中国股灾一年后，投资者应该学到什么？

大约一年前，全球股市经历了一次暴跌，有人将其称为中国的黑色星期一。去年8月24日，上证指数重挫8.5%，进而带动全球股市下滑，货币和大宗商品市场也因此陷入混乱。

除了经济损失，本次市场暴跌还有损中国决策层的声誉。这些领导人曾引领中国度过了全球金融危机，但这次他们遇到了挫折，投资者的大举抛售反映出中国政府在控制市场方面能力有限。面对可能无法继续迅猛增长的中国经济，投资者也就软着陆一说提出了质疑。还有人认为中国可能引发新一轮金融危机。

差不多在同一时间，人们开始观察人民币，以便找到中国经济存在弱点的迹象。据说，货币走弱是贬值的明确征兆，它意味着一定出了什么问题。而实际原因是人民币走弱是汇率市场化的体现，但这种说法对许多人来说则不那么有说服力。

一年过去了，尽管全球经济持续复苏似乎依然遥不可及，但中国的情况已经稳定了下来。虽然今年初股市又让人们担惊受怕了一次，但中国政府的促增长措施已经开始见效，尽管那意味着对长期发展至关重要的改革进程将放慢。

这能说明中国已经摆脱困境了吗？除非大家把许多问题都抛诸脑后，比如债务规模扩大，公司盈利能力下降，以及众多国企生存艰难，其中包括为整个城镇提供就业机会的钢铁厂和矿山。

当然，房地产市场有了起色。楼市开始去库存，建设活动持续反弹；按照目前的销售速度，南京、合肥等城市的楼市库存将在短短三、四个月内售罄，只是这种销售速度并不常见。受资本管制影响，资本外流速度也在放慢。

人民币下跌时，投资者并未慌张。央行官员在官方媒体上阐述了他们的看法，进而改善了政策沟通情况，这就意味着更多人明白了为何会出现这种情况——由于现在的人民币汇率以11种货币构成的贸易加权货币篮为基础，它兑美元的汇率将出现更大的起伏。

目前的问题在于，全球金融危机以来，中国的债务雪球越滚越大，这是一张错综复杂的网，连接着和政府有关联的企业、政府控制的银行以及债券市场。中国的公司、个人、政府以及银行债务之和从2008年GDP的164%升至了2015年的247%。不过，尽管过去五年中国的美元债券发行量猛增，但外币债务只占中国债务总额的一小部分，约为1500亿美元。

在所有这些债务中，会有多少变成坏账呢？没人知道。预测数字跨度很大，从近7万亿元人民币一直到大约23万亿元人民币。1万亿美元左右的最低预期约占中国10万亿美元经济规模的10%。

虽然外界认为中国国家主席习近平倾向于采取强硬措施，比如关闭无法维继的国企，以及对和政府有关的借款人加强约束，但到目前为止，中国采取的办法一直是释放更多的刺激措施，只是规模没有前几次那么大。虽然可以争取时间，但这样做会产生更多债务。

那么，债务引发的崩盘会很快出现吗？答案是：可能不会。

中国的大多数债务都以人民币计价，也就是说，在最坏情况下，中央政府可以通过发行货币来解救那些和政府有关而且具有系统重要性的借款人；中国政府可以直接向国有银行放贷，这种资金来源枯竭的可能性较小；同时，中国还是净出口国和资本借出国，也就是说，中国经济不需要靠变化无常的外国人来填补赤字。

然而，刺激政策只能是权宜之计。它可能有助于延缓信贷金融的突然撤退或者资产价值的陡然下降。在历史上，这两种情况一直都是金融危机的诱因。但要解决将资金用于生产力匮乏的行业和投资造成的重大扭曲现象，就需要进行改革，这是刺激政策所无法代替的。

决策层已经取得了一些进展。他们正在解决债券市场的道德风险问题，途径是允许几家国企违约；中国的金融体系已经开始区分信用风险，虽然按国际标准其做法还不成熟，但这对中国市场来说是个突破。

随着全球风险增大，决策层必须在保稳定和进行必要改革的需求之间做出平衡和妥协。今后的选择会很艰难。（财富中文网）

作者Hugh Young是阿伯丁资产管理亚洲分公司董事总经理

译者：Charlie

审校：詹妮

This week marks the anniversary of last year’s stock market crash that some have dubbed China’s Black Monday. Shanghai shares fell 8.5% on August 24, triggering losses on exchanges around the world and causing mayhem in currency and commodity markets.

