中国精酿啤酒市场新来了一位恶霸

2015年底，钱德勒·尤林考意识到有人正在窥探他的啤酒龙头。

尤林考是悠航啤酒坊的两位业主之一。这家位于北京的精酿啤酒厂在中国十几座城市分销啤酒，还在著名的夜生活区三里屯经营一家拥有3个楼层的全新旗舰店。（尤林考介绍说，悠航啤酒坊的名称源于弗兰克·罗瑟在上世纪40年代创作的爱情歌曲《一艘驶往中国的慢船》。）向各大高档餐厅和酒吧销售桶装啤酒，是悠航啤酒坊的重要收入来源。在中国首都，好啤酒不像在西雅图或堪萨斯城那样容易找到。

本垒美式烧烤就是它的客户之一。这家极具人气的餐厅曾经利用它的9个啤酒龙头销售5款悠航鲜啤。悠航啤酒坊每周派遣一名技术员来照看这些啤酒管线。尤林考说，“我们购买啤酒管线，还负责安装和维护。”但有一天，这位技术人员惊奇地发现，一种被称为流量计的设备正在检测每条管线。流量计测量经过龙头的啤酒数量，这是餐厅追踪销量的一种方式。

In late 2015, Chandler Jurinka realized someone was spying on his beer taps.

Jurinka and a partner own Slow Boat Brewery, a Beijing craft-beer maker that distributes its beers across a dozen cities in China and runs a new three-level brewpub in Beijing’s nightlife district. (Jurinka named the brewery after the 1940s Frank Loesser love song “On a Slow Boat to China.”) The business is driven in part by sales of kegs to restaurants and bars in China’s capital, where good beer isn’t as easy to find as it is in, say, Seattle or Kansas City.

One of those restaurants, a popular spot called Home Plate BBQ, once sold five Slow Boat drafts on its nine taps. Slow Boat sent a technician weekly to take care of the tap lines: “We bought them, installed them, and maintained them,” says Jurinka. But one day the tech was startled to find a device called a flow meter monitoring every line. Flow meters measure the beer passing through the taps, as a way for restaurants to track sales.

这个流量计并非本垒美式烧烤自己安装的，而是全球啤酒巨头百威英博集团的杰作。餐厅老板告诉尤林考，它是这家拥有百威(Budweiser)、科罗娜(Corona)和时代(Stella Artois)等著名品牌的啤酒酿造商提供的一项免费福利。就凭这样一个小小的举动，百威英博就赢得了这家餐厅的好感，并获得了一个窥视竞争对手的情报源——因为这个流量计可以实时监测悠航鲜啤的销量。尤林考极其愤怒。“但除了从龙头拿下我们的啤酒，我几乎没有办法。”这位强壮的前美国陆军军士无奈地说道。

然后，在去年夏天，本垒美式烧烤为百威英博主办了一场为期四天，旨在向北京消费者推介精酿品牌鹅岛啤酒(Goose Island)的活动。参与者不仅有免费啤酒喝，还有机会与该品牌吉祥物自拍留念。中国新闻网站像追踪时装秀那样，报道了这场活动。到了秋天，这家餐厅仅有一个出酒阀在销售悠航鲜啤。现如今，位列本垒美式烧烤啤酒推荐清单之首的，是三款鹅岛啤酒。

啤酒流量计仅仅是一场新营销战争的序曲之一。百威英博正在进军中国新兴的精酿啤酒市场：自2016年初以来，这家比利时-巴西啤酒集团在北京和上海铺天盖地地投放了大量鹅岛啤酒——百威英博于2011年收购了这个来自芝加哥的精酿品牌。鹅岛借助法国葡萄酒桶和波旁威士忌橡木桶，酿造充满异国情调的啤酒。伸着细长脖子的呆萌鹅Logo有望赢得中国消费者的追捧，并改变其口味。百威英博正在致力于向中国不断增长的年轻消费者推销高档啤酒，而这场宣传攻势恰恰是该战略的核心所在。尽管包括喜力啤酒(Heineken)和督威啤酒(Duvel)在内的竞争对手也从海外进口精酿啤酒，投放在中国市场，但没有一家拥有像百威英博这样高涨的热情。

Home Plate itself hadn’t installed the meter: The global beer giant AB InBev (bud, -0.33%) had. The restaurant owners told Jurinka it was a free perk from the brewer of Budweiser, Corona, and Stella Artois. With one move, AB InBev had earned goodwill with the restaurant and got a source of intel on its competition—since the meter could monitor Slow Boat’s sales in real time. Jurinka, a broad-shouldered former U.S. Army sergeant, was incensed, he says, “but other than take our beer off tap, there was little I could do about it.”

