Grab对决Go-Jek：亚洲超级应用之争的幕后故事

所有人都喜爱冰淇淋。

“冰淇淋日”便源于这一理念。该节日是Uber于2012年发起的一项促销活动。为了取悦客户，这家拼车服务巨头允许客户在每个夏天的某一天通过Uber应用来安排即时的甜点送餐服务。然而在2015年6月，随着这家美国公司将该活动推广至53个国家，马来西亚企业家陈炳耀看到了将Uber赶出市场的机会，并亮出了极具吸引力的本土打车服务品牌——Grab。

就在Uber刚刚采取促销活动之后，Grab祭出了真正令马来西亚人为之疯狂的热带水果：臭气熏天的榴莲。首都吉隆坡的客户可以让Grab司机将这种刺鼻的水果直接送到家门口。为了实现这个承诺，Grab不得不设计特殊的包装，而且虽然榴莲被认为是一种珍馐，但其释放出的气味难以去除，因此被很多机场和酒店拒之门外。Grab克服了这一困难，并以每份1林吉特（约合24美分）这样的超值价来出售。很快，所有榴莲几乎销售一空，如今“GrabDurian”促销券已经进入第四个年头。

陈炳耀笑着说：“外国人肯定想不出这个点子。Uber还没有完全理解需要本土化到什么程度”，才能赢得东南亚市场。

Grab采用了超级本土化策略，并获得了巨大的成功。自从2012年在吉隆坡郊区的一所仓库创建以来，公司业务已经拓展至8个国家，拥有280万名司机，比Uber的200万还要多。Grab表示，其应用已经在1.39亿个设备上安装，每日处理的打车订单数超过了600万个。Grab 2018年的营收达到了10亿美元，预计今年的营收将翻倍。在这一过程中，Grab击败了以冰淇淋为卖点的竞争对手：2018年3月，Uber宣布把东南亚业务出售给Grab，用于换取Grab 27.5%的股份，以及Uber在Grab董事会的一个席位。

37岁的陈炳耀与联合创始人陈慧玲（马来西亚人，35岁，与陈炳耀没有血缘关系）的梦想远非租车业务那么简单。他们试图将Grab转型为一家“日常超级应用”，从而从各个方面与消费者互动，并提供食品运送、数字支付、金融服务，甚至是车载医疗服务。在该地区6.5亿名消费者中，大多数如今才刚刚获得中国和西方早已习以为常的便捷服务。Grab希望这一应用能够满足消费者的任何产品和服务需求。

东南亚2017年的GDP达到了2.8万亿美元，如果把这个地区看作是一个单一国家，则可算是全球第七大经济体；按当前的增速，2030年它将跃居至第四的位置。但对于投资者来说，市场规模仅是其中的一个吸引点。超级应用提供了一个与客户互联的新模式，以及搜集大量有关客户喜好与购买行为宝贵数据的机会。最先采用这一模式的是阿里巴巴的支付宝和腾讯的微信。马克·扎克伯格在最近的博客中暗示，他希望Facebook能够模仿这种模式。很多人认为来自于超级应用服务及其产生数据的收入较打车服务来说更稳定，更有利可图，也更容易扩张。因为就打车服务而言，即便其增速呈直线上升，但利润依然飘忽不定。

We all scream for ice cream.

That’s the idea behind Ice Cream Day, a promotion launched by Uber Technologies in 2012. The ride-share giant courts customers by allowing them, for one day each summer, to arrange instant dessert delivery through the Uber app. But in June 2015, as the American powerhouse expanded that campaign across 53 countries, Malaysian entrepreneur Anthony Tan saw a chance to cast Uber as an outsider—and burnish the appeal of his homegrown ride-hailing venture, Grab.

Just after Uber’s event, Grab offered what Malaysians really scream for: smelly durians. Customers in Kuala Lumpur, the capital, could have one of the pungent fruits rushed to their doorstep by a Grab driver. To deliver on that promise, Grab had to devise special packaging: Durians, though considered a great delicacy, emit an odor so overpowering that they are banned in many airports and hotels. Grab surmounted that obstacle and offered the fruits at the bargain price of a single ringgit (24¢). They sold out almost immediately, and the “GrabDurian” marketing coup is now well into its fourth year.

“No foreigner would have thought to do that,” chortles Tan. Uber, he says, “couldn’t fully appreciate how local you needed to go” to win in Southeast Asia.

Grab has employed hyperlocal strategies with remarkable success. Since its 2012 launch from a warehouse closet in a gritty Kuala Lumpur suburb, the venture has expanded to eight countries. It boasts 2.8 million drivers—more than the 2 million claimed by Uber. Grab says its app has been downloaded to 139 million devices and that it processes more than 6 million ride orders a day. Grab’s 2018 revenue topped $1 billion, and it expects to double that figure this year. Along the way, it outlasted its ice-cream-peddling rival: In March 2018, Uber announced that it would sell its Southeast Asian operations to Grab in exchange for a 27.5% stake in the company and a seat on its board.

Tan, 37, and cofounder Hooi Ling Tan (a 35-year-old fellow Malaysian to whom Anthony is not related) have aspirations stretching far beyond the taxi business. They aim to transform Grab into an “everyday super-app” that engages consumers on multiple fronts—offering food delivery, digital payments, financial services, and even health care along with rides. Most of the region’s 650 million consumers are only now getting access to conveniences long taken for granted in China and the West; Grab hopes to be the app that connects them to whatever goods and services they demand.

