上周四， 《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal)一篇探讨互联网初创企业正面临“现金紧张”的文章在风投界引发热议。

    这篇文章主要是基于业界网站AngelList的数据(也可能不是，参见下文更新)，外加道琼斯公司（Dow Jones）的风投融资统计数据。我无意质疑这些数据，但相信须放在更宏观的范围内来考量。更重要的是，我认为这些数据反映的真实情况被忽视了。

    首先，总体风投活动没有下降。正式的三季度数据要到本周晚些时候公布，但初步数据显示美国公司募资额虽然低于二季度，但仍然要高于一季度。而且，由于7、8月份时值很多人度假，三季度的募资活动传统上就相对处于低谷，总量数据看来没什么出人意料之处。

    而且，过去3个月完成的美国风投交易有约49%面向种子期或早期公司。过去12个月的这一比例在47%。投资额占比的差幅可忽略不计（过去3个月为30.4%，过去12个月是30.6%）。

    AngelList数据是一项重要指标，但它反映的是相对较小范围内的投资者的倾向，而且可能这部分投资者的态度并不公允。例如，近期的市场震荡可能已吓跑了很多曾将10-15%的资产配置于风险投资的天使观光者（分母，不只影响公共退休基金）。但机构风投迄今并未受到类似影响（我把超级天使投资人也归入此类）。

    的确，募集资金的风投公司数量越来越少，但这股趋势已持续多年，目前风投业仍有充足的弹药。毕竟，超级天使的崛起只有一年而已。而且，过去18个月里许多大中型公司推出了种子期投资项目——加大了新兴初创企业的总资本池。例子包括恩颐投资（New Enterprise Associates）、Greylock风投公司和Menlo Ventures投资公司。有些人认为这些项目只是装点门面，但在统计中钱就是钱（而且，我反而认为这些项目大多数都是实实在在的）。

    对我而言，更大的问题是种子期之后的资本供应情况。我说的不是Facebook或Groupon规模庞大的Series F轮融资，而是500万美元至2,500万美元的Series A或B融资。我认为在这个阶段有点资本供应不足。首先，现在有多少风投公司自封为Series B投资者？不多(这并不奇怪，第一轮资本未得到第二轮或第三轮资本的响应)。

    例如，扩张期交易占过去12个月美国完成的风投交易数的28%，投资额占比约为35%。五年前，这两个比例分别是36%和42%。

    为什么未出现这种情况？因为种子期后的A或B轮融资风险往往和种子期一样高，但潜在回报相对较低。原有的种子投资者按比例继续参与融资是一回事，外部投资者参与则完全是另外一回事（除非成功显而易见，在这种情况下会出现天价估值）。事实上，创业者在种子期完全可以与大中型机构风投签约，而不是依赖那些道指跌上400点就要害怕跑路的天使投资人。

    我知道有些创业者不愿意“淹没”在大中型机构风投，而是更喜欢天使投资人的个人关注和人脉。当然也有两全其美的情况。但如果二者只能选一，机构要有价值得多。如果网络初创企业正面临现金紧张，可能是因为它们选择了错误的种子期投资者（假定他们当初有“选择的余地”），导致如今没有足够的中间期融资者帮助它们渡过困境。

    更新：AngelList的内维尔•拉维坎特(Naval Ravikant)刚刚在Twitter上发了下述信息：

    Venture capitalists today are buzzing about a Wall Street Journal story about how Internet startups are facing a "cash crunch."

    It's mostly based on AngelList data (or not, see update below), plus venture fund-raising statistics from Dow Jones. I don't dispute either of them, but believe they need to be viewed in a broader context. More importantly, I think the real story they tell was overlooked.

    First, overall venture capital activity is not decreasing. Official Q3 data won't be released until later this week, but a preliminary look shows that U.S.-based companies raised less money than in Q2 but more than in Q1. And since third quarters are traditionally slow due to the vacation months of July and August, there doesn't seem to be much news in the top-line numbers.

    Moreover, around 49% of completed U.S. venture deals in the past three months were for seed-stage or early-stage companies. For the past 12 months, the figure stands at 47%. The difference in dollars invested as a percentage of the whole was negligible (from 30.4% for past 3 months to 30.6% for past 12 months).

    AngelList data is an important metric, but it also reflects the biases of a relatively small -- and arguably skewed -- subset of venture investors. For example, the recent market volatility has likely knocked out a lot of angel tourists who had been allocating 10 or 15% of their assets to venture investing (denominators don't only affect public pension funds). Institutional VCs, however, have not been similarly affected (and I include super-angels in this category).

    It certainly is true that fewer and fewer VC firms are raising money, but that trend has been in place for years and there is still plenty of dry powder. After all, the rise of super-angels is barely one year old. Moreover, many larger firms have launched seed-stage investing programs within the past 18 months -- thus increasing the overall capital pool for nascent startups. Examples include New Enterprise Associates, Greylock and Menlo Ventures. Some folks discount these programs as cynical window-dressing, but money is money within this particular argument (and I happen to think most of the programs are legit).

    To me, the larger issue is capital availability beyond the seed-stage. I'm not talking about massive Series F rounds for Facebook or Groupon, but rather Series A or B deals in the $5 million to $25 million range. This is where I see a bit of capital gap. How many venture firms out there market themselves as Series B investors, first and foremost? Not many (it's no surprise that First Round Capital hasn't been copied by a Second Round Capital or Third Round Capital).

    For example, expansion-stage deals made up 28% of all U.S. venture deals completed in the past 12 months, and around 35% of the total invested capital. Five years ago those figures were 36% and 42%, respectively.

    How come? Because post-seed A or B rounds often carry the same risks as seed with less potential reward. It's one thing for an existing seed investor to participate pro rata, but quite another for an outsider to join the party (unless success seems obvious, at which point the valuation will be sky-high). In fact, that's a pretty good case for entrepreneurs to sign on with larger institutional VCs at the seed-stage, rather than trying to rely on angels who are one 400-point Dow loss away from being tapped out.

    I know some entrepreneurs don't want to get "lost" in a larger firm, and appreciate the personal attention and networks of angels. And there certainly can be a happy mix of both. But, if you have to choose, the institution is far more valuable. If Web startups are hitting a cash crunch, it's likely because they chose the wrong seed-stage investors (assuming they had a "choice") and there aren't enough mid-round institutions to help them out.

    Update: AngelList's Naval Ravikant just tweeted the following: