无视银监会打压，中国银行影子贷款继续增长

尽管中国已将不透明信贷视为影响金融稳定性的一个重大威胁，然而今年上半年，中国上市银行借出的“影子贷款”却依然激增，突显了中国银行业监管机构所面临的挑战。

近些年来，以一些中游规模的银行为首的信贷机构甚至加大了对影子贷款产品的使用，因为它们能向银行提供更高的回报率，而且它与传统借贷相比，占用的银行资本也更少。

然而这些影子贷款也掩盖了一家银行的资产负债表的真实质量。同时，整个行业齐“下水”的无奈现状，也使监管机构难以评估影子贷款在国民经济中的数额，以及其所带来的系统性风险。

近日，路透社的一篇分析文章指出，今年前六个月，上海浦发银行将信托计划和资产管理计划的应收款项上调了14%，至1.27万亿元人民币（约合1900亿美元），标志着浦发银行持有了中国规模最大的应收款项类投资组合。

另据路透社计算，中国最大的股份制银行——中国工商银行的影子贷款总额也上涨了4.4%，达到1.23亿元人民币，几乎等于其正常贷款总额的63%。

中国民生银行、中国浙商银行、盛京银行、锦州银行、重庆银行也显著提高了他们的投资组合，幅度达9%以上。据路透社的计算，民生银行和浙商银行的涨幅更是都达到了86%，也是所有中国上市银行中影子借贷的涨幅最快的。

AB Bernstein公司的银行业分析师候伟（音译）表示：“我其实有点惊讶，有些小银行竟然依然在加大持仓。”他补充道，考虑到当前的监管压力，各个银行应该倾向于减仓才对。

中国银监会并未立即回应我们的评论请求。

新规则

在此之前，中国银监会也曾试图遏制这些影子银行产品的野蛮增长势头，尤其是在一些中型规模的银行。

今年四月，银监会向各大银行颁布了第82号文件，大多数银行家和分析师在解读该文件时，都认为银监会的用意旨在迫使各大银行提高对影子贷款的准备金，使其与正常贷款保持一致。

当时有些分析师曾表示，银监会此举可能会迫使银行寻求新鲜资本来巩固其资产表。随着今年上半年各大银行的资本状况恶化，这种情形的可能性也越来越大。

根据瑞银（UBS）估算，到去年年底，中国的影子贷款总额已达12.6万亿元人民币，约占中国全年经济产出的五分之一。

信用评级机构惠誉（Fitch）也于今年七月表示，中国银行系统约有三分之一的贷款都在银行的正常贷款账目以外，从而严重影响了资产质量数据的信誉。

这一点格外令人担忧，因为根据官方数据，中国的不良贷款水平已经达到了创纪录的高度，而大多数分析师则认为，真实数据还要糟糕上好几倍。

银行对这些贷款式的信托和资产管理计划的会计处理方式也显然是不同的。

“虽然从本质上看，影子贷款很大程度上也是贷款，但它和贷款账目走的不是同一套规则。”瑞银证券分析师杰森·贝德福德表示。

“因此，正常贷款的一些常规限制，比如对单一贷款人的风险限制，以及一些关于不良贷款的识别规则，就无法应用到影子贷款上。”

虽然银监会的干预似乎并未对大多数上市银行上半年的财务文件上的数字造成什么明显的影响，但现在还是出现了一些积极的迹象。

比如中国招商银行就是今年上半年少数几家缩小了影子贷款规模的银行之一。据路透社计算，招商银行的信托计划和资产管理计划的应收账款下降了23%，降至5287亿元人民币。

招商银行副行长李浩表示：“在某种程度上，银行不符合标准的投资就是贷款，”并表示招行即将就此进行改革。

李浩在一次电话会议上向分析师们表示：“将来在新投资的问题上，招行的做法将会更加标准化。新的投资将不会再归入非标准投资的范畴，而是会归入贷款一类。”

AB Bernstein公司的分析师侯伟表示，他认为今年下半年，中国的中小银行将缩小投资应收账款的规模，否则监管机构可能将出台“更有针对性的政策。”

不过侯伟也补充道，虽然有些实力强劲的银行可以直接削减风险或者提高影子贷款的准备金，但对于一些较弱的银行来说，对影子贷款的处置有可能会带来不小的问题。

“对于一些面临较大运营压力的银行来说，提高影子贷款准备金或是把那些高风险的投资划回到贷款类别，可能会对原本就已经很脆弱的财务状况造成另一次打击。”（财富中文网）

译者：朴成奎

Shadow lending by listed Chinese banks surged in the first half, underlining the challenges faced by the country’s banking regulator as it tries to rein in the use of opaque lending structures that are seen as a threat to financial stability.