With a 2017 GDP of $2.8 trillion, Southeast Asia, were it a single country, would be the world’s seventh largest economy; at its current growth rate, it would rank No. 4 by 2030. But for investors, market size is only part of the appeal. Super-apps promise a new mode of connecting with customers and an opportunity to amass a vast data trove about their preferences and purchasing behavior. It’s a model pioneered in China by Alibaba’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChat; Mark Zuckerberg, in a recent blog post, hinted that he hopes Facebook can emulate it. Many believe revenue from super-app services and the data they generate will prove to be more stable, more profitable, and easier to scale than revenues from ride-hailing—where profits have been elusive even as growth skyrockets.

在东南亚，超级应用模型的发展速度比全球其他地区更快。这一点也有助于解释Grab为什么能够从多家行业巨头手中筹集到86亿美元的风投资金，这些投资者包括日本的软银集团和丰田汽车、中国打车服务巨头滴滴出行，以及微软。Grab在近期融资轮的估值超过了140亿美元，也让Grab成为了东南亚最有价值的独角兽。

陈炳耀认为，Grab之所以比Uber更受欢迎，原因在于它迎合了当地消费者的需求。在收入相对较低的地区，Grab提供了获取廉价出租车和摩托车的平台，而不是Uber昂贵的“黑色轿车”。与此同时，Uber还要求使用信用卡支付，但Grab打造了一个中间网络平台，帮助“没有银行账户”的客户用现金支付。（别忘了，还有榴莲！）

但在最近的竞争中，Grab却没有任何主场优势。Grab将其总部迁至新加坡，但陈炳耀最近却将其70%的时间用在了印尼。很多分析师认为，占据印尼的市场对于树立区域性数字主导权至关重要。印尼贡献了东南亚40%的GDP，而且其对科技很在行的消费者比例异常之高。社交媒体管理平台HootSuite称，74%的印尼人都可以利用移动网络在网上购物，这个数字在全球排名第一。

问题在于：在这个群岛国家，Grab的司机必须与印尼的Go-Jek抢客，而后者的投资者包括谷歌和腾讯。

Go-Jek拥有100多万名司机，而且每月处理的交易数超过了1亿笔，涵盖2500万名用户。Go-Jek也是一个超级应用：公司的18类按需服务包括Go-Mart（百货购物）、Go-Clean（房间打扫）、Go-Glam（理发和化妆）以及Go-¬Massage（顾名思义按摩服务）。Go-Jek应用的下载量达到了1.08亿次，而且该公司称至少近半使用其应用的用户也会使用其支付服务Go-Pay。

Go-Jek的创始人34岁的纳迪艾姆·马卡里姆则有着自己的区域发展梦想。它表示，Grab的两位创始人抄袭了他的超级应用模式。马卡里姆说：“很有意思的是，Grab已经开始尝试剽窃我们的创意。要我说，‘不是吧？’你们俩第一年抄袭Uber的模式？然后接下来的三年又来抄袭Go-Jek？”马卡里姆的讽刺遭到了Grab针锋相对的反驳，这两位创始人并未称这一理念属于其原创。在给《财富》杂志的一封电子邮件中，二陈称“有好主意并不一定能保证成功。”

此次交锋也暗示了马卡里姆和二陈在这场竞争中的私人恩怨。这种蔑视源于相互的熟知：这三位曾是哈佛商学院的同学，也曾是志趣相投的至交。

In Southeast Asia, the super-app model is evolving more rapidly than anywhere else in the world. That helps explain why Grab has raised $8.6 billion in venture funding from powerful players including Japan’s SoftBank Group and Toyota Motor, Chinese ride-hailing giant Didi Chuxing, and Microsoft. Grab’s most recent funding round values it at more than $14 billion, making Grab Southeast Asia’s most valuable unicorn.

Grab prevailed over Uber, Anthony argues, because it adapted to local consumers’ needs. In a relatively low-income region, Grab provided a platform for cheap taxis and motorcycles to counter Uber’s expensive “black cars.” And while Uber required payment by credit card, Grab created a network of intermediaries to help “unbanked” customers pay cash. (Plus, those durians!)

But in Grab’s latest battle, it doesn’t hold home-court advantage. Grab has moved its headquarters to Singapore, but Anthony Tan has recently been spending more than 70% of his time in Indonesia. Many analysts believe that winning there is crucial to establishing regional digital hegemony. Indonesia accounts for 40% of Southeast Asia’s GDP, and it boasts unusually tech-savvy consumers: 74% of Indonesians with mobile Internet access make e-commerce purchases, the highest figure in the world, according to social media management platform HootSuite.

Here’s the rub: Across the archipelago, Grab’s drivers must vie for passengers with rivals from Go-Jek, an Indonesian venture whose backers include Google and Tencent.

Go-Jek employs more than a million drivers and processes more than 100 million transactions for 25 million monthly users. Go-Jek is also a super-app: The venture’s 18 on-demand services include Go-Mart (grocery shopping), Go-Clean (housecleaning), Go-Glam (hairstyling and makeovers), and Go-¬Massage (self-explanatory). Go-Jek claims 108 million app downloads and says at least half of those who have used its app have also used its payment service, Go-Pay.

