西班牙告急，欧元命悬一线

    看起来，债券市场对西班牙的宽限和容忍已经到了头。由于担心马德里政府可能不久将需要据信约3,000亿欧元的巨额主权救助，周一西班牙主权债券的收益率大大突破了7%的关键水平，最高升至7.57%。欧美股市闻声下挫，标普指数（S&P）当日跌幅达到了2.5%。

    不久之前，欧元区领导人刚刚批准了一项1,000亿欧元的救助计划，用于拯救岌岌可危的西班牙银行业。但此后事情并没有向好的方面转变，反而越来越糟。

    令人难以接受的一个意外结果是，银行业救助计划似乎加快了西班牙需要全面主权救助这一天的到来，因为救助计划打消了投资者对于任何类型西班牙债券的需求。它不仅影响到了主权债券，也将西班牙17个自治区关在了债券市场外面，迫使它们向马德里政府寻求救助。如果西班牙不能很快从欧元区伙伴国那里获得亟需的全面救助，欧元很可能就此寿终正寝。

    市场迟早会看穿马德里的把戏。在1,000亿欧元的银行业救助计划中，西班牙政府事实上是把银行损失社会化，将损失从银行账面转到了政府的资产负债表上。如果这还不够糟糕，它还迫使这些银行的次级债券持有人接受投资减值，却保优先债券持有人全身而退。

    没错，公司破产时股票和次级债券持有人在偿付名单中排在最末。但这里的情况不同。西班牙银行业次级债券的持有人大多（占三分之二）是小投资者，而且往往都是听了个人理财顾问的建议，才买下这些被认为是安全的债券。随着今年西班牙股市下跌三分之一，西班牙投资者损失惨重。而且，此时正值西班牙失业率达到类似大萧条时期的25%之际。

    不过，把这些损失推给小投资者，西班牙政府可是打错了算盘，西班牙的地方和自治区债券市场基本上都受本地投资者的支持。西班牙投资者在银行救助计划中被西班牙政府坑了一道后，躲着政府债券的行为可以理解。国际投资者和大型养老基金离开西班牙市场已近一年，市场中事实上已没有什么投资者可以来买下所有这些西班牙当地债券。

    西班牙努力稳定局面，自治区已创建自己的180亿欧元救助机制。但180亿欧元将通过出售更多主权债券来提供资金，当前7.57%的收益率可能难以承受。

    这也许是为什么市场预计西班牙将很快需要欧盟全面救助的原因。目前，西班牙政府负责偿付自治区和自身的债务。但西班牙的债务/GDP比率没有准确反映其主权风险状况，因为它没有将自治区的几十亿欧元表外项目计算在内。由于这些债务事实上得到西班牙政府的支持，市场估计马德里将需要接过这些债务的偿还责任。据西班牙银行（Bank of Spain）称，如果加上这些表外项目，西班牙的债务/GDP比率将从68.5%增至87%。如果再加上1,000亿欧元的银行业救助方案，这一比率将跃升至96%左右。

    西班牙政府无法长时间承担7.57%的融资利率，更别提还要为17个自治区提供支持。该国已经让欧洲央行（European Central Bank）购买其主权债券来降低利率，但利率水平仍然太高。欧洲债券交易员们告诉《财富》杂志（ Fortune）， 他们预计欧洲央行将通过实施新一轮量化宽松措施，努力平息这种混乱局面，在欧洲被称为长期再融资计划（LTRO）的量化宽松基本上就是“开动印钞机”的花哨说法。希望银行体系中所有这些额外的资金都将提振投资和借贷，降低债券收益率并纾解西班牙政府的压力。

    但欧洲央行能做的也相当有限。它不能永远为西班牙债务提供融资，就像马德里政府不能永远都为各个自治区提供债务融资一样。如果西班牙不能很快重启债券市场，吸引私有投资者，它很快就会面临违约。

    债券市场当然是在寻找一个解决欧元问题的长期有效方案，但欧元区领导人在这个问题上行动迟缓。与此同时，对西班牙进行大规模且强有力的主权救助将有助于稳定这些市场——至少短期内如此。这样的救助将基本耗尽欧洲救助基金中的剩余资金，迫使欧元区成员国要么提供更多资金（这种可能性不大），要么最终携手组建一个更紧密且更稳定的联盟。无论哪种方式，看来欧元都与西班牙坐在同一条船上。

    译者：早稻米

    It looks like the bond markets are done cutting Spain financial slack. Bond yields for Spanish sovereign debt broke well past the critical 7% mark Monday, hitting as high as 7.57%, on concerns that the government in Madrid will soon need a big sovereign bailout, thought to be around 300 billion euros. European and US stock markets fell on the news, with the S&P down 2.5% on the day.

