嘉能可与俄企业的110亿美元交易：有答案，更有疑问

上周三晚间莫斯科传出消息，全球大宗商品交易行业龙头嘉能可和卡塔尔投资局已经同意斥资105亿欧元（111亿美元）收购俄罗斯国家石油公司Rosneft 19.5%股权。此事一经披露，立即被俄罗斯和西方媒体奉为能源行业年度最佳交易。

据称，嘉能可正在回归大宗商品交易本源。为了减轻巨额债务负担，过去两年该公司一直在竭力紧缩开支，而今则重新开始增长。

同时，俄罗斯已经通过吸引大型外国投资者打破了国际上孤立无援的处境，不断扩大的预算缺口也得到了填补。

不过，尽管这些大数字当然足以证明此项交易的合理性，但它几乎绝不会是乍看上去的样子，而且仍不明朗的实际交易情况牵扯的地缘政治因素很可能跟生意因素一样多。

首先，双方对交易的描述大相径庭。在双方会晤的电视直播片段中，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京“祝贺”手握大权的Rosneft首席执行官伊戈尔·谢钦“完成了”价值105亿欧元的交易（13年前谢钦策划了俄罗斯政府从寡头米哈伊尔 ·霍多尔科夫斯基手中没收尤科斯石油公司的行动，此后一直是普京政权背后的力量）。

嘉能可却在上周四表示，它只是处于一项交易的“最终谈判阶段”，预计此项交易将在12月中旬完成，而且价值为102亿欧元。

谢钦告诉俄罗斯媒体，两位买家的出资额相同。但嘉能可按要求向伦敦证券交易所披露，该公司只会以股权形式出资3亿欧元（所占权益仅为0.54%，而且还是“间接”持股），剩余资金则来自“卡塔尔投资局和非资源性银行融资”。这些银行融资是指一笔贷款，它实际上让嘉能可避开了持有Rosneft股份带来的大多数风险。

这笔交易中有一点很明确，那就是一份五年期协议，内容是每天为Rosneft销售22万桶石油。这将使嘉能可再次成为全球最大的俄罗斯石油交易商。美银美林分析师估算，假设每桶原油给嘉能可带来1美元收益，该公司在这五年期间可获利4亿美元，“相对于3.23亿美元的持股，这样的回报率非常有吸引力”。

《财富》杂志采访的一位石油交易公司高管认为，这样的利润率“听上去很高”，但一切都取决于此项交易的定价方案。他指出，无论如何，为自己的交易业务争取到数量如此庞大的石油对嘉能可来说就是一项“巨大”成就。

然而，如果嘉能可不拿出那100亿欧元，谁会提供这笔资金呢？卡塔尔投资局尚未做出承诺，也未对《财富》杂志请其发表评论的要求做出回应。据《财富》杂志了解，意大利圣保罗联合银行安排了本次的融资事宜，但该行也未回应《财富》的询问。

近几周，莫斯科投行人士一直在猜测Rosneft可能无法找到外国买家，因而可能不得不自行从政府的控股公司手中购买股份。确实，本周Rosneft已通过发行本币债券筹集了约94亿美元资金，而目前该公司并无其他可信依据来使用这样一笔巨资。

上周五Rosneft方面无人可发表评论（《财富》杂志将在相关各方做出任何回应后更新本报道）。

批评人士怀疑买下Rosneft债券的其实是俄罗斯其他国有机构，而且它们随后会将这些债券全部卖给俄罗斯央行。如果央行拿出钱来“接盘”，那就相当于印钱来弥补政府的预算赤字。但俄政府不敢公开这样做——两年前Rosneft斥资550亿美元收购TNK-BP时曾用过类似办法，结果几乎造成卢布崩盘。

俄央行女发言人上周五对《财富》杂志表示，该行理事会尚未认定Rosneft的债券符合俄央行的信贷抵押资格，而且也不清楚何时会做出相关决定。

但无法想象在俄罗斯会有人试图阻挠此项交易。就在一个月前，俄罗斯经济发展部长阿列克谢·乌柳卡耶夫的被捕轰动一时，而此前他曾出手阻止Rosneft收购另一家石油公司Bashneft。乌柳卡耶夫被指向Rosneft索贿200万美元，才能为此项交易开绿灯。

本次交易还有一点让人摸不着头脑。俄政府曾指责卡塔尔等海湾国家（特别是沙特）支持叙利亚的“恐怖分子”以及其他国家因阿拉伯之春而出现的反政府势力。这次俄罗斯却将“皇冠上的明珠”拿出相当一块儿来（以低于市场价的水平）卖给这样一位买家，可见俄罗斯是多么需要资金。

伦敦咨询公司Ecstrat策略分析师伊玛德·莫斯塔克认为：“在叙利亚战场上卡塔尔和俄罗斯也许一直处于对立状态，但在其他领域双方有大量共同利益，特别是天然气生产。俄罗斯正在进入美国在中东留下的真空地区，因此，卡塔尔强化跟俄罗斯的关系是合理行为。” （财富中文网）

作者：Geoffrey Smith

译者：Charlie

审校：詹妮

When the news broke late on Wednesday in Moscow, Russian and western media trumpeted it as the energy deal of the year: Glencore GLNCY -1.25% , the world’s biggest commodities house, and the Qatar Investment Authority had agreed to buy a 19.5% stake in Rosneft, Russia’s national oil champion, for 10.5 billion euros ($11.1 billion).