Go-Jek’s founder, 34-year-old Nadiem Makarim, harbors regional ambitions of his own—and he says the two Tans ripped off his super-app model. “It’s really interesting that Grab has started to try to take that word away from us,” Makarim says. “I’m like, ‘Excuse me?’ You spend the first years of your life copying Uber? And then the next three years of your life copying Go-Jek?” Makarim’s jab elicits a pointed rejoinder from Grab, whose founders make no claim to inventing the concept. In an email to Fortune, the Tans note that “having a good idea does not guarantee success.”

The exchange hints at the personal acrimony that has crept into the rivalry between Makarim and the Tans. It’s a contempt rooted in familiarity: All three were classmates at Harvard Business School, and they once considered one another kindred spirits.

在此之前，Grab和Go-Jek几乎是井水不犯河水。如今，随着其业务模式和目标市场的重叠，这两家公司似乎进入了碰撞轨道。在很多城市，这两家公司掀起了无底线价格战，大幅降低打车、摩的以及其他服务的费用。双方的冲突有着令人迷惑的视觉感。在印尼，这两家公司均采用绿色作为其企业颜色，Grab的司机穿着森林绿制服，而Go-Jek的司机则身着一身趋近于酸橙色的黄绿色服装。在雅加达，这两家公司的车队将城市的大道变成了一条条脉动的绿色河流。

如今，Grab处于领先地位。它的覆盖市场比Go-Jek更广，而且在该区域的六大市场均获得了电子支付牌照。（Go-Jek仅在印尼和菲律宾提供此类服务。）在收购Uber之后，Grab的打车服务已经在新加坡、马来西亚、菲律宾和越南处于市场主导地位，同时也在上述市场面临着Go-Jek的竞争。ABI Research称，即便在印尼本土，Grab也拿到了62%的市场份额，但Go-Jek对这一数字存在异议。

然而，Go-Jek是一个打不倒的对手。Crunchbase称，该公司筹集了31亿美元，而且分析师预计，其估值达到了110亿美元。马卡里姆认为，假以时日，Go-Jek将以服务的广度击败对手。虽然业界广泛认为两家公司的打车服务都在亏钱，但马卡里姆称，Go-Jek很快将在其非运输领域盈利。（这两家公司均未按业务门类公开披露其营收数字。）

投资者发现这场竞争越来越有意思，而且已经到了刹不住车的地步。新加坡欧洲工商管理学院的创业学副教授杰森·戴维斯表示：“人们倾向于将Grab在短期内筹集大量资金的事实看作是公司实力的象征。”但在他看来，Grab在扩张过程中已经是“超出了自己的能力范围”。戴维斯负责指导有关打车服务公司的案例分析。在一开始，他会让学生投票表决自己愿意投资哪家公司。他说：“所有人都会说Grab，也有说Uber的。Go-Jek通常是那个被远远落在后面的第三个选项。”然而在课程结束之时，这一次序又成了“Go-Jek，Grab，Uber。”

Until recently, Grab and Go-Jek mostly stayed out of each other’s lanes. Now, as their business models and target markets converge, the two seem to be on a collision course. In many cities, the companies have embarked on a no-holds-barred price war, slashing fees for car rides, motorcycle trips, and other services. The conflict can be visually bewildering. In Indonesia, both ventures have adopted green as their corporate color, with Grab’s drivers clad in forest and Go-Jek’s decked in a shade of kelly verging on lime. In Jakarta, the combined fleets have transformed major thoroughfares into pulsing rivers of green.

For now, Grab is the front-runner. It operates in more markets than Go-Jek and holds e-payment licenses in the region’s six largest markets. (Go-Jek offers such services only in Indonesia and the Philippines.) With its Uber acquisition, Grab has the ride-hailing market-share lead in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, though Go-Jek competes in each. Even in Indonesia itself, Grab holds 62% of the ride-share market, according to ABI Research, although Go-Jek disputes that figure.

Still, Go-Jek is a formidable foe. The venture has raised $3.1 billion, according to Crunchbase, and analysts estimate its valuation at $11 billion. And ¬Makarim argues that Go-Jek’s breadth of services will win out over time. Although ride-hailing business lines at both ventures are widely believed to lose money, Makarim claims Go-Jek is close to profitability in its non-transport segments. (Neither company publicly breaks out revenue figures by business line.)

Investors find the race increasingly fascinating—and tough to handicap. “People tend to interpret the fact that Grab has raised so much money so quickly as a sign of strength,” says Jason Davis, an associate professor of entrepreneurship at the business school Insead in Singapore. But in his opinion, Grab has “stretched itself beyond its capacity” in its expansion. Davis teaches a case study on ride-hailing ventures. At the outset, he asks students to vote on which one they would have wanted to invest in. “Everyone begins saying Grab, maybe Uber,” he says. “Go-Jek is usually a distant third.” By the end of the course? “It’s Go-Jek, Grab, Uber.”