China’s lenders, led by the mid-tier banks, have been increasing their use of shadow lending products for years, as they can offer higher returns and tie up less of a bank’s capital than traditional lending.

But they also disguise the quality of a bank’s balance sheet, and sector-wide make it harder for regulators to assess systemic risk and the volume of lending in the economy.

A Reuters analysis of bank filings shows Shanghai Pudong Development Bank shanghai-pudong-development-bank , a leading joint-stock lender, increased its receivables for trust schemes and asset management plans, or so-called shadow loans, by 14% in the first six months of the year to 1.27 trillion yuan ($190 billion), giving it China’s biggest portfolio of such products.

The shadow loan book at China’s largest joint-stock lender, Industrial Bank industrial-bank , rose 4.4% to 1.23 trillion yuan, equivalent to 63% of its normal loan book, according to Reuters calculations.

China Minsheng Banking CMAKY 1.46% , China Zheshang Bank, Shengjing Bank, Bank of Jinzhou, and Bank of Chongqing also substantially increased their portfolios by 9% or more.

Minsheng and Zheshang both reported an 86% rise, the fastest among their listed peers, according to Reuters calculations.

“I’m actually a bit surprised that some smaller banks were still growing those positions,” said Wei Hou, AB Bernstein banking analyst. Given the regulatory push, the trend ought to be going the other way, he added.

The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

NEW RULES

The CBRC has tried to address the rampant growth of these shadow lending products, particularly at mid-sized banks.

In April it issued Document 82 to lenders, which most bankers and analysts interpreted as an attempt to compel banks to increase provisioning on shadow loans and bring them in line with normal loans.

Some analysts at the time said the move could force banks to seek fresh capital to shore up their balance sheets, a prospect that has become more likely as banks‘ capital positions deteriorated during the first half.

Shadow loans had already reached 12.6 trillion yuan at the end of last year, according to calculations by UBS, about a fifth of China’s entire annual economic output.

And credit rating agency Fitch said in July that around a third of system credit resides outside bank loan books, undermining asset quality data.

That is particularly worrying since Chinese banks‘ non-performing loans are already at a record high, according to official figures, and most analysts think the real figures are several times worse.

The accounting treatment of these loan-like trust and asset management plans is significantly different.

“These shadow loans are not subjected to the same rules as the loan book, despite being largely credit in nature,” said UBS Securities analyst Jason Bedford.

“As a result, normal limitations in the loan books, such as single-borrower exposure limits and non-performing loan recognition rules, don’t apply.”

Though the impact of the CBRC intervention is not evident in most of the listed banks‘ first-half filings, there are some positive signs.

China Merchants Bank CIHHF 5.93% was one of the rare lenders to scale down its shadow loans in the first half, with a 23% decrease in receivables from trust schemes and asset management plans to 528.7 billion yuan, according to Reuters calculations.

The bank’s deputy president, Li Hao, who acknowledged that “to some degree, the bank’s non-standard investments are loans,” indicated a change of approach was taking hold at the bank.

“For the future, the bank’s practice will be more standardized when it comes to new investments,” Li said. “They will no longer be put under the category of non-standard investments, but will be classified as loans,” he told analysts on a post-results conference call.

Hou from AB Bernstein said he expected that mid-tier and smaller banks would scale down their investment receivable positions in the second-half of the year, else the regulator would come out with “more targeted policies.”

But, he added, while stronger banks can cut their risks or increase provisions for their shadow loan holdings, it was more problematic for the weaker lenders.

“For banks facing big operational pressure, increasing provisions or bringing those high-risk investments back on their loan book would hit an already weak bottom line.”