Then last summer Home Plate hosted a four-day event for AB InBev—a Beijing unveiling for the craft brand Goose Island that included free beer and selfie opportunities with the goose mascot. China’s news sites covered the event like a fashion show. By autumn the restaurant had replaced all but one of Slow Boat’s taps. Now sitting atop Home Plate’s draft menu: three Goose Island beers.

The flow meter was one of the first salvos in a new marketing war. AB InBev is bulldozing its way into China’s nascent craft-beer market: Since early 2016, the Belgian-Brazilian beer conglomerate has inundated Beijing and Shanghai with Goose Island, the Chicago-based craft brand it acquired in 2011. Goose Island brews exotic beers that it ages in French wine casks and bourbon barrels and has the kind of cute animal logo that can turn heads, and tastes, in China. The campaign is central to AB InBev’s strategy of promoting pricier beer to China’s growing ranks of wealthier young consumers. While competitors—including Heineken and Duvel—are importing their own craft beers, none have moved with the same gusto.

百威英博正在抓住一个额外的优势：由于中国的监管环境薄弱，它可以采用一些在美国根本不能通过审查的方式强势进入市场。该公司对分销商施压，要求他们不能营销其他精酿啤酒，并给予酒吧各种奖励，以怂恿他们着力推销鹅岛啤酒，并撤下其他精酿品牌——在美国，诸如这样的交易都是非法的。它还提供优渥的薪酬来拉拢当地的酿酒人才。南京精酿啤酒品牌高大师的老板高岩表示，“百威英博想成为一家精酿啤酒酿造商，但它不想改变作为一家大啤酒商的行事做派。”

这家全球啤酒巨头对中国寄予厚望，希望在这个世界上最大的啤酒市场弥补它在美国犯下的灾难性错误——错过精酿啤酒革命。在过去十年中，以销售额计算，精酿啤酒蚕食了美国市场20%的份额，最大的受害者莫过于工业啤酒品牌，比如百威英博旗下的百威和Bud Light。2016年，该公司在美国的销售额下降了2%；百威啤酒的销售额则遭受2008年以来的最大冲击，下降35%。去年12月接受行业网站Just-Drinks采访时，桑福德伯恩斯坦公司分析师特雷沃·斯特林表示，“要不是百威英博旗下的安海斯-布希公司或多或少地忽视了这个行业，独立厂商的精酿啤酒根本就不可能发展到如此大的规模。”

在过去六年，百威英博在美国相继收购了9家精酿啤酒商（鹅岛是其最大的收购对象之一，交易额高达3900万美元），但仍然没有扭转销量放缓的颓势。规模不大，但蓬勃发展的中国精酿啤酒市场，为它提供了第二个利用这股全球趋势的机会。

啤酒酿造商无休止地讨论精酿啤酒的定义。一般而言，它是指由小型啤酒坊生产的啤酒；相较于你通常在杂货店购买的啤酒，其口感更好，酒精含量更高。（被百威英博这样的巨头收购后，这些啤酒坊是否仍然能够保持足够小的规模，从而有资格继续享有“精酿”之美名，则是一个备受争议的话题。）但无论它的具体定义是什么，中国的精酿啤酒市场正在蓬勃发展。十几家成功的酿酒坊如雨后春笋般出现在北京和上海的街头，这股潮流正在迅速地向成都、南京、深圳和武汉等城市蔓延。在中国，啤酒是仅次于茶的第二大饮品，其消费量现在占据全球啤酒产量的四分之一。根据欧睿国际提供的数据，自2008年以来，中国啤酒市场的零售额已经翻了一番，年消费额高达5500亿元。

AB InBev is seizing an additional advantage: Thanks to China’s weak regulatory climate, it can muscle into the market in ways that wouldn’t pass muster in the U.S. AB InBev has leaned on distributors to keep them from carrying other craft beers. It has given bars incentives to promote Goose ­Island while shoving other beers off the taps—deals that would be illegal in the States. It’s offering lavish salaries to poach local brewing talent. “AB InBev wants to be a craft-beer brewer,” says Gao Yan, who owns a Nanjing craft brand called Master Gao. “But they want to act like a big brewer.”