这场战争据称是在哈佛大学的教室中开始的。当时，在2011年春季，二陈与马卡里姆选修了“金字塔底的企业”（又称“B-BoP”）课程，由高级讲师迈克·初教授。该课程的名称源于商学学者CK·普拉哈拉德和斯图尔德·哈特所发布的一篇论文。这两位学者认为新兴市场最大的机遇并非源于迎合富人的需求，而是来自于为首次接触市场经济的有抱负的数十亿穷人提供服务。

陈慧玲与马卡里姆在就读于哈佛之前是好友。这两位都曾经供职于麦肯锡，担任咨询师。陈慧玲在吉隆坡工作，而马卡里姆则在雅加达。他们都没有见过陈炳耀，但都知道陈炳耀是陈兴洲的小儿子，而且酷爱社交。陈兴洲是马来西亚最知名的实业家之一。

这三位对于其祖国失败的交通系统感到失望不已。对于自称为“电子产品控”、有着机械工程学学位的陈慧玲来说，其祖国运输系统最大的弱点在于安全。在她十几岁的时候，人们认为吉隆坡的出租车非常不靠谱，为了在商场与朋友见面，她甚至不得不坐家人的车前往。在陈慧玲供职于麦肯锡期间，从事股票经纪工作的母亲通常得一直等到后半夜才能收到女儿回家的消息。

陈炳耀也有同样的担忧，也发现了其中存在的机遇。在就读商学院之前的夏天，他和好友租了40辆车，打算经营出租车服务，但他们并不知道如何将车辆与用户进行配对。陈炳耀的祖父是出租车司机，对于陈炳耀来说，效仿Uber在美国的做法，也就是使用智能手机解决这一问题的前景十分诱人，但也为他带来了烦恼，因为他的父亲希望他能够继承家族业务——在该地区制造和销售尼桑汽车。陈炳耀深知，成立自己的公司会被这个以服从为荣的家族看作是公开的叛逆。他回忆道：“真的是很难办。大家都知道，我的父亲非常崇尚儒家思想。”

最终，抓住这一商业机会的思维逻辑占了上风。陈慧玲与陈炳耀共同制定了一个针对东南亚市场、基于应用的打车服务方案，并参加了汇丰年度商业计划大赛。他们获得了季军，斩获了2.5万美元，这笔种子资金足够用于创建其称之为MyTeksi的企业。

This battle arguably began in a classroom at Harvard. There, in the spring of 2011, the Tans and Makarim enrolled in “Businesses at the Base of the Pyramid” (also known as “B-BoP”), taught by senior lecturer Michael Chu. The course takes its name from a thesis popularized by business scholars C.K. Prahalad and Stuart L. Hart, who argued that the biggest opportunities in emerging markets lay not in catering to the affluent but in serving the billions of aspiring poor joining the market economy for the first time.

Hooi Ling Tan and Makarim were friends before coming to Harvard. Both had worked as consultants at McKinsey, she in Kuala Lumpur and he in Jakarta. Neither knew Anthony, but both knew of him—the gregarious youngest son of Tan Heng Chew, one of Malaysia’s most prominent industrialists.

All three shared a frustration with the failings of their home countries’ transportation systems. For Hooi Ling, a self-described “gadget freak” with a degree in mechanical engineering, the main defect was safety. In her teen years, Kuala Lumpur’s taxis were considered so unreliable that, even to meet friends at the mall, she had to be driven by a family member. During her ¬McKinsey stint, her mother, a stockbroker, would wait up well past midnight to monitor her return home.

Anthony shared those concerns, along with a sense of opportunity. The summer before business school, he and a friend tried to run a taxi service with a fleet of 40 rented cars—but they couldn’t figure out how to match cars and riders. For Anthony, whose grandfather was a taxi driver, the prospect of solving that problem using smartphones, as Uber was doing in the U.S., was enticing. But it was also fraught. His father expected him to join the family business, which manufactures and distributes Nissan vehicles throughout the region. Launching a venture of his own, Anthony knew, would be tantamount to open rebellion in a household that prized obedience. “It was really tough,” he recalls. “My dad, you know, he’s very Confucian.”

In the end, the logic of the opportunity prevailed. Hooi Ling and Anthony teamed up to enter HBS’s annual business plan contest with a proposal for an app-based taxi-hailing service tailored to Southeast Asia. They came in second, earning $25,000—enough seed money to launch a venture they called MyTeksi.

路运之外的竞争

Grab与Go-Jek都将自己称之为“超级应用”，二者均在出租车业务之外的众多领域招揽客户。以下是它们针锋相对的其他一些行业。

移动金融

Grab和Go-Jek都希望效仿中国支付宝和微信的做法，因为后两家公司的“数字钱包”几乎可用于支付一切商品和服务。GrabPay已经进驻6个东南亚国家，而且在与万事达卡达成新预付卡服务合作之后，可以将服务延伸至更广泛的区域。借助Grab Financial Services，Grab可以向没有银行账户的当地消费者和企业家提供贷款，并使用其数字支付历史记录帮助创建信用档案。

对于Go-Jek的Go-Pay系统而言，其当前的经营地几乎都在印尼；公司称今年处理的交易额有望远超60亿美元。

移动百货

在Go-Jek在2015年推出此类应用之后，GoFood迅速成为应用菜单中最受欢迎的功能之一。创始人马卡里姆最初将预制食品送货服务看作是能够让司机在非交通高峰时段有事可做的一项业务，但如今它却成为了公司销售额的有力推手。其每年处理的食品送货额超过了20亿美元。Go-Jek用户还可以通过Go-Mart下单购买百货。

