中国地方债务成不定时炸弹

    以做空中国著称的对冲基金经理吉姆•查诺斯去年晚些时候在接受《财富》杂志（Fortune）采访时称，中国正在“做一些绝无先例的事情”。他指的是已持续多年的大规模建设热潮。2008年中国政府推出的经济刺激方案向经济体系注入了4万亿元人民币(5,860亿美元)，更是起到了推波助澜的作用。他预计房地产投机泡沫终将破灭，导致房屋闲置，更大范围内的经济遭殃。

    对于那些支持查诺斯的人们而言，中国发布的一些数据显示，他的判断可能是对的。

    据《纽约时报》( New York Times)报道，中国国家审计署日前宣布，宽松的贷款标准以及地方政府借款大幅增加(当然是用于建设项目)可能已导致债务堆积如山，无力偿还。楼市下跌或某种形式的经济放缓或将使这些难以数计的不良贷款大白于天下。

    在这份政府报告发布的同时，中国国家审计署审计长刘家义周一在讲话中称，“一些地方政府融资平台的管理不规范，盈利能力和偿债能力都相当薄弱。”审计署官员和人民银行的官员们表示，地方政府债务占中国GDP的27-30%，合计1.7-2.2万亿美元。这样的数字高于预期。《纽约时报》指出，借款不仅投向了房地产建设，也投向了桥梁、隧道、地铁和公路等低回报基建项目。

    地方政府为借款而设立的投资公司估计有6,500-10,000个，它们打造的建设热潮使依赖出口的中国经济免受到全球经济放缓的极度痛苦。

    虽然有人说中产阶级的扩大能促进消费、带动经济增长，但中国依然需要依赖出口来保持经济快速增长，为庞大的人口创造就业机会。经济学家盖瑞•谢林撰文指出，中国的人均GDP 需达到5,000美元，才会出现显著的非必需支出。但谢林表示，只有约8%的人口有这样的经济实力。而且随着通胀存在失控的威胁，老百姓也需要上调工资。

    中国正在发生的一切听起来有些耳熟，它让我们想起了曾经在美国发生的情况。由于民众无法分享到经济推动财富增长带来的好处，20世纪90年代美国官员放宽了贷款标准。结果：地方政府支出跃增，房地产泡沫让投资者感到纸面富贵，建设热潮创造了就业机会，而债务却无法偿还。

    与美国当年的情形类似，证券化使中国的信贷问题进一步复杂化，它将潜在的有毒贷款风险传递给了投资者。根据惠誉(Fitch Ratings)去年发布的一份特别报告，所谓的“非正式证券化”在中国大热(2010年被叫停)。这意味着中国将银行贷款(而不是有按揭贷款支持的债券)重新打包成投资产品。惠誉的一项声明称，这股趋势“（扭曲了）中国银行业的信贷数据，包括机构层面和整个银行体系层面，导致信贷增长和信贷敞口普遍被低估。”

    惠誉的中国银行业评级主管朱夏莲当时表示，正如美国，那些希望调整贷款余额的银行以及那些希望有更高收益率的投资者都欢迎证券化和表外记账；由于中国对有信贷抵押的投资产品的处理类似于超安全的银行存款，投资者自然相信它们是有担保的。朱夏莲目前对中国的情形仍心存忧虑，近日又称中国的经济增长一直依赖宽松的信贷。

    查诺斯的中国观点最终可能会得到证实；但他说中国正在“做一些绝无先例的事情”，这一点无疑是错误的。中国正在进行的“举债——假装贷款状况良好”的赌局与全球一些最大经济体的所作所为如出一辙。但美国和欧洲的下场告诉我们，这场赌局没有胜算。问题不是中国是否会撞上债务墙，而是何时撞上。

    Jim Chanos, the hedge fund manager who is famously shorting China, told Fortune late last year that the country was "embarking on something unprecedented." He was referring to the massive construction boom that has been underway for years, and that was supercharged by a 2008 stimulus package that pumped four trillion yuan ($586 billion) into the economy. In his opinion, the speculative bubble in real estate would end in a big pop, empty buildings, and pain for the country's broader economy.

    For those who side with team Chanos, data is seeping out of China that suggests that he may right.

    Most recently, China's top auditor said that loose lending standards and a sharp rise in local government borrowing (for building projects, of course) may have created a mountain of debt that cannot be repaid, reports the New York Times. All it will take is a fall in housing, or some sort of economic slowdown, to reveal an untold number of bad loans.

    In a speech that coincided with the release of the government report, the head of China's national audit office Liu Jiayi said Monday: "The management of some local government financing platforms is irregular, and their profitability and ability to pay their debts is quite weak." Audit officials and Chinese central bankers say that local government debt accounts for between 27% and 30% of China's GDP, and totals $1.7 trillion to $2.2 trillion. Those numbers come in higher than estimated. The Times notes that borrowed money has been used to finance not only real estate construction, but also low-return infrastructure projects like bridges, tunnels, subways, and roads.

    The estimated 6,500 to 10,000 local government investment companies created to borrow money have made a construction boom that has kept China's export-reliant economy from feeling the extreme pain of the global economic slowdown.

    Despite talk of a burgeoning middle class that can support the Chinese economy with consumption, the country still relies on exports to keep the economy growing fast enough to create jobs for its large population. It takes a per-capita GDP of $5,000 to create meaningful discretionary spending power in China, writes economist A. Gary Shilling. But Shilling says only about 8% of the population has that kind of economic clout. And with inflation threatening to run out of control, citizens will need higher wages, too.

    What's happening in China should sound familiar because it is reminiscent of what happened here in the US. Confronted by an economy that couldn't deliver real wealth to the people, our bureaucrats loosened borrowing standards in the 1990s. The result: an uptick in local government spending, a real estate bubble that made investors feel artificially wealthy, a construction boom that created jobs, and debt that can't be repaid.

    China even exacerbated the credit problem with securitization, just like we did, spreading potentially toxic loans around to investors. So-called informal securitization became popular (but was then frozen in 2010) in China, according to a special report published last year by Fitch Ratings. This simply means that the Chinese re-packaged bank loans (rather than mortgage-backed bonds) into investment products. The trend "[distorted] Chinese banks' credit data at an institutional and system level, resulting in pervasive understatement of credit growth and credit exposure," according to a statement from Fitch.

    Just like in the US, securitization and off-balance sheet accounting was encouraged by banks that wanted to adjust their loan balances and investors who wanted higher yields, said Charlene Chu, the head of Fitch's Chinese bank ratings. And since China's credit-backed investment products have been treated like ultra-safe bank deposits, investors believe that they carry an implicit guarantee, according to Chu. Fitch's Chu remains worried about China, and has recently said that the country has been dependent on loose credit to grow.

    At the end of the day, Chanos will probably be proven right on China; but he erred when he said that the country was embarking on something unprecedented. The country is making the same lend-and-pretend-that-the-loans-are-good gamble that the world's largest economies have all made. And as you can see from what has happened in the US and all over Europe, it's a losing bet. The question is not whether China will hit the debt wall, but when.