当心，俄罗斯！预计西方国家将采取更多制裁措施

    马航MH17惨剧令西方国家的压力倍增，促使他们必须针对俄罗斯的所有产业，实施全面的“行业”制裁。全球经济可能会受到严重损害，但对于即将到来的一切，西方国家有规模更大、实力更强的经济体以及流动性充足的中央银行做支持，其抗击打能力要远远超过俄罗斯。

    西方最近的制裁行动很容易被批评为小打小闹和畏首畏尾。上周，欧盟的制裁名单上又增加了33个名字，有个人也有企业，其中包括俄罗斯政府高级官员。法国依然坚持向俄罗斯出售军舰，经济利益看起来成了采取严厉措施的障碍。就连美国的最新制裁措施也只是禁止一些俄罗斯能源、金融和国防企业发行新债券或股票。并且美国的制裁名单里不包括俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行（Sberbank），而后者持有大部分俄罗斯人的存款。

    虽然这样的批评很中肯，但并不意味着那些领导人对俄罗斯过于软弱。以英国、荷兰、德国以及欧委会为首的欧盟领导人现在正采取出人意料的措施，以超越美国的力度对俄罗斯的银行、能源公司和国防企业实施制裁（特别是制裁更多的俄罗斯银行）。许多人一直都在期待这种全面的“行业”制裁，原因是迄今为止的措施只是禁止一小部分债券和股票融资。但就机构而言，美国的制裁和欧盟制裁计划的打击面足够广，它们可能对俄罗斯金融体系产生系统性影响。此外，有充分理由相信今后几个月这些制裁措施将继续升级，并最终在年底前成为针对俄罗斯金融和能源部门的综合性行业制裁。

    第一个理由是，俄罗斯总统普京在支持乌克兰分裂势力方面几乎没有退缩迹象，原因是最近一直有报道称俄罗斯方面在发射导弹，而且俄罗斯在俄乌边境的军事调动也更加频繁。第二个理由和第一个有关，那就是乌克兰军队的能力有提升迹象，而且在地面军事行动上节节胜利。这让人们重新燃起了乌克兰政局稳定下来的期望，但今后几周俄罗斯在地面上发起挑衅行为的风险只会越来越大，而这样的行为将招致更多的制裁。

    第三个理由和市场设法规避现有制裁措施有关——对此还没有多少人发表评论。盈利动机是个强大动力，它能创造性地躲过贸易或金融管制。一些规避经济制裁的行为在意料之中，这甚至能成为市场压力的一种有益释放。但这样的行为多了，就必然将削弱制裁措施的效果，也会影响美国政府的可信度。

    因此，奥巴马政府明确表示愿意加大制裁力度，比如把更多机构纳入制裁名单，或禁止其他种类的金融活动，这并不让人感到意外。最近实施的制裁只针对债券和股票融资，但举例来说，如果美国财政部（U.S. Treasury）发现金融衍生产品合约的使用量增多，并且发挥了类似于债券的作用，它就可能把制裁范围扩大到新的金融工具上。财政部不会把所有的金融创新都纳入制裁范围，但为了保持管制效果，它不断加大制裁力度的可能性相当大。

    市场反应也表明，投资者认为制裁力度将加大。的确，俄罗斯债券和股票市场一直韧性十足，原因是人们希望制裁对经济的影响有限。虽然全面金融制裁会对市场产生重大影响，但要衡量目前新增制裁措施的效果，更好的方法是看看经济增长受到的长期影响。这方面的情况并不妙，原因是大量资金持续外流，今年流出规模已经超过1000亿美元。进入俄罗斯的外资不断减少，投资者对现有制裁措施以及西方金融机构削减贷款感到担心，也从经济和法律角度担忧今后出现的制裁措施。此外，俄罗斯央行上周提高了利率，这表明他们担心制裁带来的通胀效应，包括卢布贬值提高进口价格。

    当然，乌克兰危机爆发前俄罗斯的经济增长速度已经放慢，而且现在看来有可能出现衰退——有些分析师预计俄罗斯GDP下跌幅度将超过5%。俄罗斯前财政部长阿列克谢•库德林上周警告，目前政策路线会对俄罗斯产生重大影响，已经充分体现了对长期局势的顾虑。

    难点就在这里。西方加大经济制裁力度正在发挥作用，而且将对俄罗斯经济产生深远影响，但这需要时间。同时，果断采取可靠措施的政治压力正在增大。经济和政治时间轴的错位需要重新评估，要关注那些对俄罗斯产生更明显、更直接影响的政策。(财富中文网)

