三个理由，特朗普新“太空部队”或成祸水

几十年来，对太空战的想象一直是美国民众、政策制定者和军方人士的脑海中挥之不去的梦魇。本周特朗普总统又重燃了这一话题，他宣布他已指令国防部创建一支新的“太空部队”，成为美军新的军种。有些人或许认为这是英明的举措，但特朗普的这一计划不但会破坏当前美国在太空中的地位，更可能威胁到未来对太空的和平利用。

自海湾战争以来，美国的陆军、海军和空军都高度依赖各自用于作战的航天系统所提供的指挥与控制、应急通讯、导航与监测等功能。而负责管理这些航天系统的机构分布在三个军种和各种国防部门，比如国防高级研究计划局和美国国家侦察局。

这些航天系统多数受美国战略司令部指挥，但实际上他们又从属于其母体机构，比如美国空军太空司令部、美国陆军空间与导弹防御司令部等等。特朗普提议创建的太空部队将成为平行的军种，那就有必要变更和合并这些母体机构，但这些组织间氛围各异，对上级的忠诚度不一，有可能导致混乱乃至对立。

有史为鉴，1985年至2002年间，曾有美国太空司令部这一部门，但直到90年代中期这个部门才真正掌握军方的太空项目，原因就是官僚机构的内耗。举例来说，太空司令部无法快速更新其军事条例和工作计划，直到90年代后期才改观。

建立太空部队牵涉到的机构变化相当大，会再次造成这样的紧张局面，或许还会更严重。而太空部队的建立，也会削弱军队太空项目运作的效率，会使军方失去面对快速变化的世界局势所必需的灵活性。

有些人会举二战后创立的独立军种——美国空军——作为一个符合逻辑的成功范例，而特朗普在声明中也将空军和新太空部队的角色进行类比。但不能忽视的事实是，美国空军的前身美国陆军航空兵团在空军建成前就是一个相当独立的机构，有着独特的内部氛围和行事风格，就如同海军陆战队。事实上，也正是这种独特性才促使了美国空军的建立。

然而，之后的15年里美国陆军和空军激烈对立，导致了美国发射卫星计划工作的各种重复、浪费和失败，而眼看着苏联先行发射了斯普特尼克卫星。

说这些不是为了给军方挑刺，而是为了强调这一点——在一个以传统氛围、忠诚度和预算争夺为游戏规则的军内大环境下，创立一个全新的抢国防预算的军种，只会减缓美国军方太空项目的进展，并制造不必要的紧张。

还要考虑一件重要的事，就是美国在火箭发动机和载人进入太空的通道两个方面，高度依赖于其潜在的太空竞争对手俄罗斯。宇宙神5型运载火箭，是被美国政府认可的安全且最强大的火箭，可它的发动机却进口自俄罗斯。还有，美国航空航天局（NASA）为了获取定期进入国际空间站的通道，不得不与俄罗斯太空机构签署协议。

美国确有一些待研发的项目，可以自主生产火箭发动机——这其中像太空探索技术公司（SpaceX）的一些新项目就很有前途——但在可预见的未来，这些项目并不具备持续可靠性。

没有国内扎实可靠的产业能力用以制造重型太空发射系统，一个雄心勃勃的太空计划就无法实现。想象一下，如果海军航母驱动器都依赖于从俄罗斯进口，那在战时的风险该有多大。

特朗普总统计划成立的太空部队，还会破坏太空作为开发与合作之地的现状。强国之间的军事竞争总是争锋相对的，美国太空部队的建立会触发其他有太空能力国家的反应，有可能导致太空军备竞赛。冷战期间，美国和苏联在太空领域的合作成为了两国紧张关系的一个很重要的减压阀，倒是一个反证。

毫无疑问，美国的航天系统需要防护，但要达到这个目的最好的办法是仅强化航天系统防护功能，而这只是军方太空项目的一小部分。航天飞船相互缠斗的可能性尚且遥远，而成立太空部队的风险却显而易见。此时此刻，我们必须认识到这么做的危险性。（财富中文网）

