如何看懂巴菲特近期的反常投资

如果你随便找一个上幼儿园的小孩，让他/她说出一位价值投资者的名字，他/她很可能都会说：“地球人都知道，沃伦•巴菲特！”

但在今年第三季度，巴菲特购买或增持的一些股票的估值水平，可能会让大多数传统的价值投资者望而却步。比如，生产汽车漆和其他涂料的艾仕得涂料系统。

根据伯克希尔-哈撒韦最新信息，巴菲特领导的这家公司已从凯雷投资集团手中购买了艾仕得8.7%的股份。你也许会问，这位奥马哈先知又捞到了一只便宜股票吗？并不尽然。按伯克希尔-哈撒韦的收购价计算，艾仕得的静态市盈率达到了令人吃惊的130倍，动态市盈率也有22倍。

与之相比，整个美国股市的静态市盈率约为22倍，动态市盈率为17倍。就算与同类公司相比，艾仕得的价格也依然较高。在标普1500综合指数中，特种化工细分指数的动态市盈率都不到21倍。

因此，从理论上讲，这样一只股票应该很难引起那些自诩为“抄底者”的投资人士的兴趣。然而，艾仕得还不是唯一的例子。巴菲特最近选择的其他三只股票也会让价值投资者大跌眼镜。它们分别是：

•森科能源公司（Suncor Energy）。这家综合型石油天然气公司目前的静态市盈率为577倍，动态市盈率为25.9倍。

•特许通讯公司（Charter Communications）。这家有线电视和互联网服务供应商目前尚未盈利，动态市盈率为256.4倍。

•卡夫亨氏公司（The Kraft Heinz Co.）。这家食品饮料巨擘的静态市盈率为105倍，动态市盈率为22.1倍。

在这些公司，其他的一些持股人也很不一般。比如说，艾仕得的大股东包括Prudential Jennison Mid-Cap Growth和Goldman Sachs Growth Opportunities等纯粹的成长型基金。晨星提供的数据显示，上次公布持股情况至今，大型成长型基金Fidelity Contrafund在特许通讯公司的持股增加了6.6%。其他的价值型基金经理也有类似动向，T. Rowe Price Value最近就开始买进森科能源，Vanguard Wellesley Income Fund也投资了卡夫亨氏。

那么，到底发生了什么，以致于沃伦•巴菲特都不按常理出牌了？

嗯，这还得说到巴菲特的价值投资理念。巴菲特在1989年的年度股东信中介绍了自己的抄底哲学，其内容并不完全符合教科书对价值的定义。举例来说，他表示虽然有一种“雪茄烟蒂式”价值投资法，但他不会遵循这样的策略。他在信中写道：

“扔在街头的雪茄烟蒂只能再抽一口，而且可能吸不出多少烟味来，但抄底会让这一口烟都变成利润。除非打算清仓处理，否则这种收购公司的做法就显得很傻。首先，实际情况可能证明，当初的‘抄底价’可能一点儿也不便宜。陷入困境的企业往往会一波未平一波又起——厨房里的蟑螂从来都不会只有一只。”

他还说：“用一般的价格介入一家很棒的公司，远好于用很棒的价格介入一家一般的公司。”（It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.）

就艾仕得来说，巴菲特增持的原因是他越来越看好汽车行业。艾仕得60%的利润都来自汽车漆。据彭博社的跟踪预测数据，外界预计该公司的利润增速将是特种化工行业的三倍，原因也许就在这里。

对卡夫亨氏的投资则让巴菲特成了北美第三大食品公司的股东。

巴菲特也许还借鉴了成长型投资者的做法，那就是发现暂时处于低谷的盈利水平，而不仅仅看股价。降低市盈率有两条途径，一是股价下降，二是利润上升。

上述这些公司的动态市盈率都远低于静态市盈率。尽管按价值型基金经理的标准衡量，它们的动态市盈率仍偏高，但利润的增长可能让这些股票在今后几年变得更加便宜。（财富中文网）

译者：Charlie

校对：詹妮

If you were to ask a random kindergartner to name a value investor, she’d probably respond, “Warren Buffett. Everybody knows that.”

Yet the valuations on some of the stocks Buffett bought or added to during the third quarter would make most traditional value investors cringe.

Consider Axalta Coating Systems, which makes automobile finishes and other coatings.

Berkshire Hathaway, the holding company Buffett runs, bought an 8.7% stake in the company from The Carlyle Group. Another cheap stock scooped up by the Oracle of Omaha? Not exactly. Axalta sells for a whopping 130 times its past 12 months of earnings and sports a price/earnings ratio of 22 based on future estimated profits.

To put that in perspective, the P/E ratio for the broad market is about 22 based on trailing 12 month earnings and 17 based on projected profits. If you compare Axalta to its industry peers, it’s still relatively expensive. The forward P/E for the S&P Composite 1500 specialty chemicals index is less than 21.

On paper, this would hardly seem like a stock that a vaunted bargain hunter would gravitate to. Yet Axalta isn’t the only example. Three others recent Buffett picks would make a value investor’s eye twitch:

• Suncor Energy. This integrated oil and gas producer is now trading at 577 times its past 12 months of earnings and 25.9 times estimated profits.

• Charter Communications. The cable and internet service provider has no current profits and trades for 256.4 times forward earnings.

• The Kraft Heinz Co.. Shares of the food and beverage giant sell for a P/E of 105 based on trailing profits and 22.1 based on forecasted earnings.

Buffett also has some unusual bedfellows in some of these stocks.

Some of the largest owners of Axalta, for example, are dyed-in-the-wool growth funds such as Prudential Jennison Mid-Cap Growth and Goldman Sachs Growth Opportunities. Fidelity Contrafund, a large growth fund, has goosed up its position in Charter Communications by 6.6% since its last portfolio report, according to Morningstar.

To be fair, other value managers are walking a similar path. T. Rowe Price Value recently started buying Suncor, and Kraft Heintz is part of the secret sauce in the Vanguard Wellesley Income fund.

What’s going on?

Well, chalk it up to Buffett’s take on value investing. In his 1989 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, he spelled out his personal philosophy to bargain hunting that doesn’t fit the textbook definition of value. He noted, for instance, that while there’s a “cigar butt” school to value investing, he doesn’t adhere to it.

As he wrote:

A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the “bargain purchase” will make that puff all profit. Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original “bargain” price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces — never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen.

He went on to note that “it’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.”

In the case of Axalta, he’s increasing his bullish bet on the automotive industry: The company gets 60% of its profits from automotive refinishing. This might explain why Axalta’s earnings are expected to grow three times faster than profits for the specialty chemical industry, according to estimates tracked by Bloomberg.

With Kraft Heinz, Buffett is getting a portion of the third-largest food company in North America.

Buffett may also be taking a page from a growth investor’s book by looking at temporarily depressed earnings, rather than simply price. There are two ways to get a lower PE ratio: Decreasing price or increasing earnings.

The forward PE ratios on all these companies are sharply lower than the trailing PE ratios. While those forward PEs are still high by a value manager’s lights, increased profits could make the stock look cheaper in coming years.