The leviathan is turning to China, the world’s biggest beer market, to compensate for a catastrophic mistake it made in the U.S.—missing out on the craft revolution. Over the past decade craft brews grabbed 20% of the U.S. market in dollar terms, largely at the expense of mass-produced lagers like AB InBev’s Budweiser and Bud Light. In 2016 the company’s U.S. sales fell 2%; Budweiser sales have taken the biggest hit, falling 35% since 2008. “Craft beer would never have become as big under independent ownership if [AB InBev’s] Anheuser-Busch had not more or less ignored the sector,” Sanford Bernstein analyst Trevor Stirling told the website Just-Drinks in December.

AB InBev has purchased nine craft breweries in the U.S. over the past six years—Goose Island was among the biggest acquisitions, at ­$39 ­million—but they haven’t turned around slowing sales. China’s tiny but booming craft market offers a second chance to capitalize on a global trend.

Brewers endlessly haggle over the definition of craft beer. Generally speaking, it’s beer produced by small breweries that is more flavorful and (usually) higher in alcohol content than what you typically find in the grocery store. (Whether brewers remain small enough to hold the label “craft” after being acquired by giants like ABI is a contentious topic.) However it’s defined, the craft market in the Middle Kingdom is booming. A dozen successful breweries have popped up across Beijing and Shanghai, with more appearing in Chengdu, Nanjing, Shenzhen, Wuhan, and other cities. Beer is the most consumed beverage after tea in China, which now gulps a quarter of global beer output. Retail sales have doubled since 2008, according to Euromonitor, and Chinese consumers spend 550 billion yuan (roughly $80 billion) annually on beer.

在这个消费额中，精酿啤酒占据的份额无疑很小，尽管分析师们只能提供一些粗略的猜测。英敏特市场研究咨询公司全球饮品分析师乔尼·福赛思说，“现在可能是0.1%。”但他补充道，随着中国的啤酒市场不断走向成熟，精酿啤酒必将迎来腾飞。啤酒经销商Top Shelf Asia的业主加里·布朗表示，百威英博现身中国预示着一个令人时刻的时刻即将来临。“它就像星巴克一样：如果你看到一大批咖啡店在一片区域出现，你就知道现在就是进入这一领域的最佳时机。”

对于百威英博来说，中国市场还有另一个有利因素：监管法规不成比例地倾向于最大的市场参与者。在美国，酿酒商不能合法地拥有酒吧或垄断酒吧销售的啤酒；在中国，除控制经销商之外，酿酒商还可以购买酒吧。产品安全法规给予巨头们另一个竞争优势。百威英博从美国进口鹅岛啤酒，然后在中国销售。也就是说，鹅岛的酿造工艺遵循美国的监管法规。然而，中国本土酿酒商不得不服从更加严苛的法规。监管法规要求，中国境内生产的瓶装啤酒必须获得质量认证，而这些认证标签只提供给每小时产量至少1.2万瓶的生产线——这是精酿啤酒坊产量的好多倍。中国的瓶装啤酒还必须进行巴氏消毒和过滤，进而消除了精酿啤酒独特口感所要求的酵母和沉淀物。

在实践中，这些规则意味着微型啤酒厂不得不在酒吧销售桶装啤酒，而进口的“精酿啤酒”则可以轻松地分销到任何地方。令人意想不到的结果是：在中国，啤酒罕见地成为一个监管法规有利于外国大公司，而不是本土制造商的市场。百威英博正在竭力利用这一优势。

颠覆性增长

百威英博的历史，始于三位巴西投资者（即私募公司3G的创始人）在20世纪80年代后期收购了一家名为博浪的酿酒商。2004年，博浪与比利时巨头英特布鲁公司合并为英博啤酒集团，后者随后在2008年一笔令人瞠目结舌的交易中，斥资520亿美元收购美国最大的啤酒酿造商安海斯-布希公司。去年，新成立的百威英博出资1030亿美元吞下其最大的竞争对手南非米勒公司。这家全球性啤酒巨头现在控制着200个品牌，占据全球啤酒市场近三分之一的份额。上个季度，百威英博销售了价值142亿美元的啤酒。

但一些弱不禁风的“大卫”仍然在伤害这个硕大无比的“歌利亚”。百威英博的业绩连续七个季度未达到分析师预期。销量下挫的，不只是百威啤酒，还包括Bud Light和Busch等主流品牌。于是，像其他跨国公司一样，百威英博开始在中国不遗余力地寻求增长空间。其战略核心是：在小型酿酒商有机会获得市场份额之前，挤压其生存空间——或者将其吞并。

