欧洲救援行动又搞砸了

    塞浦路斯援助行动的拙劣表现不仅表明整个欧洲在设计复杂的国家援助方案时所面临的困难，它也让人们意识到，欧洲的目标很多，但手段较为有限，二者并不对等。它还说明，为什么短期战术性折中无法取代恰当的战略决策，当然后者的难度要大得多。

    经过漫长协商，塞浦路斯政府和欧洲官员上周六一早公布了双方达成的协议，结果却马上招致批评（请参见我的专栏文章A Muddled and Risky Approach to Cyprus）。几个小时之内，外界的质疑就让政府官员开始相互指责起来。

    随着问罪范围的扩大，几乎所有参与设计这项协议的人都争相和它撇清关系。塞浦路斯人很愤怒。塞浦路斯政府被迫将国内银行歇业时间延长两天。塞浦路斯和欧洲方面都再次召开闭门会议，商讨如何修改这项协议。

    轻描淡写地把所有这些情形都说成是特别个案很容易。毕竟，用官方青睐的形容词来说，塞浦路斯的情况相当“独特”和“极端”。

    遭遇希腊一系列违约事件重创前，塞浦路斯银行业一直在不负责任地过度增长。这些银行构成了一个离岸金融中心，而且吸引了来历可疑的资金，一些欧洲官员因此认为应当对塞浦路斯银行业加强监管。此外，塞浦路斯政府刚刚完成换届。

    然而，对塞浦路斯特殊性的关注不应妨碍我们探讨这样一个问题，那就是如何通过塞浦路斯局势看到在欧洲经济和金融危机进入第三个年头之际，一些普遍存在的问题仍在对欧洲构成侵害。

    按照目前的框架，欧洲官员，不论是债权方还是债务方，仍然在使用过于简陋的工具来追求过于繁杂的目标。他们并没有改弦更张，做出痛苦但必要的战略抉择，而是自然而然地抛出了一系列蹩脚的折中措施。通常，对某个、或某些谈判方来说，每次折中似乎都有道理。塞浦路斯过去这几天的情况已经非常生动地说明了这一点。甚至连国际货币基金组织（IMF）都希望这些折中方案能成功实施。但总的来说，这些方案构成了一个支离破碎、而且难以为继的整体。

    通常情况下会出现这样的局面：

    • 官方债权人——以欧洲政府、欧洲央行（ECB）和IMF为首，希望尽可能少地提供资金，并以此换取尽可能强大的政策杠杆。他们提出的限制条件表明，他们不相信债务国有能力在现有框架下持续推进改革。

    • 官方债权人也不愿意背负过重的资金负担。他们会适当地让私营部门做出贡献。虽然他们希望后者自愿提供资金，但他们也明白，可能需要施加一定的压力（之前这种做法被称为“自救”（bail-in）或“PSI”，即私营部门参与（private sector involvement））。

    • 另一方面，债务国希望尽可能多地获得外部资金支持，帮助自己实施改革，同时尽量减少本国公民和既得利益方的负担。它还会努力消除PSI可能带来的负面影响，以保护国内信心以及自身对外国投资的长期吸引力。

    The botched bailout of Cyprus sheds light on more than just the difficulties Europeans face in collectively designing a complicated country rescue package. It also serves as a reminder of the mismatch between Europe's multiple objectives and its more limited tools. And it illustrates why short-term tactical compromises are no substitute for proper, albeit much more difficult, strategic decision making.

    After long and protracted negotiations, the Cypriot government and European officials announced early on Saturday an agreement only to see it attract immediate criticism. (see my column A Muddled and Risky Approach to Cyprus.) Within hours, outside questioning fueled contradictory finger pointing within the official community.

    As the blame game expanded, virtually everyone involved in the design of the agreement scrambled to disown it. Cypriot citizens expressed outrage. Their government was forced to announce an extraordinary two-day closure of the domestic banking system. And both Cypriot and European officials are now back behind closed doors debating potential modifications.

    It is easy to dismiss all this as idiosyncratic. After all, Cyprus is, to use descriptors favored by the official community, quite "unique" and "exceptional."

    Its banks had grown excessively and irresponsibly before getting whacked by serial defaults in Greece. They constitute an offshore center that some European officials feel should be regulated more tightly as it attracts funds from dubious sources. And the country has just gone through a change of government.

    Yet the focus on Cyprus's peculiarities should not preclude us from discussing how this case sheds light on general ailments that continue to weaken Europe in the third year of its regional economic and financial crisis.

    Under the current framework, European officials -- be they creditors or debtors -- still pursue too many objectives with too few instruments. Rather than alter the context by making painful but necessary strategic decisions, they naturally end up stumbling through a series of messy compromises. Often, and as illustrated most vividly in the last few days by the case of Cyprus, each compromise is deemed to make sense to some negotiating party or parties. It is even blessed by the IMF. In aggregate, however, they risk constituting an incoherent and unsustainable whole.

    Here is the usual pattern:

    • Official creditors -- led by European governments, the ECB, and the IMF -- seek to contribute the smallest possible financing in return for maximum policy leverage. And their quest for conditionality reflects the distrust they have in debtor countries' ability to sustain reform efforts within the established framework.

    • Official creditors are also hesitant to carry too much of the financing burden. They appropriately seek contributions from the private sector. While hoping for voluntary contributions, they know that a certain amount of coercion is likely to be needed (formally known as a bail-in or "PSI," for private sector involvement).

    • On its part, the debtor country wishes to maximize external financial support in order to facilitate the implementation of reforms and minimize the burden borne by citizens and vested interests. It also struggles with the adverse impact that PSI could have on domestic confidence and the longer-term attractiveness for foreign investment.