垂死的“伊斯兰国”可能对美国威胁更大

特朗普政府高层日前表示，本月晚些时候，美国国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森将在华盛顿召集68个国家开会，商讨接下来如何联手打击极端恐怖组织“伊斯兰国”。

此次会议的背景是，“伊斯兰国”控制着相当可观的领土和人口，虽然离覆灭已经不远，但仍然威胁着美国和其他很多国家地区的安全。我们估算，2014年以来，“伊斯兰国”在伊拉克与叙利亚控制地区的人口分别减少约80%和56%。其对占据领土内最大城市摩苏尔的控制也正慢慢减弱，所谓的首都拉卡已沦为孤城，被多国联军攻下只是时间问题。2016年进攻“伊斯兰国”的境外战机数量达到巅峰，如今大幅减少。几千名伊拉克和叙利亚境内的“伊斯兰国”战士或是被歼灭或被俘，或者沦为散兵游勇，转为地下活动。

虽然多国部队取得了不少胜利，但即便“伊斯兰国”的所谓哈里发国家垮台，该组织和其他伊斯兰原教旨主义教派——萨拉菲派圣战组织也不会轻易销声匿迹，今后很多年可能继续阴魂不散。2003年美军攻占伊拉克后不久，当时指挥战争的陆军上将大卫·彼得雷乌斯曾问：“告诉我怎么收场。”这个问题现在也没过时。短期内，“伊斯兰国”直接攻击美国本土和盟友，或诱发攻击的威胁甚至可能有增无减。

过去两年，尽管在伊拉克和叙利亚境内自封的哈里发王国版图缩小，“伊斯兰国”仍主导或诱发了多起恐怖分子袭击，欧洲的巴黎、柏林和美国的奥兰多、纽约都深受其害。而今，“伊斯兰国”的魔爪遍布全球，除了位于伊拉克和叙利亚的核心哈里发王国，还有八个自设的省，另有几十个野心勃勃的组织以及数以万计追随组织有时直接接受指令的个人，匿藏在亚洲、中东、非洲、欧洲和北美。

若要消灭“伊斯兰国”的威胁，最重要的第一步就是解放摩苏尔和拉卡。唯有国不成国，“伊斯兰国”方有可能失去对全球恐怖分子的吸引力。只有夺其疆土，才可能阻止恐怖分子攻击美国等地区。然而和此前的基地组织一样，一旦失去大本营，“伊斯兰国”很可能蔓延至别处，继续扩大影响。

外国联军战机未能消灭的“伊斯兰国”战士可能逃离伊拉克和叙利亚，回到故乡寻求庇护，或者涌入新战场。仍留在伊拉克和叙利亚的支持者和领导人将转入地下，采用游击战术重新组织武装，伺机卷土重来。该组织还将继续在互联网和社交媒体网站散步意识形态的宣传，鼓励极端行动，煽动恐怖袭击。

“伊斯兰国”是美国出兵伊拉克及此后撤离行动的产物。2003年，美国的干预改变了伊拉克的政治平衡。此前，伊拉克由人口占少数的逊尼派掌权，美军入侵后政权落到人口占多数的什叶派手中，逊尼派穆斯林倍感不满，激起极端主义倾向。2011年，美军撤出伊拉克，邻国叙利亚又爆发内战。眼见内战临近，伊拉克境内的基地组织很快更名为“伊斯兰国”，跨过叙伊边境，将活动重心转移到叙利亚。

巧的是，美国当时正从伊拉克撤军，导致许多意料之外的后果：中东失去了与伊朗影响力抗衡的力量；伊拉克军队的职业化进程戛然而止；什叶派领导的伊拉克日渐政治化、腐败丛生、越加羸弱时，美国人反而抽身离去。就这样，2014年初发生了令美国政府震惊的一幕：“伊斯兰国”士兵突然杀出叙利亚，迅速挺进，一路打到伊拉克首都巴格达市郊。

美国前总统小布什和奥巴马都宣称伊拉克战争已经结束。可战争不会因为一纸政令画上句号。关键是特朗普政府不要第三次犯同样的错误。要等到地方武装夺回被“伊斯兰国”占领的地区，地方政府真正有效地管理起来，才能放心地宣布“伊斯兰国”已被击溃。不仅要在伊拉克和叙利亚实现，还包括其他一些被“伊斯兰国”划为领地的地区，包括阿富汗、尼日利亚、利比亚和埃及等。

击败“伊斯兰国”对叙利亚的难度尤其大，目前该国还没有受到认可的地方政府组织打击恐怖分子。解放拉卡后困难也不小，如何处置这座城市就是个问题。即便多国联军夺取拉卡获得进展，就叙利亚未来谈判期间美国也要适当重新参与。

往往在一些管理不善的穆斯林国家，“伊斯兰国”容易得势，这并非偶然。建立政权其实很棘手，所以入侵伊拉克后历任美国政府都极力避免。但如果一直处于无政府状态，战争会无休无止。

若要彻底击败“伊斯兰国”并确保不会死灰复燃，除了军事手段，还需采取措施提升国家和地方政府的经济、技术和政治实力。现在要大力安抚民心，因为民怨会催生极端主义运动。美国不必一力承担，但特朗普政府应该带头组织各方，与受害国家合作齐心协力打击“伊斯兰国”。（财富中文网）