GrabFood送餐服务在2018年年初急速扩张，当时，Grab收购了Uber东南亚业务，包括UberEats。百货送货服务于8月上线，当时，Grab与马来西亚送货服务公司HappyFresh合作推出了GrabFresh服务。

其他移动服务

为了应对雅加达和印尼其他城市异常壮观的交通堵塞问题，Go-Jek已经部署了其摩的车队，为其客户提供按需服务，具体门类包括GoClean（打扫房间）、Go-Glam（理发和化妆），甚至是Go-Massage按摩服务。

双方没有GrabDrug或GrabDoctor服务，至少目前没有，但Grab在8月宣布与中国平安医疗科技公司成立合资企业，探讨通过应用提供医疗咨询服务，以及送药和就医预订服务。

Taking the Race Off-Road

Grab and Go-Jek position themselves as “super-apps,” wooing customers in fields far beyond the taxi business. Here are some other industries in which they compete head-to-head.

Mobile Finance

Both Grab and Go-Jek hope to borrow a page from China’s Alipay and WeChat apps, whose “digital wallets” can be used to pay for just about everything. GrabPay operates in six Southeast Asian nations—and could go wider with help from a new prepaid-card partnership with Mastercard. Through Grab Financial Services, Grab offers loans to local consumers and entrepreneurs who otherwise have no bank accounts, using their digital-payment histories to help establish creditworthiness.

Go-Jek’s Go-Pay system currently operates mostly in Indonesia; the company says it’s on pace to process well over $6 billion worth of transactions this year.

Mobile Groceries

After Go-Jek launched its app in 2015, GoFood quickly became one of its most popular menu options. Founder Nadiem Makarim originally saw prepared-food delivery as a way to keep drivers busy during off-peak hours. But it’s now a sales driver in its own right, processing more than $2 billion worth of food deliveries a year. Go-Jek users can also order groceries through Go-Mart.

The GrabFood restaurant-delivery service expanded dramatically in early 2018, when Grab bought the Southeast Asian operations of Uber—including UberEats. Grocery delivery joined the portfolio in August, when Grab launched GrabFresh in partnership with Malaysian delivery service HappyFresh.

Mobile Miscellany

To combat the epic gridlock in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities, Go-Jek has deployed its motorcycle-taxi fleet to bring ondemand services to its customers, with options including GoClean (housekeeping), Go-Glam (hairstyling and makeovers), and even Go-Massage.

There’s no GrabDrug or GrabDoctor—at least not yet—but Grab in August announced a joint venture with China’s Ping An Healthcare and Technology to explore delivering medical consultations via app, along with medicine delivery and appointment booking.

接受过美国教育的马卡里姆出生于印尼法律和政治世家，他认为自己可以通过参加B-BoP，为其已经创建的企业拿到贷款。Go-Jek的名字源于印尼语ojek，意为该国数百万计的摩的司机。在雅加达这个有着3000万人口的庞大都市，摩的司机一直都是在该国克服其传奇般交通堵塞的最快、最廉价的方式。马卡里姆在雅加达工作时也一直为出行犯愁。他回忆道：“我有自己的司机，然而，我最后不得不搭乘这些摩的，要不我总是会迟到。”

马卡里姆自己也承认，摩的并非是完美的解决方案。他回忆道：“在你需要他们的时候，它们总是不在你身边。”而且其喜欢挑客的名声也让很多乘客对其诟病不已。尽管如此，他将其视为一种未得到利用的资源，如果能够职业化的话，那么雅加达最令人头疼的交通问题可能会有所改观。马卡里姆招聘了20名摩的司机，以及多名调度员，并给每个人买了一件绿夹克。

Grab的首位风险投资者是陈炳耀的母亲。她曾坦言，自己并不了解儿子公司的业务模式，但希望这家企业能够获得成功，因为陈炳耀的父亲不仅拒绝了陈炳耀的请求，而且威胁要将陈炳耀从巨额家族财产继承人中除名。到2014年年底，MyTeksi已经筹集了8000万美元资金，并已通过新品牌名GrabTaxi扩张至菲律宾、新加坡、泰国和越南。但其资金消耗速度相当之快，因为Go-Jek提供高额的司机补贴和乘客折扣。

2014年12月，Uber私募市场估值突破了400亿大关，陈炳耀获邀前往东京与软银董事长孙正义会面，后者是全球最有影响力的科技投资者之一。在聊了一个小时之后，孙正义开门见山地说道，他打算当打车服务行业的教父，而且他也向陈炳耀开出了难以拒绝的条件。（陈炳耀回忆道，孙正义说：“你要是不拿我的钱，你会后悔的。”）

Makarim, a U.S.-educated scion of a family prominent in Indonesian law and politics, saw B-BoP as a way to get credit for a business he had already started. He launched Go-Jek as a side hustle in 2010. Go-Jek takes its name from ojek, the Bahasa Indonesian word for the country’s millions of motorbike-taxi drivers. In Jakarta, a sprawling metropolis of 30 million, ojeks have long been the fastest, cheapest way to cut through the legendary gridlock. Working in Jakarta, Makarim, too, had struggled to get around. “I had my own driver,” he recalls. “And yet I’d always end up using these motorcycle guys because I was always running late.”