百威英博正在通过一个名为“颠覆性增长”的部门协调其精酿战略；竞争对手称其为“精酿啤酒颠覆部门”。第一步是控制酒吧。 “这是你在美国看不到的东西。” 供职于斗猫酒吧的美籍酿酒师迈克尔·乔丹这样说道。（斗猫酒吧是一家位于上海的精酿啤酒吧，在去年的世界啤酒节上为中国赢得了第一枚奖牌。）他声称，诸如百威英博这类行业巨头在中国提供的那些奖励措施，将违反西方法律。“中国没有这方面的监管法规。”

目前还不清楚百威英博与本垒美式烧烤这类餐厅达成了多少交易，但竞争对手表示，这种“收购啤酒龙头”的现象极为普遍。在北京夜生活区三里屯，一位酒吧老板向《财富》讲述了百威英博最近向他和合伙人提出的一个交易建议。（由于担心伤害他的生意，这位老板坚决要求匿名。）去年冬天，百威英博的代表主动联系他洽谈业务，并慷慨地表示，如果他的酒吧同意销售包括鹅岛在内的多种精酿啤酒，该公司每月将提供多达6万元的奖励——这笔钱足够支付这家酒吧近三分之二的租金。百威英博告诉他，他们打算购买这片区域所有的户外广告空间，这将有助于他的酒吧跟当地官员谈判。“政府官员通常会说，‘如果我们让你架起一个大广告牌，而你隔壁的餐厅没有，这事就很难办了。’现在，百威英博打算花钱给隔壁那家也安装一个广告牌！”

不过，他和合伙人还是有些惴惴不安。他们是否仍然能够播放喜力啤酒赞助的橄榄球比赛，并且继续提供在售的其他精酿品牌，比如加州的Firestone Walker和堪萨斯城的Boulevard？根据协议，他给这些品牌设定的价位不能低于百威英博旗下品牌。他说，“这是否意味着，当鹅岛售价20块的时候，其他品牌就必须卖25块？”最终，他和合伙人没有签字：他们不想失去控制权。

百威英博的提议或许过于专横，但在中国，这样做没有任何法律问题。如果该公司在美国尝试类似的收购，它注定将面临生效时间长达80年的反垄断法制裁。禁酒令出台前，酿酒商有权拥有酒吧。他们以低廉的价格销售其酒类产品，设法从酒馆身上挤压利润，并诱惑酒吧经理通过引入赌博和卖淫等方式提高利润率。禁酒令被推翻后，三层分销系统（包括与酒吧谈判的中间分销商）成为酒类监管的主要对象，进而消解了大型酿酒商对酒吧的影响力。

在世界的另一边，这个制度并不存在。中国的酒吧很难抗拒百威英博提供的丰厚奖励。约翰·盖伊的麦考利爱尔士酒吧公司在华南地区拥有多家连锁店，去年的销售额突破1000万美元大关。这位语速极快的澳大利亚人表示，他听说百威英博为一些酒吧业主提供高达100万元人民币的奖励，以鼓励他们将在售的精酿啤酒全部转换为该公司旗下品牌。他为自己销售多种海外精酿啤酒而自豪，并一脸不屑地表示，他永远不会接受此类交易。但其他酒吧业主或许别无选择。他说，“一些酒吧在盈亏平衡线上挣扎，就靠着酿酒商的奖金（一些酒吧每年可获得1.5万美元奖励）挣点钱。”对于这些酒吧来说，百威英博看起来就像是一条生命线。

Craft’s share of that total is undoubtedly small, though analysts can only offer guesses. “Right now it might be 0.1%,” says Jonny Forsyth, global drinks analyst at Mintel. But he adds that craft beer tends to take off as a market matures, as China’s is. Gary Brown, owner of beer distributor Top Shelf Asia, says AB InBev’s appearance in China is a sign of heady times to come. “It’s like Starbucks: If you see a bunch of their coffee shops going up in an area, you know it’s a pretty good one to be in.”

There’s another reason China is a good market for AB InBev: Regulations disproportionately favor the biggest players. In the U.S., brewers can’t legally own bars or monopolize the beer a bar offers. In China, brewers can and do buy bars, in addition to controlling distributors. Rules around product safety give another edge to the giants. AB InBev imports Goose Island into China from the U.S., where it’s brewed under American regulations. China’s own brewers, however, have to obey more restrictive rules. Regulations require a stamp of quality approval on bottles produced inside China. Those stamps are available only to production lines that generate at least 12,000 bottles an hour—huge multiples of what craft brewers produce. Beer bottled in China also must be pasteurized and filtered, eliminating yeast and sediments that give craft beers character.

