米特•罗姆尼喜欢谈论他在贝恩资本（Bain Capital）做风险投资家时的那段时光，他的独具慧眼帮助史泰博（Staples）、The Sports Authority等新兴企业成长为今天的大公司。批评他的人则盯着他做杠杆收购投资人的那些年月，特别是贝恩资本赚了钱但所投资公司最后破了产的交易。到底是就业创造者，还是企业劫掠者？

    这两种说法基本上都正确，因为罗姆尼时期的贝恩资本对投资活动进行了多元化。

    但在罗姆尼的投资生涯中还有一个身份，似乎是支持者和诋毁者都没有提到的：米特•罗姆尼，对冲基金经理。

    贝恩资本早期的投资活动基本上都是私募股权长期投资，但也有例外。

    比如，1995年，贝恩资本的第四支私募股权基金购入了佛罗里达上市唱片公司Alliance Entertainment的股份。这项投资并不怎么样。两年后Alliance提交了破产申请，并指控贝恩进行“短线交易”（short-swing）获利超过290万美元——Alliance认为这些收益应该返还公司（法律规定持有10%及以上股份的大股东必须将持股6个月内的股票交易利得返还公司）。双方最终达成了75万美元的和解，而贝恩无需承认有错。

    另外，还有过一项相关的、针对贝恩资本的集体诉讼，贝恩竭力反对让罗姆尼出庭作证，虽然是正是罗姆尼签字同意了这些交易。

    在Alliance交易一年后，贝恩的一些员工开始探索推出自己的上市股票工具，希望能抓住市场机会获利（当然，这和Alliance无关）。这一模式无论是从使命、还是架构上都迥异于贝恩先前的模式，但公司高管似乎不想让员工这样费尽周章。

    因此，1996年10月，贝恩出资成立了Brookside Capital，在贝恩资本的大框架下作为一家独立的对冲基金进行经营。基金的启动资金源于贝恩合伙人的3,000万美元，1997年开始对外募资。

    让人困惑的是Brookside如何与贝恩资本其他业务契合。贝恩最初是由一群管理顾问创立的，这些顾问相信自己的经验专长能帮助年轻公司成长。随后，他们将这一模式拓展至杠杆收购，依然相信咨询之本能帮助陷入困境的企业进行亟需的改变（或让好公司锦上添花）。

    无论是哪种情况，贝恩要么要求获得控股权，要么至少要获得很强的话语权。但Brookside投资的股权比例相对较小，很多时候都不足以影响企业做出改变。

    Mitt Romney likes to talk about his time as a venture capitalist with Bain Capital, helping to launch corporate giants like Staples and The Sports Authority. His critics like to focus on Romney's years as a leveraged buyout investor, highlighting (a handful of) deals in which Bain made money while its portfolio companies went broke. Job creator versus corporate raider.

    Both narratives are largely legitimate, since Bain Capital diversified its investment activities during Romney's time at the helm.

    But there also is another part of Romney's investment activities that neither his supporters nor his detractors seem to talk about: Mitt Romney, hedge fund manager.

    Virtually all of Bain's early investment activities were centered on long-term bets in the private markets, but there were exceptions.

    In 1995, for example, the firm used its fourth private equity fund to purchase shares in a listed Florida record label called Alliance Entertainment. It didn't go too well. Not only did Alliance file for bankruptcy two years later, but the company would accuse Bain of executing "short-swing" trades that generated over $2.9 million in profits that Alliance felt should be returned to the company (under rules stating that 10% shareholders must disgorge to the issuer any profits on trades made within a six-month period of one another). The two sides eventually settled for $750,000, without Bain having to admit any liability.

    There also was a related class action lawsuit filed against Bain, in which the firm strenuously argued against requiring Romney – who had signed off on the trades – to be deposed.

    One year after the Alliance trades, some Bain staffers began talking about wanting to launch their own public equities vehicle, to capitalize on perceived market opportunity (unrelated to Alliance, of course). It was a much different model – both in terms of mission and structure – than Bain had previously employed, but senior management didn't want the staffers to go out of their own.

    So Bain sponsored the launch of Brookside Capital in October 1996, to operate as an independent hedge fund underneath the Bain Capital umbrella. It was originally seeded with $30 million in Bain partner capital, and began soliciting outside commitments in 1997.

    What was tricky about Brookside, however, was how it fit thematically within Bain. The firm had originally been launched by a group of management consultants who thought they could use their expertise to help young companies grow. They then expanded that model to leveraged buyouts, again believing that their consulting roots could help implement much needed changes at struggling businesses (or make strong businesses even stronger).

    In both cases, Bain either would require control or at least a very powerful voice at the table. With Brookside, however, the positions would be relatively small and, in many cases, powerless to effect change.