By Makarim’s own admission, ojeks were an imperfect solution. “They were never around when you needed them,” he recalls, and their reputation for haggling led many passengers to disdain them. Still, he saw them as an untapped resource that, if professionalized, might alleviate everyone’s least favorite thing about Jakarta. Makarim recruited 20 ojeks and a couple of dispatchers—and bought everyone green jackets.

Grab’s first venture investor was Anthony Tan’s mother, who confessed she didn’t understand his business model but hoped it would succeed because his father—who had already turned Anthony down—was threatening to disinherit him from the family’s considerable fortune. By late 2014, MyTeksi had amassed more than $80 million and had expanded to the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam under a new brand, GrabTaxi. But its burn rate was high, as the Tans offered aggressive promotions for drivers and discounts for passengers.

In December 2014, as Uber’s private-market valuation soared past $40 billion, Anthony was summoned to Tokyo to meet with SoftBank chairman Masayoshi Son—one of the world’s most influential tech investors. After an hour of conversation, Son cut to the chase: He intended to play godfather in ride-hailing, and he was making an offer Tan shouldn’t refuse. (“You don’t take my money, not so good for you,” Tan recalls Son saying.)

据称，软银集团向GrabTaxi注资2.5亿美元，其持股比例并未对外披露。到目前为止，对于陈炳耀和孙正义来说，这笔投资事实上让双方都受益颇多。软银已经为Grab领投了多轮融资轮，最近的一次是今年3月初的14.6亿美元。孙正义也是Uber的主要股东，当时在劝说Uber向Grab出售业务期间发挥了关键作用。

一开始，孙正义的投资对于Go-Jek来说似乎并不是什么好消息。但全球投资者开始搜寻投资美国之外的打车服务模式，而且孙正义对于Grab的注资更是助推了这一浪潮。马卡里姆为这些投资者提供了一个新切入点：超级应用模式。

Go-Jek从一开始就是一家多门类服务企业。为了让其司机能够在高峰期外的时间全天候地工作，马卡里姆鼓励他们通过信使服务、送餐服务和其他举措来补充载客业务。在Go-Jek应用于2015年1月推出之后，它提供了三项功能：Go-Bike、 Go-Send和Go-Food。美国投资者批评这个菜单十分混乱而且令人感到疑惑，但印尼用户则对其称赞不已。在一年的时间里，Go-Jek的下载量超过了1100万次。马卡里姆则一直在增添新的服务。当年晚些时候，他在雅加达举行的科技大会上说：“如果你有某种需求，不管它是什么，只要它是合法的，那么就可以在60分钟内通过Go-Jek应用得到满足。”

这种对于综合业务的敏感性让Go-Jek发生了蜕变。2015年10月，它获得了来自于新加坡NSI Ventures和红杉资本的投资。2016年，公司筹集了5.5亿美元，此轮融资由私募股权公司KKR与华平领投，也让Go-Jek迈入了独角兽公司阵营。在Grab于2017年年底推出支付平台GrabPay，加入超级应用大战时，这两家公司已经为这场火拼积累了不少资金弹药。

SoftBank reportedly invested $250 million in GrabTaxi, for a stake whose size neither company has disclosed. So far, for both Tan and Son, that investment has proved good indeed. SoftBank has led several more fundraising rounds for Grab, most recently for $1.46 billion in early March. And Son, who also is a major shareholder in Uber, played a decisive role in persuading that company to sell out to Grab.

Son’s investment initially sounded like bad news for Go-Jek. But global investors were beginning to scramble for opportunities to invest in the ride-hailing model outside the U.S., and Son’s Grab stake only fed the frenzy. Makarim offered these investors a new angle: a super-app model.

Go-Jek had been a multiservice venture from the outset. To keep drivers employed all day, not just during rush hours, Makarim had encouraged them to supplement passenger transport with courier services, meal delivery, and other endeavors. Shortly after the Go-Jek app launched in January 2015, it offered three options: Go-Bike, Go-Send, and Go-Food. American backers decried the menu as messy and confusing, but Indonesian users voted with their thumbs. Within a year, Go-Jek had been downloaded more than 11 million times. Makarim kept adding services. He told a tech conference in Jakarta later that year, “If you want something, whatever it is, in 60 minutes, as long as it’s legal, then you can get it on the Go-Jek app.”

The omnibus sensibility helped Go-Jek break through. In October 2015 it won funding from Singapore’s NSI Ventures and Sequoia Capital. In 2016 it raised $550 million in a round led by private equity firms KKR and Warburg Pincus, vaulting Go-Jek into the unicorn club. By the time Grab joined the super-app battle, rolling out the payment platform GrabPay late in 2017, both companies had plenty of financial ammunition for the fight.