In practice, those rules mean microbreweries have to sell their beer in kegs on-site in brewpubs, while “craft” imports can be easily distributed anywhere. The upshot: Beer is the rare market in which China plays favorites with big foreign companies at the expense of local producers. And AB InBev is racing to tap that advantage.

AB InBev began when three Brazilian investors—the founders of the private equity firm now known as 3G Capital—bought a declining brewer called Brahma in the late 1980s. That operation merged with Belgian giant Interbrew in 2004 to create InBev, which then obtained America’s largest brewer, St. Louis’s Anheuser-Busch, in 2008 in a stunning $52 billion deal. The new AB InBev outdid itself last year by paying $103 billion for rival SABMiller. It now controls 200 brands and nearly a third of the global beer market. Last quarter, AB InBev sold $14.2 billion worth of beer.

But diminutive Davids continue to wound this sudsy Goliath. AB InBev has missed analysts’ estimates for seven quarters in a row. Sales have sunk for not just Budweiser but Bud Light, Busch, and other mainstay brands. So, like other multinationals, AB InBev is looking for growth in China, and it’s pulling no punches. The heart of its strategy: Squash—or someday soon acquire—small breweries before they have a chance to capture market share.

AB InBev coordinates its moves through a division called Disruptive Growth; competitors call it the Craft Beer Disruption Unit. The first step: controlling the bars. “This is something that you just don’t see in the U.S.,” says Michael Jordan, the American expat brewmaster at Boxing Cat, a Shanghai brewery that last year won China’s first medal at the World Beer Festival. He argues that the incentives brewers like AB InBev offer in China would run afoul of Western laws. “There’s just no regulation on this side.”

It’s unclear how many deals AB InBev has with bars like Home Plate, but rival brewers say these “tap takeovers” are widespread. One bar owner in Beijing’s Sanlitun nightlife district described a recent deal he says AB InBev proposed to him and his partner. (The owner insisted on anonymity for fear of harming his business prospects.) AB InBev reps approached him last spring and offered to pay 60,000 yuan a month—enough to nearly cover about two-thirds of his bar’s rent—if his bar agreed to host its assortment of beers including Goose Island. He said AB InBev told him it was planning to purchase all the outdoor advertising space in the area, which would put his bar on better negotiating terms with local officials. “Often the government official says, ‘If we let you have a big sign, your neighbor restaurant won’t have one, and that will be bad,’ ” he said. “AB InBev will just buy the neighbor a sign!”

Still, he and his partner were uneasy. Would they still be able to show rugby matches sponsored by Heineken? And the craft beers he already offered, from California’s Firestone Walker and Kansas City’s Boulevard? Under the agreement, he couldn’t price those for less than AB InBev’s beers. “So how would that look, those being sold at 25 kuai [yuan] when Goose Island is 20 kuai?” he says. Ultimately, he and his partner didn’t sign: They didn’t want to lose control.

AB InBev’s offer may have been heavy-handed, but in China it’s legally unproblematic. If it tried a similar takeover in the U.S., it would face antitrust action under laws that have been in place for 80 years. Before Prohibition, the brewers owned the bars. They sold their product cheaply, squeezing the profits out of saloons and tempting bar managers to juice margins by introducing gambling and prostitution. After Prohibition was overturned, a three-tier distribution system—including a middleman distributor to negotiate with bars—became a staple of alcohol regulation, keeping big brewers’ influence at a remove from bars.

On the other side of the world, this system doesn’t exist, and Chinese bars have a tough time turning down the kind of money AB InBev offers. John Guy, a quick-talking Australian whose McCawley’s chain of bars in southern China had sales last year topping $10 million, says he has heard of bar owners being offered 1 million yuan (about $150,000) to switch all their draft beer to AB InBev brands. Guy prides himself on his range of overseas craft beers and says he would never accept such a deal. But other bar owners don’t have the same choice. “Some bars run at break-even and make money on tap bonuses—$15,000 a year on some,” he says. For them, AB InBev looks like a lifeline.

