考夫曼基金会（The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation）发布的一份报告称，风险投资模式已经破裂。报告没有归咎于一般合伙人，而是投资风险资本但未坚持要求结构性变革的有限合伙人。

    恰巧，上个月在Splunk成功IPO推动Sevin Rosen第八支基金差不多实现了100%的账面回报后，我又重提几年前关于“风险投资模式已经破产”的整场讨论。因此，很多读者问我，考夫曼的报告是否让我心有戚戚。或者，用一位读者的话说，“承认你不知道自己在说些什么。”

    考夫曼的报告主要有两个结论：

    1. 十多年来，风险投资总体而言没有达到承诺的回报率（5亿美元以上的基金尤其如此）。事实上，报告发现，如果当初有限合伙人投资小盘的上市股指基金，得到的回报会更高。

    2. 有限合伙人不能忽视第一点，为降低自身风险，必须对风投基金协议进行重大的结构性调整。

    第一点主要是基于考夫曼包含近100支风投基金的自有组合数据。而且，结论令人信服——特别是考虑到这些公司通常在“内部回报率”达到或接近峰值时（有时峰值的出现可能远早于设想）募资，它认为采用好年份的四分位数是不够的。

    不幸的是考夫曼没有披露一般合伙人情况——导致外界批评该组合只是选择了一些糟糕的基金，以偏概全。

    而幸运的是我进行了一些调研：考夫曼的“核心”风投组合包含Bessemer Venture Partners、Benchmark Capital、General Atlantic和Madrona Venture Partners的多支基金。它还有Clarus Ventures、Mayfield、MPM Capital、New Enterprise Associates和Oak Investment Partners等过往基金。从我理解来看，与Accel Partners、Kleiner Perkins、Sequoia、First Round、Foundry或Union Square等“名牌公司”没什么关系。

    初初一看，我的反应是“哇，考夫曼数据集里包含有这些基金，回报率这么差？”要么是其他基金糟透了，要么是其中的名牌基金盛名难副（要知道考夫曼从未有过一个超10亿美元的基金剔除费率后回报率可达200%）。

    The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation has published a report arguing that the venture capital model is broken. And it lays blame not at the feet of general partners, but rather of limited partners who have continued to invest in venture capital without insisting on structural changes.

    This comes, of course, just days after I revisited the whole "VC model is broken" discussion from several years back, in the wake of Sevin Rosen basically returning its entire eighth fund (on paper) from the successful Splunk IPO. So a lot of you asked for me to chime in on the Kauffman study. Or, in the words of one reader, "admit that you don't know what you're talking about."

    The study basically breaks down into a pair of primary arguments:

    1. Venture capital has, in general, not produced its promised returns for more than a decade (with the situation being particularly acute in funds >$500m). In fact, it finds that LPs likely would have been better off investing in small-cap public equity index funds.

    2. Limited partners must internalize point #1, and make major structural changes to VC fund agreements in order to minimize their risk.

    The first point is mostly based on data from Kauffman's own portfolio of nearly 100 venture capital partnerships. And it is fairly compelling – particularly its argument that using vintage year quartiles is inadequate, considering that firms often fundraise at or near "peak IRR" (which sometimes comes much earlier than you might imagine).

    Unfortunately, Kauffman does not disclose its GP relationships – leading to some charges from the outside that the organization simply picked lousy funds and is looking for a macro scapegoat.

    Fortunately, I did some digging: Kauffman's "core" venture capital portfolio includes multiple commitments with Bessemer Venture Partners, Benchmark Capital, General Atlantic and Madrona Venture Partners. It also has legacy relationships with such firms as Clarus Ventures, Mayfield, MPM Capital, New Enterprise Associates and Oak Investment Partners. From what I understand, no relationships with "brand names" like Accel Partners, Kleiner Perkins, Sequoia, First Round, Foundry or Union Square.

    At first glance, my reaction was "Wow, Kauffman has such lousy returns with those funds included in the data set?" Either the other funds are god-awful, or the included brands aren't the superstars they get made out to be (particularly when you learn Kauffman has never had a $1 billion+ fund return 2x capital after fees).