像火药、意大利面和纸币一样，超级应用通常被认为是中国的创新。其最早的雏形便是支付宝，阿里巴巴于2004年先后创建了这项支付功能和淘宝电商平台。支付宝已经发展成为中国占主导地位的移动支付工具，这个数字钱包与银行账户和信用卡关联，被用于支付账单、向朋友转账、预订酒店，几乎是无所不能。而腾讯于2011年推出的微信则更加全面。微信最初旨在相互发送文本信息和照片，但腾讯增添了类似于支付宝一样的数字钱包功能，以及一系列社交特色，以便让这个应用更快、更奇特、用户粘度更高。

对于那些经营上述应用的科技巨头来说，中国的超级应用是一座数据宝山。与美国不同的是，阿里巴巴和腾讯能够获得来自于从不同领域的信息，并生成数亿用户的全方位档案。这类数据引发了重大的隐私担忧，但到目前为止，它仍然是一种资产，公司可以通过与广告商和供应商的合作关系，以及通过自己的新产品将其转化为货币。

在模仿中国的应用时，Grab和Go-Jek面临着一个新的障碍：仅有有限的人群能够获得东南亚银行的服务。在中国，超过80%的成年人都有银行账户。马来西亚和泰国的比例跟中国差不多。但在印尼，这个数字仅有约50%，而到了菲律宾和越南，这个比例则降至35%。这些差异反映了经济发展的巨大差距，以及分散的基础设施和相距甚远的地理位置。（仅印尼一国就拥有1.7万个岛屿。）

如何为数亿名从未见过信用卡的消费者打造一款超级应用？Go-Jek和Grab使用互联网和智能手机巧妙地打造了移动支付大军。汽车和摩的司机收取现金，然后将其积分存入客户的数字钱包。他们还会与周边的代理商合作。这些代理商除了给钱包充值之外，还会帮助没有银行账户的消费者在线购买物品、支付账单、购买保险或申请贷款。

Go-Jek与Grab正在多个领域争抢客户，从送货一直到医疗咨询。但金融服务领域的竞争引发了一场白热化的交易竞赛。Go-Jek倾向于通过并购开展合作，此举能够为公司提供更严格的掌控权。例如在印尼，公司通过收购三家首要的金融服务公司巩固了其在支付领域的主导地位。这三家公司分别是与零售商合作的线下支付处理商，为在线商户服务的支付公司以及一家帮助农村和工薪阶层家庭购买家用电器的借贷网络。Go-Jek将这三家公司并入了Go-Pay系统。

Grab更喜欢开展合作和设立合资企业，这种举措能够让它更快地接触更多的市场，而且已经帮助Grab获得了印尼之外的优势。10月，Grab宣布与万事达卡达成合作，发行能够让Grab客户与任何接受万事达卡的商户进行交易的预付卡。Grab还与日本的Credit Saison联合创建了Grab Financial Services公司，并结合Grab消费者行为数据和Credit Saison在信贷分析方面的专长，给没有银行账户的客户提供贷款。

Grab去年在印尼遭遇了挫折。当时，印尼监管方禁止外资持股比例超过49%的公司开展数字钱包业务。但Grab通过收购印尼支付初创企业Kudo以及与印尼巨头力宝集团旗下金融服务公司Ovo开展合作，绕过了这一限制，力宝集团对商场的控股为Ovo的智能支付系统提供了购物中心和连锁餐厅方面的优势。Ovo的用户相对来说较为富足，能够让Grab接触马卡里姆和二陈在哈佛学过的“金字塔底端”之外的客户。

Like gunpowder, pasta, and paper money, the super-app is an innovation generally credited to China. Among the earliest incarnations was Alipay, the payment function created by Alibaba in 2004 in tandem with its Taobao e-commerce platform. Alipay has evolved into China’s dominant mobile-payment method, a digital wallet linked to bank accounts and credit cards and used to pay bills, transfer money to friends, book a hotel—or do just about anything else. Even more versatile is WeChat, launched by Tencent Holdings in 2011. WeChat was originally designed to exchange text messages and photos, but Tencent added an Alipay-like digital wallet function, along with a host of social features to make the app quicker, quirkier, and stickier.

For the tech giants who run them, China’s super-apps are a data El Dorado. Unlike in the U.S., where Google, Facebook, Amazon, and other tech leaders wrangle and squabble over disparate streams of data reflecting different aspects of consumer behavior, Alibaba and Tencent hoover up information across the spectrum, generating 360-degree profiles of hundreds of millions of users. Such data raises weighty privacy concerns—but for now it remains an asset that companies can monetize in relationships with advertisers and vendors, and through new products of their own.

In emulating China’s apps, Grab and Go-Jek faced an added hurdle: the limited reach of Southeast Asia’s banks. In China, more than 80% of adults have access to a bank account. Malaysia and Thailand have similar rates. But in Indonesia, the figure is only about 50%, while in the Philippines and Vietnam, it falls below 35%. Those disparities reflect wide variation in economic development, as well as fragmented infrastructure and far-flung geography. (Indonesia alone encompasses 17,000 islands.)

How to create a super-app for millions of consumers who have never even seen a credit card? Go-Jek and Grab have used the Internet and smartphones ingeniously to create armies of mobile tellers. Car and motorbike drivers collect cash and credit it to customers’ digital wallets. They toil alongside neighborhood agents who, in addition to topping up the wallets, help consumers who lack bank accounts purchase goods online, pay bills, buy insurance, or apply for loans.

Go-Jek and Grab are dueling for customers in ¬arenas ranging from grocery delivery to medical advice. But the race in financial services has sparked a particularly frenzied burst of dealmaking. Go-Jek tends to prefer partnering through acquisitions, which allows tighter control. In Indonesia, for example, it bolstered its payments dominance in 2018 by acquiring three major financial services companies—an offline payments processor that works with retailers, a payment company that serves online merchants, and a saving and lending network that helps rural and working-class families buy household appliances—and merging the three into its Go-Pay system.