百威英博的剑锋也指向中国啤酒经销商。《财富》看到了该公司与一家最大的全国性经销商签订的合同。该合同规定，在这家经销商与另一家酿酒商签订分销合同之前，它必须首先征得百威英博的同意。这份去年签订的合同写道，“在双方签署协议前，经销商和百威英博必须收集关于高端啤酒品牌和销量的统计数据和书面确认。”实际上，百威英博拥有这家经销商能否销售另一家公司旗下精酿啤酒的否决权。

中国的经销商过去也签订类似的合同，但他们可以通过私下交易来分销其他啤酒。然而，借助类似这样的合同，百威英博束缚住了分销商的手脚。一位分销商告诉《财富》，百威英博试图跟他签订一份鹅岛经销合同，但这份合同将限制他将其他品牌存储在同一个仓库，从而有效地阻止他的小公司经销其他竞品。（由于他不想对抗这样一家强大的酿酒商，这位经销商要求匿名。）

在美国，诸如这样的行为很可能被宣布无效。在百威英博近年来收购北美酿酒商期间，一些酿酒商抱怨说，这家啤酒巨头试图与分销商达成类似交易以遏制竞争。美国司法部随后介入调查，并于去年7月份宣布与百威英博达成和解。这项庭外和解协议要求百威英博遏制这种交易，其未来收购事宜必须交由司法部进行正式审查。据了解，中国没有类似的行动。

百威英博发言人丽贝卡·郭拒绝置评该公司与中国酒吧的关系，称其为“商业敏感事项”。她补充说，百威英博赠送流量计是为了改善该公司啤酒的普及度，并加强促销活动。她表示，“批发商选择经销哪些啤酒，完全取决于他们自身的决定。”鹅岛总裁肯·斯托特在一份声明中说，中国和其他非美国市场的啤酒爱好者“对鹅岛的反应非常好。”

四处撒钱

在这样一个进口啤酒——哪怕是百威这种大众市场啤酒——带有奢侈品光泽的国家，百威英博正在稳步扩张。根据欧睿国际提供的数据，按销量计算，2015年，这家公司控制着中国市场15.7%的份额，较2011年的11.7%有所上涨，仅次于本土巨头华润控股（它酿造世界上最畅销的雪花啤酒）和青岛啤酒。

百威英博并没有单列精酿啤酒的业绩。但在2016年前9个月，其中国销售额增长4%，达到34亿美元，税前和调整前的收益增长19%至9.73亿美元。不难计算，其利润率高达30%——在中国这样一个利润率稳居世界顶级啤酒市场末位的国家，这是一个令人艳羡的数字。

这家公司由此拥有了四处撒钱的雄厚资本。中国啤酒业资深人士表示，百威英博已经为其精酿部门发动了一场疯狂的招聘攻势，向专业人士提供相当于业内平均水平三到四倍的薪酬。尤林考透露说，悠航啤酒坊的两位销售人员去年离职，加里·布朗的经销公司也有两人转投百威英博。百威英博亚洲区总监曾致电深圳TAPS精酿啤酒屋一位员工，并问他“为什么不为我们工作呢？”如此赤裸裸的挖角行为让这家小型酿酒商的老板丹尼尔·杜姆布里震惊不已。该公司甚至大肆招募那些鼓励中国人尝试精酿啤酒的布道者。两位时尚的“啤酒女孩”曾经在长达两年的时间里，开着Mini Cooper敞篷车在上海街头销售自酿啤酒——其中一位去年加盟百威英博。

百威英博甚至会花钱招募客户。去年九月份，鹅岛在中国社交媒体上刊登广告，寻找年轻人为酒吧增加人气：“你爱喝鹅岛吗？你是否知道还有比免费更好的事情？想有偿参加这些活动吗？加入鹅岛大家庭，这些梦想真的可以实现。”在北京和上海，该公司向20岁到40岁的饮酒者承诺，除了免费啤酒，纵情摇摆之外，他们还有钱赚。既然百威英博打算不怕麻烦地控制中国酒吧，它当然希望这些酒吧人气爆棚。

这家啤酒大鳄也向酒吧提供折扣价，有时甚至免费的桶装啤酒，以建立鹅岛的人气——这是竞争对手最害怕的策略。许多酿酒商认为，百威英博正在扭曲市场，拉低精酿啤酒的价格，而小型酿酒商根本无力承受这样做招致的损失。深圳百优精酿的老板乔·芬肯宾德尔表示，他听说鹅岛桶装精酿的售价仅是自家产品成本的三分之一。“他们正在以此作为矛头，无限地压低售价。”他说。

在中国精酿啤酒市场，并非所有人都对百威英博持批评态度。深圳TAPS精酿啤酒屋的老板杜姆布里表示，“他们正在做的事情，其实让我非常兴奋。”他在不太富裕的重庆市开设了一家酒吧，那里的员工不断地向客户解释为什么精酿啤酒比街上卖的其他啤酒更加昂贵。他预计，这家跨国公司的煽动性营销活动将有助于中国饮酒者了解印度淡色爱尔(IPA，它是几乎所有精酿酒吧的标配)和贮藏啤酒之间的区别。

