Twitter上市信息披露被指嫌贫爱富

    Twitter首发上市的过程中，华尔街再次向花了大钱的客户透露了一些独家信息，其他人听到的则是另外一套说辞。

    Twitter本次首发上市融资18亿美元（110.43亿元人民币）。《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）报道，为高盛（Goldman Sachs）等承销商工作的分析师私下告诉投资者，Twitter的收入增长率可能不会像预计的那么高。高盛分析师预测，明年Twitter的收入将增长55%。华尔街其他投行预估的增幅为80%。双方的2015年Twitter收入增长预期分别为32%和58%。Twitter尚未盈利，目前对它估值的主要依据是增长能力。对这样的公司来说，这两组数字有着很大的差距。

    投行低估自己正在推介的公司听上去可能不像一件坏事。这和20世纪90年代互联网热潮期间的情况正好相反。

    但在Facebook运作拙劣的IPO过程中，这成了一个大问题，许多人都说这次上市操作对普通投资者来说有失公允。据说，Facebook高层在该公司上市前不久告诉承销商所聘用的分析师，对它销售额的预期过高。这些分析师又将这个消息透露给了一些投资者。IPO过后人们才知道，华尔街所青睐的客户已经窥见了Facebook的潜在问题，与此同时，在券商的鼓动之下，普通投资者对该公司的IPO则如痴如狂。

    最终，摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）不得不因为有选择地披露Facebook 的信息而向马萨诸塞州监管机构缴纳了500万美元罚款。受此事影响，Facebook及其承销商仍面临着集体诉讼。

    Twitter的IPO看来也出现了同样的问题。高盛拒绝就此发表评论。

    分析师可以持有不同的看法。机构投资者一般会为券商的研究工作提供报酬，虽然是通过间接方式，但总归是报酬。所以，和普通投资者等方面相比，机构投资者更容易接触到券商的研究分析师属于合理情况。

    但为承销商工作的分析师和其他分析师的关键区别在于，前者可以接触到Twitter的高层人员，这就是问题的根源所在。一般情况下，公司不能对某一部分投资者说这样的话，却对其他人又是另外一套说辞。

    实际上，首发上市前公司高层不应对任何方面公开披露任何信息。这个阶段被称为静默期。此外，除了不能公开发言，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）也不允许这些高层人员和潜在投资者会面。同样的，这样的会面通常只限于券商的顶级客户。规则就是如此，尽管它并不公平。

    Once again, Wall Street is telling its top-paying clients one thing, and the rest of us are getting a different story. This time it's the Twitter (TWTR) IPO.

    According to the Wall Street Journal, analysts who work for Goldman Sachs (GS) and other banks on the IPO, which raised $1.8 billion, have been privately telling select investors that Twitter's revenue may not increase as fast as expected. The underwriters' analysts are predicting 55% growth next year. The rest of the Street is estimating 80%. For the following year, it's 32% vs. 58%. That's a huge difference for a company like Twitter that is not yet profitable and being judged mostly on its ability to grow.

    Investment banks under-hyping a deal they're selling might not sound like a bad thing. It's the opposite of what happened during the 1990s dot-com boom.

    But it became a big issue in the bungled Facebook IPO, leading many to call the offering unfair to average investors. Facebook (FB) executives, shortly before the IPO, allegedly told a group of analysts employed by its underwriters that sales projections for the company were too high. The analysts then passed that information on to certain investors. But it didn't come out until after the IPO that Wall Street's favorite clients got a glimpse at potential problems at Facebook, at the same time that average investors were being whipped into a frenzy about the deal.

    Morgan Stanley (MS) eventually had to pay $5 million to the State of Massachusetts for its role in Facebook's selective disclosure of information. Facebook and its underwriters are still facing class action suits related to the deal.

    And yet the same thing appears to have happened in the Twitter IPO. Goldman declined to comment.

    Analysts are allowed to have different opinions. And institutional investors generally pay, in indirect ways, but pay nonetheless, for Wall Street research. So it makes sense that they would have better access to Wall Street's research analysts than, say, an average investor.

    But the key difference between the analysts who work for the underwriters and those who do not is that the former group gets access to Twitter's executives. That's what creates the problem. Companies are generally not allowed to tell one group of investors one thing, and not tell everyone else the same.

    In fact, in the run-up to an IPO, corporate executives aren't supposed to speak publicly to anyone. It's called the quiet period. Nonetheless, while they are not talking publicly, the SEC does allow corporate executives to meet with potential investors. Once again, these meetings are generally restricted to the Wall Street firm's top paying clients. Those are the rules, even if they aren't fair.