拯救欧盟必须下猛药
持续蔓延的欧洲债务危机大有演变为全球金融灾难之势,虽然各方已通过一系列措施努力防范,但仍然不能安抚投资者的情绪:希腊、葡萄牙和爱尔兰都处于崩溃边缘,意大利和西班牙可能紧随其后。尽管德国和法国经济形势现在还过得去,但就算是这些健康的经济体,也出现了疲软的迹象。 上周二,希腊议会投票通过法案,开征一项非常不得人心的财产税。这一举措是其紧缩计划的一部分,而后者则这是获得欧盟援助资金的前提。此外,欧盟官员们正在采取措施充实一项基金,以便向麻烦缠身的成员国提供低息贷款。 可是,就算欧洲金融稳定基金(the European Financial Stability Facility)的权限得以扩大,其效率仍然是个未知数。投资者仍然担心,如果西班牙或意大利等规模更大的经济体突然需要援助,这个成立于去年的基金依然拿不出足够的资金。 政界现阶段或许无意寻求更大胆的主意,但市场对此却十分期待,因为欧洲债务危机可能将全世界都拖入新一轮的严重衰退。 正如资产管理公司Gluskin Sheff & Associates的首席经济学家大卫•罗森博格在周二希腊议会投票前所写的备忘录中所称:市场希望“有人砸出海量的资金来解决这个问题,不管谁买单都无所谓(只要不是银行持有这些债务就行!)。” 其中一种解决方案是,给希腊一笔规模大得多的援助资金,条件是一旦该国债务累累的经济体开始复苏并实现增长,作为回报,它必须拿出更多资金偿还债务,哈佛大学经济学教授肯尼斯•罗格夫就支持这个方案。 这个方案与他解救美国房地产市场的设想颇为相似。美国房地产市场目前仍然深陷困境,许多房主所承担的抵押贷款甚至超过了房屋的现价。罗格夫认为,如果房主同意分享住宅未来升值的收益,银行可以减记其贷款余额。同理,如果希腊愿意在未来经济表现好转的时候多加回报,欧洲的富裕国家也就可能同意给希腊规模大得多的援助(用罗格夫的话来说,“大到真的管用”)。 如此一来,借款方和援助方都有理由期待这笔交易能够成功。或许更重要的是,双方都付出了代价,没人可以免费搭便车——至少在原则上是这样。 就美国房地产市场的例子而言,这种方案意味着双赢。不仅那些所欠贷款超过房屋市价的房主能够获利,而且贷款方和投资者最终也能获得回报,使其给予借款方喘息之机的举动同样有利于自己。同理,负债累累的欧洲边缘成员国的债务压力将会大幅减轻。一旦这些经济体重新实现健康成长——比方说在10到15年之后——纳税人必须将国内生产总值(GDP)增长额的一定比例偿还给富国。 除此之外,罗格夫并未作出详细阐释,但几乎可以肯定地推断:任何此类计划都将缓解希腊的紧缩政策——欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织迫使希腊推行此类政策,以交换援助资金。可这些措施给希腊造就了一把双刃剑,如果希腊未来不能实现经济增长,又怎么可能偿还贷款? 没错,让一个负担着巨额债务的国家削减开支是合情合理的。但事实证明,裁掉数以千计的政府雇员,提高税收,给希腊经济带来了灾难性的后果。该国国内生产总值的萎缩幅度超出所有人的预期,2010年下降了6%,截至6月份的三个月中又下降了7.3%。如果增长率继续下降,希腊将无法实现财政收入目标,甚至会要求更多援助。市场走势表明,投资者预期希腊最终将会债务违约,很大程度上正是因为担忧上述恶性循环。 据彭博社(Bloomberg)报道,希腊国债暴跌,表明投资者认为违约率超过90%。目前,希腊两年期国债的收益率已经超过70%。 罗格夫的主意实质上就是给希腊提供一笔可以延期偿还的长期贷款。这个计划并非没有缺陷,很可能招致政界的反对——至少眼下的确如此。德国显然已经受够了,不愿再做欧洲的终极贷款人。尽管为更大规模的援助计划提供资金最终可能使德国获得丰厚回报,但这仍然很可能被视为富国免费援助穷国,而后者却不顾自身经济实力,肆意挥霍资金。 况且,密歇根大学福特公共政策学院(University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy)副院长艾伦•迪尔多夫指出,现在的问题不仅是如何让富国参与进来,希腊本身也得要有动力才行,否则该国可能也不会同意这个方案,因为它实际上相当于开征新税,将来出现任何形式的收入增长都将被征税。事实上,对未来国内生产总值增长所征的税必须控制在一定比例之内,否则希腊就会丧失促进经济增长的动力。而希腊的增长有赖于对本国经济进行深层次的结构性改革。 虽然罗格夫的想法当前可能无法获得政治上的支持,但至少在理性上,它颇有吸引力,稍晚些时候或许会更值得考虑。 译者:小宇 |
After a series of efforts to keep Europe's ongoing debt crisis from turning into a worldwide financial disaster, it seems as though little has calmed investors: Greece, Portugal and Ireland are on the brink. Italy and Spain could be next. And while the economies of Germany and France are doing okay for now, even the healthy ones are showing signs of weakness. Late Tuesday, lawmakers in Athens voted on a hugely unpopular property tax as part of a package of cuts to secure funds for a bailout package. Officials are also working to beef up a fund that facilitates low-cost loans for struggling EU countries. But even with new powers granted to the European Financial Stability Facility, it's still uncertain how effective it will be. Investors continue to worry that the fund, established last year, won't have enough money if bigger economies such as Spain or Italy suddenly need a lifeline. Politicians may not be looking for bold ideas at this point, but the markets certainly are, as Europe's debt crisis threatens to plunge the world into another deep recession. As Gluskin Sheff & Associates chief economist David Rosenberg wrote ahead of Tuesday's vote: The markets want "massive amounts of money thrown at the problem, regardless of who pays (so long as it's not the banks holding the debt!)