是谁杀了长颈鹿杰菲？揭密玩具反斗城最后的日子

大家都想去玩具反斗城，或者说是去长颈鹿杰菲（该公司吉祥物）的总部走一遭，体验一下游览糖果玩具仙境的感觉。

但在新泽西州韦恩镇吉欧菲瑞路1号，也就是吸引着几代孩子的杰菲的精神家园，这些天的气氛很是糟糕。

3月14日，下午刚过3点，这家经典玩具连锁零售商的首席执行官戴夫·布兰登，带来了令3万多名美国员工一直害怕的消息——我们完了。70年后，玩具反斗城关门歇业，成为亚马逊时代的零售行业以及举债支撑的私募并购中的一名伤亡人员

布兰登哽咽着对大约600名员工说：“走到这一步让我十分伤心。我深信我们已经竭尽全力，而事实证明我们遇到了几乎无能为力的情况。”

情况怎么会变成这样？和大多数倒闭的公司一样，玩具反斗城的演变刚开始很缓慢，随后一溃千里。在互联网即将来临的黑暗时期，这家公司是所向披靡的玩具超级市场，决定着影响整个行业的时尚和品位。它的广告词——“我不想长大，我是玩具反斗城小孩”在数百万人脑海中留下了烙印。

但到了去年9月，也就是离关键的假期购物季还有几个月的时候，来自亚马逊和沃尔玛的无休止竞争，再加上2005年杠杆收购留下的50多亿美元债务，最终压垮了这家公司。玩具反斗城在几乎没有警示的情况下申请了破产保护。布兰登当时说，希望玩具反斗城能以更胜以往的姿态出现。

他在纽约时代广场的玩具反斗城门店宣布：“这是公司新时代的黎明。”

然而，布兰登满怀的期望以令人吃惊的速度破灭了。很快，管理层和长期债权人之间出现了争执。申请破产保护时，这些债权人持有该公司约50亿美元的债务，他们迅速催促布兰登关闭800家美国门店中的一部分，以便减少损失。不久，供应商对于向玩具反斗城供货的顾虑开始变大，他们担心自己拿不到货款。

放弃希望

玩具反斗城背后的金主，包括KKR公司、贝恩资本和Vornado Realty Trust当时均已放弃了努力。提交给监管部门的文件显示，拿到逾4.7亿美元手续费和利息但没获得分红后，这些资方为了最后的清算而放弃了让玩具反斗城在2013年重返股市的希望。当时看来，唯一要做的事就是不断降低成本，并在可能情况下就所有债务争取到更好的条件。

从某个角度来说，玩具反斗城宣布清算（至少在美国范围内）只不过是老式零售行业又一个似曾相识的悲伤故事。在另一个角度上，它再次表明私募资金是如何让这个行业的激变朝着更糟糕的方向发展，这样的情节已经上演了很多次。体育用品经销商Sports Authority、婴幼儿用品店金宝贝、平价鞋店Payless Shoesource、饰品经销商Claire’s和服装经销商J. Crew等等连锁经营企业在私有化后一直难以适应迅速变化的行业格局。

受到破产保护的玩具反斗城拒绝发表评论。所有者代表也都拒绝发表意见，或对《财富》杂志的询问默不作声。

价值缩水

债券持有人发现手中投资的价值一落千丈。美国金融业监管局债券报告系统Trace提供的数据显示，2018年到期的玩具反斗城高级无担保债券上周四的收盘价为5.25美分，而申请破产保护前一周这个数字是72美分。

参与破产保护程序的人士透露，局势几乎从一开始就十分明朗。9月份申请破产保护后，包括持有约30亿美元破产债务的债权人在内，债权方纷纷抱怨玩具反斗城在披露业绩和反转策略方面不够配合。申请破产保护6个月后，该公司仍未拿出脱离破产保护状态的方案，债权人开始失去信心。