    This all comes days after eurozone leaders approved a 100 billion euro bailout of Spain's crippled banking sector. But instead of things getting better, they have clearly just gotten worse.

    In a bitter twist of irony, it seems that the bank bailout may have actually hastened the need for a possible full sovereign bailout as it has crushed investor demand for any kind of Spanish debt. This not only affected the sovereign but has also locked the nation's 17 states or "regions" out of the bond market as well, forcing them to look to Madrid for a bailout of their own. If Spain doesn't receive a comprehensive and fair bailout from its eurozone partners soon, the euro could very well end here.

    It was only a matter of time before the markets caught on to Madrid's shell game. In its 100 billion euro bank bailout, the Spanish government essentially socialized bank losses by simply transferring those losses from the banks to the government's balance sheet. If that wasn't bad enough, it also forced the banks' subordinated bondholders to take a hit on the value of their investment, but allowed the senior debt holders to walk away with full value.

    In a corporate bankruptcy, it is true that equity holders and subordinated debt holders are at the bottom of the payout heap. But this is different. The subordinated bondholders in the nation's banks were mostly (around two-thirds) made up of small-time investors who bought that debt thinking it was safe, often on the advice of their personal financial advisors. With the Spanish stock market down by a third this year, the Spanish investor has really taken a hit. This comes on top of the nation's depression-like 25% unemployment rate.

    But in pushing the losses on the little guy, the Spanish government basically shot itself in the foot. That's because the local and regional bond markets in Spain are largely supported by local investors. After getting burned by the national government in the bank bailout, Spanish investors have understandably shunned government debt. With international investors and big pension funds out of the Spanish market for nearly a year, there is really no one left to buy up all that local Spanish debt.

    Spain has tried to calm the situation with its regions by creating its own 18-billion euro bailout mechanism. But those 18 billion euros will be financed by selling more sovereign debt, which, at 7.57% would be prohibitively expensive.

    That is partly why the market anticipates Spain will soon need a full on bailout from the EU. The national government is now responsible for covering the debts of its regions, as well as its own. It turns out that Spain's official debt-to-GDP ratio didn't give an accurate picture of the country's sovereign risk. That's because it didn't take into account the billions of euros of off-balance sheet items from its regions. Since those debts were implicitly backed by the national government, the market now believes that Madrid will need to take over the payments. Add in those off-balance sheet items and the nation's debt-to-GDP ratio jumps from 68.5% to 87%, according to the Bank of Spain. Top it off with the 100 billion euros bank bailout and the ratio jumps to around 96%.

    The national government cannot afford to finance its own debt at 7.57% for very long, let alone support its 17 regions as well. It already has the European Central Bank buying its debt to keep rates low but they are still too high. Traders in European debt tell Fortune that they believe the ECB will try to calm the melee by instituting another round of quantitative easing, which is known as LTRO in Europe, but which is still essentially just a fancy way of saying: "printing more money." The hope is that all this extra money in the system will boost investment and lending, lowering bond yields and taking the pressure off the national government.

    But there is a limit to what the ECB can do here. It simply cannot finance Spain's debt forever, just as Madrid cannot finance the debt of its regions forever. If Spain is unable to reopen its bond markets to private investors quickly, then it will soon be facing default.

    The bond markets are clearly looking for a real long term solution to the euro question, but eurozone leaders are slow in getting there. In the meantime, a large and powerful sovereign bailout of Spain would help stabilize the markets – at least in the short term. Such a bailout would essentially exhaust what's left of the European bailout fund, forcing eurozone members to either put up more money, which probably won't happen, or to finally work to form a closer and more stable union. Either way, it appears as if the euro stops here with Spain.