." One solution is to give Greece a much bigger bailout in exchange for bigger payments once its heavily indebted economy begins to heal and grow, as Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff has suggested. The idea is analogous to what he thinks could help fix America's troubled housing market. Just as homeowners could receive write-downs on their underwater mortgages in exchange for claims on a percentage of future appreciation of their homes, rich countries in Europe could possibly agree to a much bigger bailout for Greece (one, as Rogoff says, that's "actually big enough to work") in return for higher payments later if its economy outperforms. That way, both borrower and lender would have a stake in seeing the deal succeed. And perhaps more importantly, nobody is really getting a free ride – at least in principle. In the case of the U.S. housing market, this would potentially mean a win not only for homeowners who owe more on their homes than their properties are worth, but also a win for lenders and investors who would eventually be repaid for giving borrowers a break. Conversely, Europe's heavily indebted peripheral countries would get meaningful relief on their debt payments. Once these economies grow in healthier fashion – say 10 to 15 years from now – taxpayers would repay the rich countries via a portion of its GDP gains. Rogoff hasn't elaborated much beyond this, but it's almost assumed that any such plan would include easing austerity measures that the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund have forced on Greece in order to secure its bailout money. These measures have created a double-edge sword for Greece, since it can't possibly repay the loans if it can't grow. True, it makes sense for a nation with huge debts to cut spending. But laying off thousands of workers and raising taxes has proven devastating on the Greek economy. GDP has shrunk more than anyone expected, falling 6% in 2010 and 7.3% during the three months ending in June. A further decline in growth could cause Greece to miss revenue targets and even seek more bailouts, which is largely why the market is pricing in the likelihood that Greece will eventually default. Greek bonds have plunged, putting the chance of default at more than 90%, according to Bloomberg. Two-year notes yield more than 70%. Now back to Rogoff's idea of giving Greece what would essentially be a long-term loan with delayed payments -- it has its drawbacks. Politicians would likely be against it, at least today. Germany is clearly fed up and resents having to be Europe's banker of last resort. And even though Germany could get substantial returns for funding bigger bailouts, this could still easily be viewed as rich states giving handouts to poor states that haphazardly spent beyond its means. The problem isn't just getting rich countries on board, however, says Alan Deardorff, associate dean of University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. Greece would need an incentive to agree to what would essentially create a tax on any rise in income. Indeed, any collection on future GDP growth would have to be limited to a certain percentage so that Greece would have an incentive to grow its economy. And growth, at least in the long-term, would depend significantly on deep structural reforms in the state's economy. Nevertheless, if Rogoff's idea may not be politically feasible today, it's at least intellectually appealing. And something perhaps worth considering later. |