作者：James Dobbins,Seth G. Jones

译者：Pessy

审稿：夏林

本文作者之一赛斯.G.琼斯任非营利、无党派智库兰德公司旗下国际安全与防务政策中心主管，同时任约翰·霍普金斯大学兼职教授。另一作者詹姆斯·多宾斯为美国资深外交官，退休前任美国国务院驻阿富汗和巴基斯坦的特别代表，现任兰德公司外交与安全政策特聘高级研究员。

Later this month, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson plans to host a 68-nation meeting in Washington to discuss the next moves by the coalition fighting the Islamic State, a senior Trump administration official said on Thursday.

This comes as the Islamic State, an actual state with territory and population, is on the verge of extinction, but remains a threat to the U.S. and many parts of the world. Since 2014, the group’s control over people has been cut by roughly 80% in Iraq and 56% in Syria, according to our estimates. The Islamic State is also slowly but steadily losing control of its largest remaining city, Mosul. Its capital, Raqqa, has been isolated and is awaiting assault. Foreign fighter flows to the region peaked in 2016 and have drastically shrunk. Thousands of Islamic State fighters in Iraq and Syria have been killed, captured, dispersed, or driven underground.

Yet despite these successes, the collapse of the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate will not eliminate the organization or other Salafi-jihadist groups, which will likely continue for years. “Tell me how this ends” then Major General David Petraeus asked in 2003, just after American forces had taken Iraq. This question is just as pertinent today. In the short term, the threat of Islamic State directed or inspired attacks on the U.S. homeland and its allies overseas may even grow.

Over the past two years, the Islamic State has conducted or inspired an increasing number of terrorist attacks from Paris and Berlin to Orlando and New York even as its self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria has shrunk. Presently, the Islamic State’s global footprint includes eight formal provinces outside of the core caliphate in Iraq and Syria; dozens of additional aspirant groups; and tens of thousands of inspired and sometimes directed individuals across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America.

The liberation of Mosul and Raqqa are important initial steps in diminishing the threat from the Islamic State. Without an actual state, the Islamic State will likely lose a substantial amount of its appeal. Without a secure territorial base to operate from, it may have a harder time organizing external attacks. Yet the Islamic State, like al Qaeda before it, will continue to metastasize and seek to spread its influence once it loses its home base.

Those foreign fighters that aren’t killed will likely flee from Iraq and Syria, returning to their homelands, seeking refuge in other countries, or flocking to new jihadist battlefields. Islamic State supporters and leaders in Iraq and Syria will go underground, seeking to regroup and renew the fight by turning to guerrilla tactics. And the Islamic State will continue to orchestrate an ideological campaign on the internet and social media sites to inspire radicalization and encourage attacks.

The Islamic State is a byproduct of the American intervention in Iraq and also of its subsequent departure. The 2003 intervention shifted the political balance in the country away from the formerly dominant Sunni minority toward the Shi’a majority, leaving Sunnis disgruntled, adrift, and ripe for radicalization. The year 2011 saw both the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and the opening of a civil war in neighboring Syria. With the advent of that civil war, al Qaeda in Iraq, soon to rename itself the Islamic State, shifted its center of gravity across the border.

The coincident American withdrawal from Iraq had several additional consequences. It removed a counterweight to Iranian influence; it halted professionalization of the Iraqi Army, and it reduced American visibility into the deteriorating condition of those forces as they became politicized, corrupted, and progressively weakened by the Shi’a-dominated regime in Baghdad. Washington was consequently taken by surprise when, in early 2014, Islamic State fighters burst out of Syria, rapidly advancing to the outskirts of Baghdad.

George W. Bush and Barack Obama both declared their wars in Iraq over. But wars don’t end by fiat. It will be important that the new administration in Washington not make this mistake a third time. The Islamic State will not be defeated until local forces can secure liberated territory and local governments can effectively administer these areas. This needs to occur not just in Iraq and Syria, but in the half dozen other lands where the Islamic State has established territorial footholds, to include Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, and Egypt.

This challenge is particularly acute in Syria, where there is at present no acceptable local government to support. This makes the question of what to do with Raqqa once liberated particularly difficult. Even as the military campaign to take the city gains momentum, Washington will need to reengage diplomatically in the ongoing negotiations over Syria’s future.

It is not accidental that the Islamic State has taken root in some of the most poorly governed countries in the Muslim world. State-building is an unpopular mission, from which successive American administrations have shied. Yet the alternative is war without end.

If the Islamic State is to be defeated and stay defeated, military measures will need to be combined with economic, technical, and political assistance designed to improve state and local capacity. Popular grievances that have given rise to extremist movements need to be better addressed. These are not steps the United States should take alone, but Washington should lead in assembling and guiding donor coalitions working with each of the affected countries.

Seth G. Jones is director of the International Security and Defense Policy at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. James Dobbins, a veteran diplomat who most recently served as the State Department’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a senior fellow and Distinguished Chair in Diplomacy and Security at RAND.