为什么下一个苹果可能不是一家上市企业可能不是一家上市公司？

苹果，以及与之类似的其他大型上市公司可能正在成为濒危物种。或者说，岌岌可危的至少是其所有权结构。实际上，在一些经济学家已经开始设想的未来中，就连苹果这样最有价值的美国公司也会和公开市场说再见。

本周，美国国家经济研究局以此为主题，发布了一份研究报告。其作者是知名经济学家亚利桑那大学教授凯思林·卡尔和俄亥俄州立大学教授雷内·M·史图斯。

美国上市公司不断改变的性质，和40年来一直影响美国工人的变化颇有些相似之处。其中之一就是，上市公司的数量不断减少，其经济状况也变得越发不平衡。

Apple, and other large public companies like it, may be an endangered species. Or at least their ownership structure might be. Indeed, some economists are starting to imagine a future where even the most valuable companies in America, like Apple, say so long to public markets.

That’s the subject of a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper published by this week by well-known economists Kathleen Kahle of the University of Arizona and Rene M. Stulz of the Ohio State University.

The changing nature of the American public corporation shares some similarities with changes that have affected the American worker over the past 40 years. For one, not only is the the number of public corporations on the decline, there is a growing inequality in the economic fortunes of those that remain:

如上图所示，虽然几十年来上市公司的总市值仍然接近历史最高水平，但它们的绝对数量不断下降。

不过，两位经济学家的研究发现，不光是现有上市公司聚集了更多的财富，更重要的是，上市公司内部的财富也变得更加集中。他们写道：“2015年，35家企业拥有上市公司一半的资产，一半的上市公司净利润集中在30家企业手中。而在1975年，这两个数字则分别是94和109。”

另一个令人吃惊的变化是，1980年，机构投资者在上市公司的持股比例平均为17.7%，现在则超过50%。最后，上市公司正在迅速老龄化，其平均年龄已经从1995年的12.2岁增至目前的18.5岁。这表明新公司越来越不愿意上市，而这种趋势对上市公司的整体性质有非常重要的影响。比如，老一些的公司不如新公司那样有创新性。

为什么这些情况很重要呢？

今年5月，针对为什么较年轻的公司都在躲避上市这一问题，《财富》杂志发表过一篇调查报告。结论是，由于现代经济的资本密集程度下降，再加上如今很容易获得资本支持，很多企业认为没必要忍受因上市而招致额外的监督。报告还认为，这或许不完全是一件坏事，因为“公共所有制一直存在的掣肘因素之一就是所谓的代理人问题，即所有者和经营者不统一。”这种理论认为，“大型上市公司的最高管理层一般只持有很少的股份，他们会想法设法增加自己的财富。这些方法也许有损于其他股东，而后者的所有权往往非常分散，无法约束经营者。非上市企业则不存在这个问题，因为主要所有人经常是经营者自身，或者是强有力的董事会成员。”

不过，近些年来跟踪过上市公司行为的人都应该知道，这项理论有个很大的问题：股票回购。上市公司正在把越来越多的盈利返还给股东，其形式包括分红和股票回购。上市公司的加权平均分红率已从1975年的27.1%升至目前的47%。倘若上市公司高管没有遵循股东的最大利益，他们很可能早把这些钱中饱私囊，或者投入自己看中的项目，而不是把它交还到老板。

所有这些都显示，现代上市公司正在丧失使命感。卡尔和史图斯写道：“整体而言，上市公司显得缺乏抱负，也未获得正确的激励以及机会。他们把资金返还给投资者，或者囤积现金，却没有筹措资金进行更多的投资。”

美国的上市公司群体正在萎缩，这不仅是企业领导人的问题，也是我们所有人的问题。我们认为，活跃的公开市场带来的透明度及其提供的机遇让经济受益。这种情况不仅限于投资者，也包括工薪族和选民。一个更偏向私营的经济体将导致更大的贫富差距和不公平，不仅是在公开市场和金融市场，在这些市场以外也会如此。（财富中文网）

作者：Chris Matthews

译者：Charlie

审校：夏林

As you can see from the above chart, the absolute number of public corporations has been on the decline for decades, while the total market capitalization of those left remain near all-time highs.

But what the economists in the study found is that it’s not just that there is more wealth concentrated in the remaining public companies. More importantly, the wealth among public companies is concentrated as well. “In 2015, 35 corporations account for half the assets of public corporations and 30 account for half the net income,” the authors write. “In contrast, in 1975, these numbers were 94 and 109.”

Another striking change: In 1980, institutional ownership of public firms averaged 17.7%. Today it’s over 50%. Lastly, public firms are aging rapidly, with the average age rising from 12.2 years in 1995 to 18.5 years today. This reflects the increasing unwillingness of new firms to go public, and this trend has very important effects on the overall nature of public firms. For one, older firms are less innovative than newer firms.

Why does this all matter?

Back in May, Fortune published an investigation of just why newer companies are eschewing going public concluding that because the modern economy is less capital intensive, and because capital is so easily available today, companies feel no need to put up with the extra regulation and scrutiny that come with being publicly listed. The argument was also floated that this might not be an entirely bad thing, as “One of the enduring drawbacks of public ownership is the so-called agency problem, the misalignment of owners and managers.” According to this theory, “Top executives at big public companies typically own only tiny stakes and are tempted to enrich themselves in all manner of ways that may harm the other shareholders, whose ownership is often so diffuse that they can’t discipline the managers. That problem doesn’t arise in private firms, where the majority owners are usually either the managers themselves or members of a powerful board of directors.”

But this theory has a big problem. And it is one that anyone following the behavior of public companies in the past few years should know: Buybacks. Public firms have been increasingly giving earnings back to shareholders. Since 1975, the weighted average of total payouts—in the form of both dividends and share buybacks—has risen from 27.1% of income to 47% today. If public corporate executives weren’t following the best interest of shareholders, they’d likely be using this money to invest in perks or pet projects, not returning it to their bosses.

All of this points to a loss of the sense of purpose of being a public company in the modern economy. “As a whole, public firms appear to lack ambition, proper incentives, or opportunities. They are returning capital to investors and hoarding cash rather than raising funds to invest more,” Kahle and Stulz write.

Public corporate America is shrinking, and that’s not just a problem for business leaders, but one for all of us who think that the economy benefits from the transparency and access to opportunity that robust public markets create. And that goes not just for investors but for investors but for workers and for voters, as well. A more private economy creates more inequality and inequity, not just in public markets, and financial markets, but outside of them as well.