百威英博大力推广鹅岛，也有助于酒吧吸引那些在理论上愿意尝试其他啤酒的客户。北平机器啤酒吧联合所有人，35岁的央视主持人李伟（音译）去年增添了两个鹅岛龙头。作为回报，百威英博去年为北平机器啤酒吧免费提供了两桶鹅岛波旁世涛。在美国，这款限量版精酿啤酒每年的短期发布活动，是精酿鉴赏家们翘首以盼的盛事。在李伟的啤酒吧，一瓶8盎司的鹅岛波旁世涛。他把百威英博称为合作伙伴。

百威英博提供的一些免费赠品反映了精酿啤酒在世界各地的销售方式。欧睿国际饮品分析师安娜•沃德指出，像百威这样的大众市场品牌很适合传统广告，但“当你给精酿啤酒打广告时，你也就贬低了它的声誉。”好莱坞不会像营销最新大片《变形金刚》那样营销一部独立电影；同样的逻辑也适用于啤酒。这是一个重要的区别，因为美国精酿啤酒的大繁荣，正是拜消费者对“大啤酒”的厌恶所赐，而这种厌恶势必会迁移到中国。自2014年以来，中国啤酒市场一直呈下滑趋势。百威英博告诉分析师，它计划通过专注于高端啤酒来提高在华业务利润，这种战略似乎正在起效——即使销量下滑，该公司在中国的销售收入仍然在增长。

尽管百威英博最近不惜成本地推广鹅岛精酿，它仍然在等待收获回报的时刻。去年夏天，这家公司在中国各大城市举办了一系列营销和折扣活动，但鹅岛的销量据说并不理想。业内人士表示，有一段时间，鹅岛以成本价涌入各大酒吧和餐厅，极其渴望在啤酒陈腐前将其售出。

在这样一个自身仍然很微小的精酿啤酒市场上，这种短暂颓势的后果或许同样微不足道。曾几何时，美国精酿啤酒市场同样极其微小，而百威英博错失了这一趋势。它不想重蹈覆辙。3月份，这家全球啤酒业巨头再次彰显了它称霸中国精酿市场的决心：该公司以一笔未公开的金额收购上海斗猫酒吧。美籍酿酒师乔丹不再担心跟这个新来的巨人正面竞争。他现在是鹅岛团队的一份子。（财富中文网）

原文刊载于2017年3月15日发布的《财富》杂志。

译者：Kevin

AB InBev is also targeting China’s distributors. Fortune has seen a contract between AB InBev and one of the country’s nationwide distributors under which the distributor must report to AB InBev before it signs a craft-beer deal with another brewer. “Dealers and AB InBev should gather statistics and written confirmation regarding the super-premium beer products’ brand and sales volume before both sides sign the agreement,” says the contract, issued last year. In essence, AB InBev gets veto power over whether the distributor sells another company’s craft beer.

Previously in China, distributors would sign similar contracts but could carry other beers through side deals. But through contracts like this one, AB InBev has hamstrung distributors. A distributor owner who requested anonymity because he didn’t want to antagonize a powerful player told Fortune he was offered a deal to carry Goose Island, but it would have restricted him from storing competing brands in the same warehouse—effectively keeping his small company from carrying the rivals.

Behavior like this would likely get quashed in the U.S. During AB InBev’s acquisitions of breweries in North America in recent years, craft brewers complained that the beer behemoth was trying to curb competition by striking similar deals with distributors. The Justice Department scrutinized the practice, and in July it announced a settlement with AB InBev curbing such deals and requiring the opportunity for formal DOJ review of future acquisitions. As far as anyone knows, there’s no similar action afoot in China.

Rebecca Kuo, an AB InBev spokesperson, declined to comment on AB InBev’s relationships with China’s bars, calling them “commercially sensitive matters.” She added that InBev had given away flow meters to improve availability and sales promotions of the company’s beers and that “it is ultimately up to the wholesalers as to which beers they choose to carry.” Goose Island president Ken Stout said in a statement that drinkers in China and other non-U.S. markets “have responded really well to our beer.”

In a country where imported beers—even mass-market ones like Budweiser—have a patina of luxury, AB InBev has steadily expanded. The company controlled 15.7% of China’s market by volume in 2015, up from 11.7% in 2011, according to Euromonitor, trailing only domestic giants China Resources Holdings (which brews the world’s top-selling beer, Snow) and Tsingtao.

AB InBev doesn’t break out craft numbers, but its China sales grew 4%, to $3.4 billion, in the first nine months of 2016, and earnings before taxes and adjustments jumped 19%, to $973 million. That’s a 30% profit margin—impressive in a country that ranks dead last among the world’s top beer markets for profitability.

That gives the company piles of cash to throw around. China’s beer veterans say AB InBev has launched a frenzied hiring blitz for its craft unit, offering salaries three to four times what the pros could earn elsewhere. Two salespeople from Slow Boat left last year, Jurinka says, and Gary Brown’s distribution business had two defections. Daniel Dumbrill, owner of Shenzhen microbrewery Taps, was stunned when the AB InBev district manager for all of Asia called one of his staff and demanded, “Why are you not working for us?” The company is even poaching the beer proselytizers who helped build China’s craft scene. Two hip women from Shanghai and their Chihuahua—a team known collectively as BrewGirl—sold homebrewed beer out of their Mini Cooper for two years before one joined AB InBev last year.

AB InBev will even hire customers. In September, Goose Island advertised on Chinese social media looking for young people to fill bars: “Do you LOVE drinking Goose Island? Do you think it’s even better when it’s FREE? Or, better yet, getting PAID to attend these events? Join the Goose Family and these dreams really can come true.” The company promised drinkers in Beijing and Shanghai, ages 20 to 40, that they would earn money in addition to “beer and swag.” If AB InBev is going to go to the trouble of controlling China’s bars, they had better be crowded.

The brewer also offers discounted and sometimes free kegs to bars to build Goose Island’s popularity—and that’s the tactic some competitors fear most. Craft brewmasters believe that AB InBev is distorting the market, dragging down prices for craft beer while incurring losses that smaller brewers can’t sustain. Joe Finkenbinder of Bionic Brew in Shenzhen says he has heard of Goose kegs selling for a third of the cost of his kegs. “They’re using that as just the tip of the spear and then driving the prices into the ground,” he says.

Not everyone selling craft beer in China is critical of AB InBev. “I’m actually excited about what they’re doing,” says Dumbrill, the Taps owner. Dumbrill opened a location in Chongqing, in Sichuan province, a less affluent city where his staff is constantly explaining to customers why craft beer is more expensive than what’s being sold down the street. He expects that the multi­national’s splashy marketing campaigns will help teach Chinese drinkers about the differences between, say, an IPA and a lager.

Heavy promotions of Goose Island also help bars attract customers who, in theory, will try other beers. Li Wei, a 35-year-old host on CCTV, co-owns a Beijing brewpub called Pei Ping Machine Brewery. He added two Goose Island taps last year. In return, AB InBev last October delivered two free kegs of Goose Island’s Bourbon County Brand Stout, a special-edition beer whose annual short-term release in the States is celebrated among the craft cognoscenti. Li’s tap house sold it in eight-ounce glasses for $14. He calls AB InBev a partner.

Some of AB InBev’s freebie promotions mirror the way craft beer is sold worldwide. Mass-market brands like Budweiser lend themselves well to conventional advertising, says Anna Ward, drinks analyst at Euromonitor, but “when you advertise craft, you take away from its credentials.” Hollywood doesn’t market an indie film the same way it does the latest Transformers blockbuster; the same logic applies to beer. That’s a key distinction, because the distaste for “big beer” that fueled the craft boom in the U.S. is bound to migrate to China, if it hasn’t already. Total beer volumes sold in China have declined since 2014. AB InBev has told analysts it plans to boost profits in the country by focusing on premium beers, and it may be working—its China revenue is growing even as sales by volume decline.

For all its recent spending on Goose Island, AB InBev is still waiting for a payoff. After the company blanketed Chinese cities with events and discounts last summer, there were reports of tepid sales. Insiders say at one point Goose Island flooded bars and restaurants with kegs priced at cost, eager to move the beer before it went stale.

The consequences of such hiccups may be tiny in a craft-beer market that’s still tiny itself. Once upon a time, the U.S. craft market was equally microscopic, and AB InBev missed the trend. That’s a misstep it doesn’t want to repeat. And in early March it showed it was serious, acquiring the Boxing Cat brewery for an undisclosed sum. Jordan, the brewmaster, no longer has to worry about competing against the new giant in town. He’s now on the team.

A version of this article appears in the March 15, 2017 issue of Fortune.