Grab prefers partnerships and joint ventures, which enable it to reach more markets faster—and have helped Grab get an edge outside Indonesia. In October, Grab announced a partnership with Mastercard to issue prepaid cards that Grab customers can spend with any merchant that accepts Mastercard. Grab also has paired up with Japan’s Credit Saison to found Grab Financial Services, which now offers loans to unbanked customers—combining Grab’s data on consumer behavior with Credit Saison’s expertise in credit analysis.

Grab suffered a setback in Indonesia last year when that country’s regulators barred ventures with more than 49% foreign ownership from offering digital wallets. But Grab worked around that restriction by acquiring Kudo, an Indonesian payment startup, and partnering with Ovo, a financial services firm owned by Indonesian conglomerate Lippo Group. Lippo’s shopping mall holdings give Ovo’s smartphone payment system an advantage at shopping centers and restaurant chains. Ovo’s users are also relatively affluent—allowing Grab to reach beyond the “base of the pyramid” that ¬Makarim and the Tans studied at Harvard.

即便在Grab与Go-Jek四处扩张之际，其最初的运输之战也是愈演愈烈，而且各类竞争方式也暗示了业务快速增长的风险。在新加坡，Grab收购Uber的举措引发了司机的愤怒，他们抱怨合并后的公司取消了其福利，而乘客也对价格的上涨和服务水平的下降提出了抗议。（Grab已开始着手解决乘客的抱怨，包括取消下单5分钟之内的行程取消费用等。）

两家公司还经历了监管方更加严格的审查。新加坡的竞争监管方对Grab和Uber开出了950万美元的罚单，原因在于双方的交易破坏了竞争，并推动价格最高上涨了15%。监管方下令Grab恢复其合并前的定价，并让打车服务取消有关司机和出租车队的排他性条款。此举似乎为Go-Jek创造了机会，该公司为了在新加坡和其他市场扩张豪掷了5亿美元。但Go-Jek在海外创建分公司的举措也遇到了阻力。例如在菲律宾，监管方拒绝向Go-Jek的一项业务发放牌照，原因在于该领域对外资有限制。

有时候，行业的颠覆会体现为现实中的行业动荡。10月，一群愤怒的摩的司机聚集在雅加达市中心的力宝大厦。抗议者要求向Grab高管提交一份最低薪资方案，该公司的总部便位于这栋大楼。在遭到拒绝之后，司机们转而使用暴力，砸碎了前厅的窗户，警察动用催泪瓦斯才驱散了人群。

雅加达的动荡反映了两家企业所处竞争市场的波动。在这个市场，迅速的增长，再加上工人以及消费者期许的提升，会让事态迅速升级。这场动乱可能会以一场超级并购收尾，也就是绿衫巨人的一方吞并另一方。但很多投资者表示，他们如今将东南亚的超级应用行业视为这样一个市场：在这个市场中，资本充足的企业将与大量的当地合作伙伴一道，陷入一种长期的竞争僵局。Go-Jek的投资方KKR的大卫·卡茨说：“传统的观点曾经认为，这是一个赢家通吃的市场。但如今没人这么想了。”换句话说，这场竞赛还远未结束。（财富中文网）

本文另一版本登载于《财富》杂志2019年4月刊，标题为《街头竞赛》。

译者：冯丰

审校：夏林

Even as Grab and Go-Jek expand elsewhere, their original battle over transport rages—in ways that hint at the perils of rapid growth. In Singapore, Grab’s acquisition of Uber sparked outrage from drivers, who complained that the combined companies revoked their incentive, and passengers, who protested higher prices and poorer service. (Grab has begun addressing rider complaints, including by eliminating fees for trips canceled within five minutes of booking.)

The rivals are also weathering more scrutiny from regulators. Singapore’s competition watchdog imposed fines of $9.5 million on Grab and Uber, ruling that their deal had eroded competition and driven fares up by as much as 15%. The regulator ordered Grab to restore its premerger pricing and told the service to remove exclusivity obligations on drivers and taxi fleets. This would seem to create opportunities for Go-Jek, which has committed $500 million to expanding in Singapore and other markets. But Go-Jek’s efforts to establish subsidiaries abroad have also met resistance. In the Philippines, for example, regulators have refused to license one Go-Jek business, citing restrictions on foreign ownership.

Sometimes the upheaval in the industry manifests itself as actual unrest. In October a swarm of angry motorcycle drivers converged on the Lippo Building in downtown Jakarta. Protesters demanded the chance to present a minimum wage proposal to executives from Grab, whose local headquarters are in the building. Denied an audience, the crowd turned violent, smashing the windows of the front lobby, and police cleared the scene with tear gas.

The scrum in Jakarta echoes the volatility of the markets in which Grab and Go-Jek compete—places where rapid growth and the rising expectations of workers and consumers combine to keep conditions at a rapid boil. The turmoil could conclude in a mega-merger in which one of the green-jacketed giants gobbles up the other. But many investors say they now see Southeast Asia’s super-app arena as a marketplace in which well-capitalized firms will settle into a long-term competitive standoff, alongside their myriad local partners. “The conventional view used to be that this is a winner-take-all market,” says David Katz of KKR, one of Go-Jek’s backers. “But no one thinks that now.” The race, in other words, has many laps to go.

A version of this article appears in the April 2019 issue of Fortune with the headline “Racing in the Streets.”