包括摩根大通和高盛在内，债权方使尽浑身解数来提供债务人持有资产贷款，这是首先要偿还的借款。随后，几家对冲基金在10月份威胁说，如果不让它们拿到3000万美元款项，它们就会对这些贷款启动违约程序。其他方面则就各家海外子公司和资产的价值争论不休，比如知识产权和不断成长的亚洲业务。

关键购物季

接下来到了黑色星期五，也就是美国假期购物季的关键起点。这次圣诞节前的预热对玩具反斗城来说成了一场灾难。布兰登后来抱怨说，9月份申请破产保护动摇了消费者信心。此外还有其他一些问题，比如谈判进展缓慢让供应商感到紧张，再比如咄咄逼人的债权人催促该公司关闭更多门店。

纷争之中，供应商变的越发焦虑。玩具反斗城真的能脱离破产保护吗？给供应商吃定心丸并提供短期贷款的公司开始退却。到今年2月初，其中大多数公司都弃它而去。

此时供应商也发现了布兰登已经看到的东西，那就是购物季对玩具反斗城来说是个打击，销售额比上年同期下降了15%左右。

布兰登当初的乐观情绪开始降温。1月23日，他在致员工的信中把购物季的失败表现归结为破产以及一些运营失误。作为密歇根大学前体育主管（布兰登辞职的原因是大学董事会的否定以及学生对他追逐利润的工作方式感到愤怒），他在达美乐披萨获得了成功，而后在2015年由贝恩聘请至玩具反斗城。现在他急需另一场胜利。

放手政策

熟悉情况的人士透露，但除了挑选主管，这些私募所有人基本采取放手政策。同时，玩具反斗城每年还得自行为债务支付逾4亿美元的利息。

到了2月份，一些最高级负责人开始推动直接清算。这家公司70年的零售历史由此开始走向一个不光彩的终点。

几家玩具厂商上周三表示，他们打算买下玩具反斗城在加拿大的业务，并借此在清算时收购一些美国门店，作为子公司来经营，这可能改善玩具反斗城的前景。清算时的其他潜在收购方也纷纷浮现。

上周四，28岁的安吉拉·米利根和25岁的切斯·道格拉斯在曼哈顿中城第33大街的玩具反斗城Express门店寻找破产打折商品（该公司尚未因清算而下调玩具价格）。还有顾客回忆了往事。

39岁的约翰·帕克说：“它伴随我们长大。我的孩子们再也找不到货架上只有玩具的地方了。”（财富中文网）

译者：Charlie

审校：夏林

You want a trip to Toys “R” Us, head office of Geoffrey the Giraffe, to feel like a visit to a sugarplum Toyland.

But the mood is black these days inside One Geoffrey Way in Wayne, New Jersey, spiritual home of the cartoon mascot who’s been beckoning to kids for generations.

Shortly after 3 p.m. on Wednesday, Dave Brandon, chief executive officer of the iconic toy chain, delivered the news that his more than 30,000 U.S. workers had been dreading: We’re finished. After 70 years, Toys “R” Us would close shop — a casualty of Amazon-era retailing and debt-fueled, private-equity deal-making.

“I am devastated that we have reached this point,” Brandon told a group of about 600 employees. “I truly believe we did our best, under what turned out to be nearly impossible circumstances.” He choked up as he spoke.

How did it come to this? The answer, as with most bankruptcies, is slowly, and then all at once. In the pre-Internet dark age, the company was the unrivaled supermarket of toys, the arbiter of fads and tastes that shaped the entire industry. Its advertising jingle — “I don’t want to grow up, I’m a Toys ‘R’ Us kid” — is lodged in the brains of millions.

But by last September, just months before the crucial holiday season, relentless competition from Amazon.com Inc. and Walmart Inc. — combined with more than $5 billion in debt from a 2005 leveraged buyout — had finally overwhelmed the chain. With little warning, it filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, in the hope, Brandon said at the time, of emerging better than ever.

“It’s the dawn of a new day for the company,” he proclaimed at the Toys “R” Us in New York’s Times Square.

