上星期，《财富》杂志发布了最新一期美国500强榜单。排在前面的有很多熟悉的老面孔，如埃克森美孚（Exxon Mobil）、沃尔玛（Wal-Mart）等等。但有一家公司你再也看不到了，即去年排名第256位的私募股权公司KKR公司（Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.）。

    去年这个时候，我就写过KKR首先就不该入选这个榜单（该公司自己也持有同样的观点）。KKR入选完全是因为一条古怪的会计规则。根据这一会计规则，KKR的全部“投资利润总额”（实现和未实现的收益/损失）都被纳入财富美国500强评选的计算中。但事实上，KKR公司只能获得其中很少一部分（其余归KKR基金的有限合伙人所有）。

    2010年，KKR公布投资利润总额约为92亿美元，服务费收入4.35亿美元。这就是这家公司如何登上财富美国500强第256位的原因。2011年，KKR的服务费收入增至7.23亿美元，但投资利润降至14.5亿美元——基本上是由于私募股权投资组合的增值减少。

    值得一提的是，从任何角度看都大于KKR公司的黑石集团（The Blackstone Group）也没有入选，原因是该公司不将旗下基金的收益合并报表。

    大多数公司都会为入选财富美国500强而称庆，为落选而苦恼。但KKR就没想过要入选——可能它也知道即便入选也只是昙花一现。这对KKR既没有正面、也没有负面影响，但这显露出私募股权公司的会计/估值与更传统的上市公司之间是多么难以协调一致。

    译者：老榆木

    The new Fortune 500 came out this morning, with lots of familiar names up top (Exxon Mobil, Wal-Mart, etc.). One company you won't see, however, is private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), which last year came in at #256.

    At the time, I wrote that KKR shouldn't have made the list in the first place (a sentiment shared by the firm itself). Its inclusion was the result of an accounting oddity, by which KKR's entire "total investment income" (realized and unrealized gains/losses) was included in Fortune's calculations, even though the firm itself was only entitled to a small fraction of it (the rest going to limited partners in KKR funds).

    In 2010, KKR reported around $9.2 billion in total investment income and $435 million in fee income. That's how it hit #256. For 2011, fee income rose to $723 million but investment income dropped to $1.45 billion – basically due to a lower level of appreciation in the firm's private equity portfolio.

    For context, The Blackstone Group (BX) -- a larger firm than KKR by all accounts -- didn't make the list because it doesn't consolidate gains from all of its funds.

    Most companies celebrate when they make the Fortune 500, and fret if they fall off of it. KKR, however, didn't want to be there in the first place -- likely because it knew the stay would be a short one. Not a positive or negative reflection on the firm, but rather an illustration of how private equity accounting/valuations are difficult to reconcile with more traditional listed issuers.