布莱恩·中山是马萨诸塞州南哈德利曼荷莲学院国际关系学系的访问讲师，他的主要研究方向是科技与战争的关系。

译者：宣峰

Visions of warfare in space have both haunted and piqued the imaginations of the public, policymakers, and the United States military for decades. President Trump ignited the conversation again this week when he announced that he is directing the Department of Defense to create a new “Space Force” branch of the military. While it might seem a smart move to some, Trump’s proposal would both undermine America’s current position in space and potentially threaten the future of peaceful space exploration.

The U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force have all become highly dependent on their own space systems to fight on the battlefield since the Gulf War. These systems provide for command and control, critical communications, navigation, and surveillance. Responsibility for these functions is spread across the three services and various defense agencies, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or National Reconnaissance Office.

Many of them are directed by the United States Strategic Command, but they functionally remain part of their parent services, such as the Air Force Space Command or the Army Space and Missile Defense Command. The creation of a Space Force as a co-equal service branch, as Trump proposed, necessitates juggling and combining these various agencies, which would likely lead to confusion and rivalry due to differing organizational cultures and allegiances.

History is instructive in this regard. The United States Space Command, which existed from 1985 to 2002, only consolidated its control over military space programs in the mid-1990s due to bureaucratic infighting. This meant, for example, that the Command was unable to quickly update its doctrine or operational plans until the late 1990s.

The creation of a Space Force would reproduce the same tensions and more because of the scale of organizational change. It would undermine the effectiveness of military space operations and lead to a loss of the flexibility necessary for a rapidly changing world.

Some have pointed to the successful creation of an independent Air Force as a new military branch following World War II as a logical comparison. Indeed, President Trump compared the role of the new Space Force to the Air Force in his announcement. However, this ignores the fact that the Army Air Corps, which preceded the U.S. Air Force, was largely independent prior to its creation with a distinctive culture and organizational style much like the Marine Corps. In fact, it was this existing distinctiveness that drove and enabled the creation of the Air Force.

Moreover, the Army and Air Force spent the next 15 years as fierce rivals—leading to duplication, waste, and the failure of the United States to launch a satellite before the Soviet Sputniks.

This is not to criticize the armed services, but rather to highlight that, in a world governed by tradition, loyalty, and competition over budgets, the creation of an entirely new military service and budget competitor would detract from military space readiness and cause unnecessary tensions.

It is also important to consider that the United States is highly dependent on a potential space adversary—Russia—for rocket engines and human access to space. The Atlas V, which is the most powerful rocket considered safe by the U.S. government, depends on engines imported from Russia. Likewise, NASA has had to contract with Russia’s space agency for regular access to the International Space Station.

While there are programs under development to produce these engines domestically—and new ventures such as SpaceX are quite promising—these programs have been yet to reach the reliability necessary to be consistently relied upon for the foreseeable future.

Embarking on an ambitious military space program cannot happen without a proven domestic capacity for the construction of heavy space launch systems. Consider the risks that naval aircraft carriers would face in times of war if they were dependent on Russia for their propellers.

What’s more, President Trump’s proposed Space Force could undermine the status of space as a place of exploration and cooperation. Powerful states develop military systems in a tit-for-tat fashion, and a Space Force would trigger a response from other space-faring nations, potentially leading to the weaponization of space. Space cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War served as a crucial pressure release valve in times of high tensions.

It is certainly true that United States space systems need to be defended. However, this mission would be best served by consolidating only space system defense functions, which constitute a minority of military space operations. While dogfights between spaceships are still a far-off possibility, the risks of a Space Force are significant—and the time to recognize the danger of moving forward is upon us, here and now.

Bryan Nakayama is a visiting lecturer in international relations at Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Mass., whose research focuses on the relationship between technology and warfare.