, China presents far greater risk than it is worth, and many rightly elect to stay out. However, for those companies that feel compelled to enter the Chinese market, a measured approach is key. Uber understood the importance of proceeding slowly and investing in relationships. Kalanick made frequent visits to China to cultivate political relationships and develop an extensive network of drivers. However, for Western companies expanding to China, it is often also critical to align with the right local business partners. Local companies typically have a better handle on the cultural, economic, and political environment, and can help foreign firms navigate the full set of risks they face. This is where Uber erred: It tried to tackle a risky and complex market alone. Partnering with a company like Didi from the outset might have saved Uber some costly pain, and the embarrassment of having to accept a role as junior partner in a Chinese company. |