Instead, his hopeful plans unraveled at a startling clip. Battles quickly broke out between management and long-time creditors, who were owed about $5 billion at the time of the filing. Lenders soon were urging Brandon to shut hundreds of the 800 U.S. stores fast to contain the damage. Before long, vendors were growing wary about shipping toys to the chain, fearing they might not get paid.

Abandoned Hopes

The financial powers behind Toys “R” Us — among them KKR & Co., Bain Capital and Vornado Realty Trust — had all but given up by then. After earning more than $470 million in fees and interest payments while taking no dividends, according to regulatory filings, they’d abandoned hopes of flipping Toys “R” Us back onto the stock market in 2013 for the ultimate payoff. The only thing to do, it seemed, was to keep cutting costs and, hopefully, negotiate easier terms on all that debt.

On one level, the announced liquidation (at least in the U.S.) is yet another familiar story about the sorry state of old-school retailing. On another, it’s a tale of how private equity has, in many cases, worsened the industry’s upheavals. Sports Authority, Gymboree, Payless Shoesource, Claire’s, J. Crew: All these chains, and more, have struggled to adapt to the fast-changing landscape after being taken private.

With Toys “R” Us in Chapter 11, the company declined to comment. Representatives of the owners also declined to comment or didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Falling Values

Bondholders have seen the value of their investment plummet. The company’s senior unsecured bonds due in 2018 last traded Thursday at 5.25 cents on the dollar, down from 72 cents the week before the bankruptcy filing, according to Trace bond-price data.

Almost from the start, sharp lines were drawn, according to people involved in the bankruptcy process. After the September filing, creditors — including holders of some $3 billion in bankruptcy financing — complained that Toys “R” Us was being less than forthcoming about its financials, as well as its turnaround strategy. Six months after the filing, the company had no bankruptcy-exit plan in place, and lenders were losing faith.

The lenders, including JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., jockeyed to provide debtor-in-possession loans, which are first in line to get repaid. Then a group of hedge funds threatened in October to trigger a default on these loans until they got a $30 million piece of them. Others argued over the valuations of various international subsidiaries and assets, such as intellectual property and the growing Asian business.

Crucial Season

Then came Black Friday, the crucial kickoff to the U.S. holiday shopping season. The Christmas run-up turned into a disaster for Toys “R” Us. Brandon later complained that the September bankruptcy had shaken customers’ confidence. But there were other problems: The slow pace of negotiations was unnerving vendors and prompting creditors to urge more store closings.

Amid the disputes, suppliers grew increasingly anxious. Would Toys “R” Us really emerge from bankruptcy? Firms that insure vendor shipments and provide short-term financing began to back away. As of early February, most had bolted.

By then, vendors had learned what Brandon already knew: The holiday season had delivered a blow, with sales plunging about 15 percent from the previous year.

Brandon’s initial optimism was fading. In a Jan. 23 letter to employees, he blamed the holiday showing on the bankruptcy, as well as some operational missteps. Formerly athletic director at the University of Michigan (he resigned amid disapproval from the Board of Regents and student anger over his profit-driven approach to the job), he’d had a successful stint at Domino’s Pizza and was recruited by Bain in 2015. Now, he desperately needed another win.

Hands-Off Approach

But beyond picking executives, the private-equity owners generally took a hands-off approach, people familiar with the matter say. Toys “R” Us, meantime, was left to pay more than $400 million a year in interest alone on its debts.

By February, some senior-most lenders began to push for an outright liquidation. And, with that, 70 years of retail history slid toward an ignominious end.

Prospects could be buoyed by a group of toymakers who said Wednesday they’re looking to make a bid for the company’s Canadian business, through which they would buy some U.S. locations in the liquidation to operate as a subsidiary. Other potential liquidation bidders have begun to crop up as well.

On Thursday, at the Toys “R” Us Express on 33rd Street in Midtown Manhattan, Angela Milligan, 28, and Chace Douglas, 25, were looking for bankruptcy bargains (no liquidation markdowns yet). Other customers waxed nostalgic.

“We grew up with it,” said John Park, 39. “My kids aren’t going to experience a place where there’s just shelves of toys.”