    罗伯特•卡恩是华盛顿美国外交关系协会（Council on Foreign Relations）国际经济Steven A. Tananbaum高级研究员。此前他在摩尔资本管理公司（Moore Capital Management）担任高级策略分析师。卡恩还在世界银行（World Bank）、国际货币基金组织（IMF）、美国财政部和美联储（Federal Reserve）供职。

    译者：Charlie

    The tragic downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 accelerates pressure on the West to put full “sectoral” sanctions in place targeting entire industries across Russia. The economic disruption could be profound, but the West—backed by a larger, stronger economies and central banks flush with liquidity liquidity—is far more resilient than Russia for what is to come.

    It is easy to criticize the West’s most recent sanctions as incremental and timid. The European Union last week added 33 individuals and entities to their sanctions list, including senior Russian security service officials and oligarchs. France continues to insist it will provide warships to Russia, and economic interests seem to be blocking tough action. Even the most recent sanctions by the United States only moved to block new debt and equity issuance by a number of energy, financial and military companies. What’s more, U.S. sanctions exclude Sberbank, which holds the majority of Russian deposits.

    While such criticism is fair, it does not suggest that leaders are being too soft on Russia. European leaders—led by the United Kindom, the Netherlands, Germany and the European Commission—now may be ready to surprise us with sanctions against banks, energy and military companies that surpass the U.S. measures (notably by sanctioning more banks). This is short of the broad “sectoral” sanctions many had hoped for, as the move only blocks a narrow band of new debt and equity. But in terms of institutions, the U.S. and proposed European measures are sufficiently broad in the sense that its effects on the Russian financial system could be systemic. Further, there are compelling reasons to expect that sanctions will continue to be extended in coming months, resulting in comprehensive sectoral sanctions on finance and energy by the end of the year.

    For one, we have little evidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin is backing down in his support for separatists, as there have been recent reports of missiles fired from Russia; the country has also intensified troop movements near the border. The second reason, related to the first, is that the Ukrainian military is showing improved capabilities and is gaining ground. This provides renewed hope for political stability in Ukraine, but the risk of provocation on the ground that will draw additional sanctions will only intensify in coming weeks.

    The third reason —which hasn’t received much comment—relates to market efforts to evade the sanctions in place. The profit incentive is a powerful motive to innovate and evade the controls whether on trade or finance. Some evasion is anticipated, and can even be a useful “escape value” for pressure in markets. But substantial evasion undermines both the effectiveness of the measures and the U.S. government’s credibility.

    It is therefore not surprising that the Obama Administration has made it clear they are willing to extend the sanctions either by expanding the list of sanctioned institutions or the types of transactions that are prohibited. The sanctions applied recently may apply have only targeted new debt and equity issuance, but if, for example, the U.S. Treasury saw an increase in use of derivative contracts to mimic the effects of new debt, the agency would extend sanctions to cover the new financial instruments. Treasury will not catch all the financial innovations that take place, but it is quite likely that the effort to sustain the effectiveness of the controls will still lead to their expansion over time.

    Market reaction suggests investors expect more sanctions under way: True, Russian bond and stock markets have been resilient on hopes that sanctions would have a limited impact on the economy. While comprehensive financial sanctions would cause severe market effects, the impact of the current incremental approach is better measured by the longer-term effects on growth. In this regard, the trajectory is grim, as large-scale capital flight has continued and is on track to exceed $100 billion this year. Foreign investments into Russia are dropping on concerns about existing sanctions, a cutoff in lending by western financial institutions, and both economic and legal concerns about future sanctions. What’s more, Russia’s central bank last week raised interest rates, reflecting concern about the inflationary consequences of sanctions, including a weaker rouble that boosts import prices.

    To be sure, growth in Russia was already slowing prior to the crisis, and a projected recession—some analysts project declines in excess of 5% of GDP—now is likely. This concern about the longer term was well captured by former finance minister Alexei Kudrin who last week warned on severe consequences for Russia from the current policy path.

    Herein lies the conundrum. The West’s incremental approach to economic sanctions is working and will have a profound effect on the Russian economy, but it will take time. In the same instance, the political pressures to act credibly and decisively have grown. The disconnect between economic and political timelines calls for a reassessment, with an eye to policies that produce more visible, immediate costs for Russia.

    Robert Kahn is the Steven A. Tananbaum senior fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was a senior strategist with Moore Capital Management. He also has held positions at the World Bank, IMF, U.S. Treasury, and Federal Reserve.