Apart from the financial losses, the market meltdown damaged the reputation of China’s policymakers. The technocrats who had steered the country through the global financial crisis were humbled as investor capitulation showed the limits of their power to control markets. Investors questioned assumptions about a soft landing for an economy that could no longer sustain its relentless pace of growth. There was talk China would trigger the next financial crisis.

Around the same time, people started monitoring the renminbi for signs of economic vulnerability. Currency weakness, it was argued, clearly meant devaluation – a sure sign that something was amiss. The real reason – that a weaker yuan was a symptom of currency liberalization – was, for many people, less convincing.

One year on, and although the prospects for a sustainable global recovery seem just as remote, things in China have stabilized. Despite another stock market scare at the start of this year, government stimulus is bearing fruit, even if that means slowing reforms crucial to long-term development.

Does this mean China has turned a corner? Only if you ignore a long list of problems that include: ballooning debt; declining corporate profitability; and the countless state-owned businesses such as steelmakers and miners that provide work for entire towns, but struggle to survive.

True, the property market has picked up. Housing inventory levels are starting to clear and construction activity has been recovering: cities such as Nanjing and Hefei have only three to four months of housing stock based on current rates of sale, although these are exceptional. The pace of capital outflows has been decelerating because of capital controls.

When the renminbi weakens, investors haven’t panicked. Better policy communication – central bank officials have started sharing their views on state media – means more people understand why this is happening: with the Chinese currency now guided by a trade-weighted basket of 11 currencies, its relationship with the US dollar will be more volatile.

The problem now is that China’s debt – an intricate web connecting government-linked businesses, state-controlled banks and the bond markets – has snowballed since the global financial crisis. Combined corporate, household, government and bank debt rose from 164% of GDP to 247% between 2008 and last year. However, only a fraction – around $150 billion – is debt denominated in a foreign currency, even after a surge in US dollar bond issuance from China over the past five years.

How much of all this debt can turn bad? Nobody knows: estimates range widely from nearly 7 trillion yuan to some 23 trillion yuan, depending on different assumptions. That’s around $1 trillion at the lower end of these estimates, or some 10% of China’s $10 trillion economy.

Although President Xi Jinping is thought to favor a hard-line approach – shutting commercially unviable state-owned companies, imposing discipline on government-linked borrowers – China’s solution so far has been to unleash more stimulus, albeit on a smaller scale than previous rounds. While this buys time, it also creates even more debt.

So will there be a debt-inspired meltdown soon? The answer is: probably not.

Most of China’s debt is denominated in renminbi, which means, in the worst case scenario, the central government can print money to bail out government-linked borrowers deemed systemically important; Beijing can direct lending at the government banks so this source of financing is less likely to dry up; China is also a net exporter and lender of capital, which means the economy doesn’t rely on fickle foreigners to fund any deficits.

However, stimulus can only be a temporary solution. It can help delay the sudden pull-back of credit financing or abrupt asset value depreciation that, historically, have been catalysts of financial crises. But stimulus cannot replace the reforms needed to fix the massive distortions created by the misallocation of capital into unproductive industries and investments.

To China’s credit, policymakers have made some progress here: they are tackling the problem of moral hazard in the bond market by letting a handful of state-owned companies default on repayments; the financial system is beginning to differentiate between credit risks which, while still rudimentary by global standards, is a breakthrough for local markets.

As global risks grow policymakers have to reconcile the desire for stability with the need for essential reforms. Tough choices lie ahead.