希腊不是阿根廷，违约之路不可行

    本周，所有的眼睛(仍)在盯着希腊债务危机。一旦希腊政府无法通过财政紧缩方案，确保希腊国内根据去年几十亿欧元救助方案完成涉及1,110亿欧元的预算削减和资产出售，希腊就距离违约风险又近了一步。

    以工会罢工为代表的抗议浪潮中，有人却持有截然相反的观点，他们认定违约对希腊可能没那么糟。他们指出，阿根廷、俄罗斯等国在经历了违约后的短暂沉浮后，很快就出乎意料地重回正轨。

    这种观点可能会让希腊人稍感安心，但却根本站不住脚。

    2001年阿根廷银行体系危机爆发几个月后，阿根廷818亿美元主权债务出现违约。当年阿根廷GDP下降10.9%，并被信贷市场拒之门外。尽管融资困难，但阿根廷经济还是出现了复苏，2003年以来该国经济年增长率超过8%。而且，阿根廷经济呈现的韧性，也让一些人猜测希腊有望部分复制阿根廷的成功。

    “基本观点是阿根廷违约后经济表现非常好，”华盛顿智囊机构Center for Economc and Policy Research的联合创始人迪恩•贝克写道，“如果希腊人认为希腊经济能沿袭阿根廷经济过去9年半走过的路，希腊人肯定立马愿意违约。”

    但希腊很难效仿阿根廷的复苏之路。推动阿根廷迅速东山再起的一个重要因素恰恰是希腊所不具备的，即农业出口。相比希腊经济增长主要依赖服务业，农产品出口帮助阿根廷渡过了经济低迷期。阿根廷享有贸易顺差，并受益于农业大宗商品的国际价格上涨。阿根廷作为主产国的大豆，其价格已从2003年的200美元/吨升至今日的约500美元/吨。

    除了旅游和航运服务，希腊事实上出口很少，而且外国直接投资几乎为零。因此，即便希腊违约，退出欧元体系，实行本币贬值，也很难看到希腊通过出口走出经济低迷期。

    “这些优势，希腊无一具备；而且，希腊的经济增长存在结构性问题，即便重组也不会改善，” 彼得森国际经济研究所（Peterson Institute for International Economics）从事欧洲经济和改革研究的雅各布•方克•柯克加德表示。

    与阿根廷类似，1998年违约的俄罗斯状况也在好转。经过十年深度下跌后，俄罗斯经济正在回升，动力也是大宗商品(特别是石油)价格的上涨。俄罗斯政府已偿还了对外债务。虽然2009年，俄罗斯经济在全球金融危机期间受挫，但2000-2010年俄罗斯经济增长总体强劲。

    这倒不是说违约永远不可行。希腊的悲哀窘境说明每个经济体都是不同的，对于有些经济体，违约可能有益，有些则不是。希腊有很多问题，违约不可能是最佳出路。正如柯克加德所指，爱尔兰同样负债累累，但在爱尔兰银行业承担过多高风险贷款前，爱尔兰经济非常健康；而希腊的问题则是几十年来征税不力、退休年龄门槛低及其他不良政策的产物。

    “他们需要全面改革整个经济，而爱尔兰……只需改革银行体系，恢复财力，筹措更多财政收入，”他说。

    毋庸讳言，更重要的问题是希腊违约对欧洲和全球其他地区意味着什么。违约不仅会严重影响希腊自身经济，而且很可能导致市场担忧西班牙、葡萄牙和意大利等欧元区周边国家也可能违约。【参见《意大利会步希腊后尘吗？》 As Greece goes, so goes Italy?】

    不管怎么看，违约绝非终南捷径。

    This week, all eyes are (still) on Greece's debt crisis. The country edges toward a possible default if the government fails to pass an austerity plan that asks citizens to make due with $111 billion worth of budget cuts and asset sales as part of last year's multi-billion euro rescue package.

    Amid the ongoing saga marked by union strikes against the unpopular measures, some have taken the contrarians' view that defaulting might not be so bad for Greece. They point to places like Argentina and Russia, which defaulted and briefly struggled before emerging from their economic ruts unexpectedly well.

    This might put Greeks a little more at ease, but hardly for the right reasons.

    In 2001, Argentina defaulted on $81.8 billion of sovereign debt following months of turmoil in the country's banking system. GDP dropped by 10.9% that year, and the country was locked out of the credit markets. Despite financing challenges, its economy recovered, growing by more than 8% a year since 2003. And Argentina's resilience has led some to hint that Greece could actually follow some of Argentina's playbook.

    "The basic point is that Argentina's economy has done extremely well following its default," writes Dean Baker, co-founder of Washington DC-based think tank Center for Economic and Policy Research. "It is difficult to see why anyone in Greece would not want to default in an instant if they thought Greece's economy would follow the same path as Argentina's economy has over the last 9 ½ years."

    Argentina's road to recovery is hardly something Greece could follow, however. One big factor explaining its comeback includes an advantage Greece isn't so lucky to have: Agricultural exports. Whereas the engine driving Greece's economy relies mostly on services, selling agricultural products abroad helped Argentina ride through its downturn. It runs a trade surplus, helped especially by rising global prices for agricultural commodities. Prices for soybeans, of which Argentina is a major producer, have risen from $200 a ton in 2003 to about $500 a ton today.

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    Aside from tourism and shipping services, Greece actually exports very little and has next to no foreign direct investments. So even if Greece defaults, drops the euro and devalues its own currency, it's hard to see how Greece could export its way out of tough economic times.

    "Greece has none of these advantages and fundamentally has a structural growth problem that even a restructuring won't alleviate," says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, whose research includes European economies and reform.

    Similarly, Russia, which defaulted in 1998, is seeing better days. After a decade of steep declines, its economy is on the rebound driven also by higher commodity prices, especially oil. The Russian government has paid back foreign debts. Despite economic setbacks in 2009 amid the global financial crisis, growth has generally been robust throughout the 2000s.

    It's not that default is never the answer. What Greece's sad predicament underscores is that every economy is different and default could work better for some and not others. The problems in Greece are significant and it's unlikely that a default would be the best way out. Kirkegaard makes an interesting point: Whereas debt-ridden Ireland had a very healthy economy before its banks took on too many risky loans, Greece's problem is the product of decades of poor tax enforcement, corruption, low retirement ages and other bad policies.

    "They need to overhaul their entire economy, where Ireland …. merely has to reform its banking system and restore its fiscal finances to raise more revenue," he says.

    Needless to say, the bigger issue is what a Greek default could mean to the rest of Europe and the world at large. Not only could it be ugly for Greece's individual economy, but there's a real possibility that markets will think other peripheral euro-zone countries including Spain, Portugal and Italy, might default too. (See As Greece goes, so goes Italy?)