Glencore–so the narrative went–was returning to its dealmaking roots, starting to grow again after two years of brutal retrenchment to cut a crippling debt burden.

Russia, meanwhile, had broken its international isolation by attracting major foreign investors, filling a gaping hole in its budget.

But while the numbers are certainly big enough to justify the billing, the deal is almost certainly not what it appears at first sight–and the still-murky reality of it most likely has as much to do with geopolitics as with business.

For starters, the two sides of the deal are saying very different things about it. In a televised excerpt of a meeting between the two, President Vladimir Putin “congratulated” Rosneft’s powerful CEO Igor Sechin on the “completion” of a deal worth 10.5 billion euros. (Sechin has been the power behind Putin’s throne ever since he orchestrated the Russian government’s seizure of Yukos from the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky 13 years ago.)

However, Glencore yesterday said it is only in “final-stage negotiations”of a deal that it expects to close in mid-December, and that the value is only 10.2 billion euros.

Sechin told Russian media that the two buyers would contribute equally to the deal. But Glencore, under London Stock Exchange reporting obligations, said it would only contribute 300 million euros in equity (taking a tiny equity interest of 0.54%, and even that only “indirectly”), while the rest of the money was provided by “QIA and by non-recourse bank financing,” the latter being a loan that effectively insulates Glencore against most of the risks of owning Rosneft shares.

What is clear is that one part of the deal–a five-year agreement to trade 220,000 barrels a day of Rosneft’s oil–will restore Glencore to the position of the world’s biggest trader of Russian crude. Analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, in a back-of-the-envelope calculation, speculate that, if it can make $1 a barrel on that flow, Glencore will earn $400 million over the five years–”a very compelling return on $323 million in equity.”

One oil trading executive that Fortune spoke to reckoned that such a profit margin “sounds high,” but that everything depended on the deal’s pricing formula. Either way, he noted, securing such huge volumes of oil for its trading operations was a “huge” achievement for Glencore.

But if Glencore isn’t providing the 10 billion euros, who is? QIA hasn’t commented and didn’t respond to a request for comment from Fortune. Neither did Italy’s Banca Intesa SanPaolo, which Fortune understands to be the arranger of the financing.

In recent weeks, Moscow bankers had speculated that Rosneft would have to buy the shares from the government’s holding company itself, because it wouldn’t be able to find a foreign buyer. And indeed, Rosneft this week raised some $9.4 billion through the sale of local currency bonds, at a time when it has no other conceivable use for such a huge pile of cash.

No-one at Rosneft was available to comment Friday. (Fortune will update this article to reflect any later responses from the parties involved.)

Cynics suspect that the investors who took Rosneft’s paper are just other state-controlled Russian institutions who will dump the bonds at the Central Bank in due course. If the Central Bank creates money to refinance the bonds, then it will, effectively, be printing money to fund the government’s budget deficit. But the Kremlin is afraid of doing that openly: the ruble nearly collapsed two years ago when Rosneft used a similar trick to refinance its $55 billion acquisition of TNK-BP.

A Central Bank spokeswoman told Fortune Friday that its board hasn’t yet approved Rosneft’s bonds as eligible collateral for its credit, and that it’s not clear when it will take any such decision.

But it’s unthinkable that anyone in Russia will try to stop the deal going through. Only a month ago, Economy Minister Alexey Ulyukayev was sensationally arrested after trying to stop Rosneft buying another oil producer, Bashneft. Ulyukayev has been accused of extorting a $2 million bribe from Rosneft to approve the deal.

One final aspect of the deal also has heads spinning. Moscow has accused Qatar and other Gulf governments (notably Saudi Arabia) of supporting “terrorists” in Syria and rebels in other countries affected by the Arab Spring. That Moscow would sell a big chunk of its crown jewel (below market) to such a buyer illustrates how badly it needs the money.

“Qatar and Russia may have been opposing sides on the battlefield in Syria but have significant mutual interests elsewhere, including gas production in particular,” said Emad Mostaque of the London-based consultancy Ecstrat. “Russia is stepping into the vacuum left by the U.S. in the Middle East, and it makes sense for Qatar to build stronger relationships as a result.”