为什么西方不会进一步制裁俄罗斯
弗拉基米尔•普京的支持率可能正在飙升,但不能说俄罗斯股市或卢布也会出现同样的走势。 投资者不断从俄罗斯撤回资金,因为他们担心吞并克里米亚可能让西方国家对俄罗斯施加严厉的经济制裁。不仅如此,还有一点也变得越来越明显——俄罗斯的这个行动还将拖累它的经济。原因是除了海军基地和相对温暖的气候,克里米亚地区并无所长。换句话说,克里米亚的离去对乌克兰或西方来说并不是什么重大的损失。尽管奥巴马总统和欧洲领导人放出了狠话,但我们要一位美国和欧洲方面真的会对俄罗斯实行经济制裁,严格限制贸易或资金的流动。除了前面提到的原因,这里还有几个理由。另外三条理由如下: 1. 俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后,西方实际上更容易巩固对乌克兰其他地区的影响。政治风险咨询机构欧亚集团(Eurasia Group)分析师兼欧洲业务负责人穆杰塔巴•拉赫曼认为,对于俄罗斯的吞并行为,欧盟和乌克兰新政府现在的反应是向联系国协定(Association Agreement)——也就是乌克兰最终加入欧盟的路线图——迈进,这比任何经济制裁都大胆和重要得多。 拉赫曼指出,“退一步看,整个事件其实是关于乌克兰是否会成为欧盟成员国,以及俄罗斯是否愿意让乌克兰倒向西方。现在,欧洲方面已经明确表示他们要采取这样的行动。”再加上克里米亚现在已经成为俄罗斯而不是欧盟的一部分,俄罗斯在乌克兰的影响力已经大为减弱。有近100万克里米亚人投票支持俄罗斯,本来今后可以利用这些人来影响乌克兰政局,但如今这股力量已经不复存在。“现在,亲西方的乌克兰新政府要推选一位亲西方的总统就会变得容易得多。” 2. 严厉制裁最终会让西方和俄罗斯两败俱伤。办公室设在拉脱维亚的经济学家安德里斯•斯特拉兹德斯指出,俄罗斯经济高度依赖对欧洲的石油出口。虽然这一点可能让大家认为欧洲可以牵制俄罗斯,但它其实对双方都有影响。斯特拉兹德斯写道: 对俄罗斯石油的禁运会造成油价急剧上涨,至少短期内会导致这样的结果。此外,有几个欧盟成员国非常依赖俄罗斯的天然气。除了能源,德国以及其他许多欧盟国家的公司和俄罗斯都有着广泛的贸易往来,制裁也会同时伤及这些欧洲企业。除了贸易,欧盟和俄罗斯之间的大量企业投资也会受到不利影响。 美国和欧盟拥有对俄罗斯施加影响的政治杠杆,因此,它们会不会借助经济制裁这把双刃剑来达到目的值得怀疑。 3. 无论如何,制裁往往不起作用。通过协同行动来伤害自身经济会给西方带来什么回报呢?很可能一无所获。经济制裁往往不会达到预期效果,而且经常事与愿违。芝加哥大学(University of Chicago)政治学家罗伯特•佩普研究了1914-1990年期间经济制裁的效果。他发现,在115次制裁行动中,达到目的的只有5次。实际上,在许多案例中,经济制裁反而让受制裁国家的民众团结在了他们的领导人周围,而且更加支持原先引发制裁的行动。 当然,如果俄罗斯决定进一步侵入乌克兰,所有这些都可能发生改变。拉赫曼说:“没有人希望因为克里米亚而真正开战,无论是经济上的还是在其他领域。”然而,如果普京打算扩大俄罗斯在欧洲的军事影响力,而且克里米亚只是这项计划的第一步,西方就会考虑用真正的经济力量,甚至可能是军事力量,予以回击。(财富中文网) 译者:Charlie
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Vladimir Putin's approval ratings may be soaring, but you can't say the same thing for the Russian stock market or the ruble. Investors have been pulling their money out of Russian investments, fearing that the country's annexation of Crimea could lead to harsh economic sanctions from western nations. Not only that, it's increasingly clear that Russia's move will be a drag on its own economy -- as the region has little to offer but a naval base and a relatively warm climate. In other words, the loss of Crimea isn't a huge one for the Ukraine or the West, and that's just one of several reasons why we shouldn't expect the U.S. and Europe to respond with economic sanctions that will significantly restrict trade or capital flows, despite tough talk from President Obama and European leaders. Here are three others: 1. The annexation of Crimea actually puts the West in a stronger position to consolidate its influence over the rest of Ukraine. Western attempts to draw the Ukraine closer to the EU and the United States triggered this crisis. According to Mujtaba Rahman, an analyst and European Practice Head at the Eurasia Group, the fact that the European Union and the new Ukrainian government have now, in response to Russia's annexation, moved forward with an association agreement -- which serves as a road map for Ukraine's eventual joining of the European Union -- is a much bolder and consequential step than any economic sanctions would be. "When you take a step back, this whole drama was about whether or not Ukraine is going to become an E.U. member, and whether or not Moscow is willing to let it turn West, and Europe has now made it clear that it's going to allow this to happen." And with the Crimea region now a part of Russia rather than the E.U., Russia's influence over the Ukraine has been greatly weakened. Nearly one million pro-Russian votes in Crimea that could have been used to influence Ukrainian politics going forward are gone, argues Rahman. "It's now a lot easier for this Western-friendly government in Kiev to get a Western-friendly president in place." 2. Strong sanctions would end up hurting the West as much as Russia. As the Latvian-based economist Andris Strazds has pointed out, the Russian economy is heavily dependent on oil exports to Europe. While this fact might lead you to believe that Europe has leverage over Russia, this road goes both ways. Strazds writes: An embargo on oil exports from Russia would result in a huge increase in oil prices, at least temporarily. In addition, several EU countries are heavily dependent on Russia for natural gas. Beyond energy, German and many other European Union businesses trade extensively with Russia, and they would be harmed by sanctions. In addition to trade, there are also extensive investments between EU and Russian firms that would be adversely affected. The U.S. and the E.U. have political levers to influence Russia, so it's doubtful they'll resort to mutually painful economic sanctions in order to achieve their goals. 3. Sanctions tend to not work, anyway. What would the West get in return for a concerted effort to harm its own economy? Probably nothing. Economic sanctions don't usually deliver their intended effect, and they can often be counterproductive. University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape studied the effects of economic sanctions from 1914-1990 and found only five examples in 115 attempts in which such sanctions achieved their goals. In fact, in many of these cases, sanctions led the populations of effected nations to rally around their leaders and further support the actions that paved the way to sanctions in the first place. Of course, all of this could change if Russia decides to make further incursions into Ukrainian territory. "Nobody wants to get into a serious fight, economic or otherwise, over Crimea," says Rahman. But if this is just the first step in Putin's plan to expand Russia's military influence in Europe, the West will consider responding with real economic -- and perhaps military -- force. |