欧洲已经放弃了吗？

    欧洲最大的几个经济体不能仅仅因为“难度过大”或“不受欢迎”而不去执行欧盟的债务上限规定。这样做既伪善又危险。说它伪善是因为此前这几个国家坚持要求那些比自己小得多、而且更为脆弱的欧盟成员国采取有害的紧缩措施，说它危险是因为此举可能再次引发主权债务危机。

    欧洲主要经济体迟迟没有认识到，如果能够进行有实际意义的结构性改革，就仍有可能在勒紧裤带的情况下实现经济增长。

    此种不作为所产生的结果夸大了赤字和负增长——如果欧盟还像本周这样给这些国家过多的回旋余地，这种情况必将延续下去。口头支票和不切实际的财政目标根本于事无补。虽然塞浦路斯危机过后市场给了欧盟一些空间，但以往经验证明，市场变化无常。现在它还风平浪静，此时进行改革要比市场陷入愤怒后被迫采取改革措施好得多。

    主权债务危机让欧洲大陆陷入瘫痪至今已有三年多时间。虽然欧洲外围国家，比如希腊、葡萄牙、西班牙和爱尔兰在解决财政失衡问题上已经取得了长足进展，但法国、意大利、荷兰和比利时等欧洲核心国家一直未能果断进行必要的改革，因而没有给自身的财政困境带来实质性影响。虽然在养老金、就业和税制改革方面，外围国家所面临的困难要大得多，但核心国家也到了采取同样的行动、同时顺财政政策和经济产出关系的时候。

    欧元问世之日开始，成员国就一直需要采取一系列财政措施来确保欧元的实力和稳定性。其中最重要的措施就是所谓的《稳定与增长公约》（stability and growth pact），它的要求之一就是成员国的预算赤字不得超过当年GDP的3%。违反这项规定将遭到处罚，轻则罚款，重则驱逐出欧元区。但在主权债务危机爆发前的十年中，欧盟并没有认真执行这项关键规定。因此，几乎所有欧盟国家的赤字都一直高于GDP的3%，包括德国等外界认为作风稳健的国家。这最终带来失衡局面并让欧元区陷入债务泥潭。

    3%的上限看似武断，而且一些人相信应该把它当成一个目标，而不是一个限制条件。但经历了过去几年的困苦之后，市场和主权债务投资者已经把这项规定视为一个国家真实信誉的象征。

    不出意料，那些赤字一直超标的国家也正是债券市场“治安员”（指通过抛售债券来反对有通胀倾向的货币或财政政策的投资者——译注）发泄怒火的对象。以希腊为例，十几年来它的赤字/GDP比例从未低于3%——最低水平是2001年的4.5%，即希腊加入欧元区的头一年；最高水平是2009年的16%，也就是希腊经济开始崩溃的那一年。爱尔兰在这方面似乎独占鳌头。它的预算赤字/GDP比例高达31%，超过上限十倍还多。在这种情况下，爱尔兰政府决定接收银行的坏账，以免国内经济全面崩溃。

    毫无疑问，欧洲外围国家在解决财政问题方面还有很长的路要走，但许多国家已经有了巨大进步。比如说，爱尔兰已在2012年成功地将赤字水平降至GDP的7.6%。但就其他国家——具体来说是希腊和葡萄牙而言，更为富裕的欧洲核心国家大力紧缩导致经济大幅滑坡，以至于政府大量削减开支后预算赤字水平不降反升。一些核心国家领导人就此指出，紧缩措施不能解决欧元区的问题。因此，在更为谨慎的上届政府实施紧缩并扩大税收后，法国和意大利现任政府又将这些政策恢复原状，目的就是证明自身观点的正确性。

    Europe's largest economies shouldn't be able to skirt European Union debt ceilings rules just because it's "too hard" or "unpopular." To do so would not only be hypocritical, as they have insisted on crippling austerity measures in much smaller and more vulnerable EU member countries in the past, but it is also dangerous, as it risks reigniting the sovereign debt crisis.

    It is still possible to have economic growth while pursuing belt-tightening policies if meaningful structural reforms are made -- something that the big European economies have been slow to recognize.

    The result of such inaction has been overblown deficits and negative growth -- a trend that will surely continue if Brussels allows countries too much leeway as they have recently done this week. Failed promises and unrealistic fiscal targets just won't cut it anymore. While the markets have cut the EU some slack post-Cyprus, it has proven to be mercurial in the past. It is much better to take reforms on now when it is calm than to do so under pressure from an angry market.

    It has been over three years since the European sovereign debt crisis paralyzed the continent. While there has been much progress made in fixing the fiscal imbalances in Europe's periphery, such as in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, Europe's core, namely France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, have failed to take on the tough reforms necessary to have a meaningful impact on their own fiscal mess. While the periphery had a much larger hill to climb in respect to pension, labor, and tax reform, the time has come for the core countries to follow suit and align their fiscal policies to match their economic output.

    From the inception of the euro, member countries have been required to adhere to a number of fiscal measures to ensure the strength and stability of the single currency. The most important measure was the so-called stability and growth pact, which stated, among other things, that a nation could not run a budget deficit that exceeded 3% of its GDP in any given year. If a nation broke that rule there would be consequences, ranging from fines to ejection from the monetary club. But in the decade leading up to the sovereign debt meltdown, Brussels failed to seriously enforce this key rule. As a result, pretty much all EU states, including supposedly prudent ones, like Germany, consistently ran deficits exceeding the 3% rule. This eventually led to an unbalanced and debt-ridden eurozone.

    The 3% threshold seems like an arbitrary line in the sand, one that some believe should be seen as a goal rather than a threshold. But given the troubles of the last few years, that line has come to symbolize to the markets and sovereign debt investors the true creditworthiness of a nation.

    It is no surprise that those nations that had consistently run afoul of the 3% threshold are the same ones that have faced the wrath of the bond market vigilantes. Greece, for example, never ran a deficit below 3%. Its budget deficits in the decade or so since it joined the euro have ranged from 4.5% in 2001, the first year it joined, to as much as 16% in 2009, the year it started to melt down. Ireland seems to have taken the prize, running a budget deficit of 31% of its GDP, more than 10 times that of the threshold, when the government decided to take on the bad debts of its banks to avoid a total economic meltdown.

    The periphery has a long way to go to get their fiscal houses in order, no doubt, but many have made great progress. Ireland, for one, was successful in lowering its debt levels to 7.6% of GDP in 2012. But for others, namely Greece and Portugal, harsh austerity measures imposed by their richer neighbors in the core of Europe have caused their GDPs to shrink to such a degree that it has made their budget deficits jump even after massive cuts in government spending. This has led some leaders in the core of Europe to say that austerity isn't the answer to solve the eurozone's problems. As a result, governments in France and Italy have reversed austerity measures and tax increases implemented by former, more prudent, regimes, in an effort to prove their theory.