“股市已死”论可以休矣

    债券大佬比尔•格罗斯最近又掀起了轩然大波。他宣称“股市神话正在破灭”，还把股票的历史回报比做庞氏骗局。他的论点是，过去一个世纪内GDP的真实增速不过3.5%，因此股票投资者实际获得的6.6%的回报“泡沫很多”。在他看来，股票市场的长期回报不可能超过真实GDP的增长。但是，股市总回报除了来自资本增值之外，还包括股息在内的公司现金流分配的贡献。而后者恰恰就是股市回报得以超越GDP增长的原因。

    买股票实际上和买债券很相似，只是现金流更多变、更不确定。股东所能得到的净利润就相当于债券的息票，不过不像息票那样固定，而是可能随时间剧烈震荡。公司可能以派息的形式直接返还净利润，也可以还债，回购股票，或者对业务再投资。在后两种情况中，股东要么增加他们所拥有的未来现金流的份额（由于所有权比例的增加），要么拥有一家持续增值的成长型公司。

    现金流在产生股东回报中的重要性怎么评价也不为过。举个例子，如果投资者以15倍的市盈率购买股票，那她就相当于购买了收益率为6.7%的债券，当然收益可能会大幅震荡。现在假设国家经济稳定，而真实GDP并未增长。这样一来，公司很可能不会增加运营资本，而资本支出也不会超过折旧。那么净利润基本上就等价于自由现金流（FCF）。假定100%的派息比率，投资者每年就可望得到6.7%的回报，就像很多业主有限责任合伙企业（Master Limited Partnerships）的安排一样。当前经济增长停滞，由于好坏公司互相抵消，真实的整体公司估值应该保持恒定。因而，除非真实的整体公司估值随时间出现了明显下跌（如下讨论），否则投资者的回报就会显著超过GDP的增速。

    股票对于债券的优势就在于它对通胀的耐受性，如果通胀上升，就真实购买力而言，净利润也能保持相对恒定（假定公司能够通过价格上涨来转嫁输入成本的上升）。此外，如果真实GDP增长，公司还可以利用自由现金流进行再投资，扩大业务规模。这样的做法虽然在短期内会减少股东可以获得的现金流，但从理论上说，长期看，他们拥有的公司会变得更有价值。

    通过对过去一个世纪股市回报的分析，我们预期投资者本应得到约10%的年均回报（1912年的股市市盈率也是接近15倍，和今天相似，相当于6.7%的净收益率，加上3.5%的真实GDP年均增长率作为公司价值增值的估计）。实际回报较低的原因有二个。首先，股市在任一时间点上都只能代表上市公司，而市场指数（如标普500）通常只包括大盘股。然而随着时间推移，某些大盘股的市场份额会被新兴的私人公司或者小型的上市公司抢占（也就是说，新公司和新产业总是在取代老公司）。由于投资者（以市场指数为代表）拥有这些“过气”的大盘股，而不是“抢班夺权”的私人公司或者小型的上市公司，那么实际的回报低于理论值也就情有可原了。其次，大部分公司的自由现金流还是用于公司发展，而不是派息，有些资本支出很可能被用错了地方，特别是在走下坡路的公司中。换句话说，管理团队对公司现金流的使用并非尽善尽美。

    由于全球经济增长放缓，以及其它一些很有说服力的原因，未来的股市回报可能会低于历史水平，就此而言，格罗斯也许是对的。此外，市场市盈率可能会降低，管理团队对超额现金流的投资可能出现失误，而上市公司中的“输家”数量也可能显著增加。但是，只要你计算回报时记得把现金流包含在内，所有这些现象和股市整体回报超出GDP增速的结论并不矛盾。

    杰夫•维斯蒙特曾是投资银行家，他创建了一家专注于消费品公司的对冲基金Westwoods Capital。他最近首次出版的新书《圣战倒计时》（Countdown to Jihad）是一本政治题材的惊悚小说。

    Bond guru Bill Gross recently created a controversy when he proclaimed "the cult of equity is dying" and compared historical stock returns to a Ponzi scheme. His position is that since GDP for the last century grew at a 3.5% real rate, stockholders were effectively "skimming off the top" to achieve their actual 6.6% return. In his view, shareholder returns can't exceed real GDP growth over time. Yet total stock market returns include both capital appreciation and the impact of the deployment of corporate cash flows, including dividends. It is this latter component that enables investors to achieve returns in excess of GDP growth.

    In effect, buying a share of stock is similar to buying a bond, but with more variable and uncertain cash flows. Net income available to stockholders is comparable to an interest payment, although one that can vary significantly over time. Corporations can either pay out this net income in dividends, reduce debt, repurchase stock or reinvest it in the business. In the latter two scenarios, shareholders either increase their share of future cash flows (due to an increase in ownership percentage) or own a growing and increasingly valuable corporation.

    The importance of these cash flows in generating investor returns cannot be overstated. For instance, if an investor pays 15 times earnings for the market, she is effectively buying a bond with a 6.7% yield, albeit a highly variable one. Now assume a steady state economy where real GDP does not grow. In this scenario, corporations are probably not increasing their working capital or making capital expenditures in excess of depreciation. Thus, net income is a decent proxy for free cash flow (FCF). Investors should expect to receive 6.7% annually -- assuming a 100% payout ratio -- similar to how many master limited partnerships are structured. In this no-growth economy, aggregate real corporate valuations should remain constant, as corporate winners and losers offset each other. As a result, unless the aggregate real value of public corporations decreases materially over time (as discussed below), investor returns will significantly exceed GDP growth.

    The advantage stocks have over bonds is that if inflation rises, this net income payment stream should remain relatively constant in real terms (assuming corporations can match the rise in input costs with price increases). Moreover, if real GDP grows, companies can reinvest their FCF in expanding the business. While this in the short run will decrease cash flows available to investors, theoretically, over time, they will own a more valuable business.

    In examining investor returns for the past century, one might have expected that investors would have earned closer to 10% annually (the market multiple in 1912 was about 15x, similar to today, implying a 6.7% earnings yield and adding the real 3.5% GDP annual growth as a proxy for the appreciation in corporate values). Yet actual returns were lower, which may be due to two reasons. First, the stock market at any one point in time represents only public companies and market indices (such as the S&P 500) generally include only large capitalization companies. Yet over time, some larger public companies lose market share to emerging private or smaller public companies (e.g. new companies and industries constantly emerge to replace established ones). Since investors (as represented by the indices) own these large public company "losers" and not the private or smaller public company "winners," it is not surprising that actual returns are lower than theoretically possible. Second, since the majority of corporate free cash flow is used for expansion and not to pay dividends, some of these capital expenditures are probably misallocated, particularly by companies in decline. In other words, management teams don't always make the best use of corporate cash flow.

    Gross may be right that future stock market returns will be lower than historical due to slower growth worldwide and his other compelling arguments. In addition, market multiples may contract, management teams may invest excess cash flow poorly or the number of public company "losers" could increase significantly. But there is nothing inconsistent with having total stock market returns greater than GDP growth, as long as cash flows are included in the calculation.

    Jeff Westmont, a former investment banker, is the founder of Westwoods Capital, a consumer oriented hedge fund. He recently published his first book, Countdown to Jihad, a political thriller.