欧元将何去何从？2017年或见分晓

欧元自从18年前问世以来已经走过了很长的一段路，它也给世界经济带来了很多好处。正因为此，过去十年间，欧元区才从12个成员国壮大到了19个成员国。尽管欧元取得了这些成就，然而2017年，欧元在欧洲大陆上恐怕将不会像过去那样受欢迎了。

欧元区主权债务危机的经历表明，欧元区还是具有相当的应变力和灵活性的。首先，欧元区各成员国都积极参与了对希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙、西班牙和塞浦路斯的紧急援助计划，并免除了希腊的部分债务，而且建立了两个规模达数十亿美元的救援机制——欧洲金融稳定机制（EFSF）和欧洲稳定机制（ESM），彰显了各国对保留欧元这一共同货币的决心。

另一方面，从这些基金中受益的几个国家也表示愿意以史无前例的力度稳固本国财政，并且进行深入、痛苦的结构性改革，以继续保持他们的欧元区成员国地位。而这些国家也的确取得了一些实质性进展，比如在政府治理、平稳经济和巩固财政等方面出台了新一些政策。另外从若干宏观经济指标来看，相关国家也已经加强了对货币账户余额、实际汇率和房地产价格的监管力度。此外欧元区在增强抗风险能力方面也迈出了一些重要的步伐，比如强化了欧洲央行对新成立的银行业联盟的监管角色。

虽然欧元区各国在主权债务危机期间做出了很多努力，但欧洲经济货币联盟（EMU）总体上仍然是一个很脆弱的组织，它面临的一些基础性挑战仍然没有得到根本解决。在这种背景下，2017年欧洲的经济政治发展情况很可能将决定欧元的未来。这番判断主要基于以下三个理由：

银行业危机或将动摇欧元区的稳定性

首先说银行业。在一些欧元区成员国中，特别是塞浦路斯、希腊和意大利三国，银行业的不良贷款率已经达到令人担忧的水平，让人不禁质疑欧洲银行业的抗风险能力。目前很多人都在猜测一些欧洲银行（比如德意志银行和西亚那银行）是否会重演当年雷曼兄弟的悲剧，意大利、荷兰、法国等个别成员国还出现了政治动荡，加之英国脱欧对欧元区的潜在影响，都预示着欧洲的金融危机有再度升级的可能。

其次是财政方面，很多欧元区国家的公共部门和私营部门均存在严重的债务负担，而且存在宏观经济严重失调问题的成员国也变得越来越多——如保加利亚、克罗地亚、塞浦路斯、法国、意大利和葡萄牙等国，这也是一个很值得担忧的因素，因为这些国家的经济问题有可能会对其他成员国产生传导效应。最后，这些主权债务国及其国有银行体系之间都保持着紧密的联系，如果其中一方失去稳定，就会使另一方变得更加脆弱。只要这种恶性循环继续存在，就会继续有人围绕欧元区成员国是否有能力保持欧元区的稳定性做文章，针对欧元大搞投机。

经济增长不均衡的局面仍将继续

欧洲的金融危机和银行业危机虽然促使欧盟及其成员国开始着手修补欧洲货币联盟的一些短板，但这次危机所带来的低增长与投资率和高失业率等影响还将持续很久，并将导致欧洲大陆的经济差异进一步拉大。如今，欧元区在地缘上已经出现了明显的划分，呈现出了南北失衡、东西失衡的特点；在社会层面上也出现了国家内部和国家之间的经济发展水平失衡和贫富差距拉大的问题。

与此同时，虽然欧盟各国在危机期间做出的多数决策都对欧洲各国人民的日常生活产生了直接影响，但实际上，公民对这些决策流程的参与度并不高，（比如很多决策都由欧洲央行、欧洲稳定机制、欧洲投资银行等机构负责。）这种社会和政治焦虑导致欧洲各地都出现了反对欧洲一体化的思潮，而这反过来必然会威胁到欧元项目的政治接受度。因此，欧元目前面临的最严峻的挑战之一，在于欧元区国家能否针对部分成员国出现的一些紧迫的社会和政治情绪做出一致的反应。

2017年是欧洲的大选年

明年，荷兰、法国、德国、意大利等国都将举行重要的选举。这是否为欧元区各国解决上述政治社会挑战提供了有利的契机呢？

由于欧洲人民对移民和安全问题的关注与日俱增，因此经济和财政改革的问题在政改日程上的地位也就相对下降了。另外，由于眼下欧洲经济出现了一些利好因素（如低利率、相对美元的有利汇率、油价下降等等），金融和经济危机造成的紧迫感也暂时在一定程度上被冲淡了。各国的政策制定者不太可能在大选之前出台要付出较高的短期成本的长远改革措施。

在当前的政治环境下，将欧元作为主要攻击目标之一的“民粹”政党在荷法德意四国的影响力和代表性很有可能扩大。不过这些小党没有一个能够独力拿下足够的席位组阁，因此欧元的命运很可能要看那些主流政党执政后，将采取何种手段应对这种民粹情绪。

一方面，民粹势力的兴起很可能会促使新当选政府“随大流”采取财政紧缩策略。另一方面，激进的领导者则可能认为，他们必须马上采取必要的改革措施，因为他们发现民族主义兴起的危险已经变得愈发迫近。

如果第一种情境变成现实，欧洲各国或许将顺从日益增长的保护主义声浪，那么不仅欧盟对欧元的改革将难以形成共识，甚至整个25年的欧元建设项目所取得的成就都将受到影响。不过如果第二种情境成真，那么在四到六个欧盟创始成员国的大选结束后，欧洲货币联盟的改革或许将真的迎来契机。

欧元的历史表明，欧元改革首先需要法德两国围绕欧元的发展道路形成共识。因此，现在所有人的关注点应当集中在两国的新当选领导人能否凭借成熟的政治智慧调解欧元区的矛盾。（财富中文网）

作者：Robin Huguenot-Noël

译者：朴成奎

The euro has come a long way since its introduction 18 years ago, and has brought a lot of benefits. This has notably led it to expand from 12 to 19 members in the last decade. Despite these achievements, though, 2017 is unlikely to see the euro celebrated across the continent.

The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has shown that the euro area was able to square the circle between resilience and flexibility. On the one hand, euro area members have shown their commitment to preserving the common currency by notably engaging in substantial bailout programs for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus, agreeing to a partial write-off of the Greek debt, and creating two multi-billion-euro rescue mechanisms: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

On the other hand, the countries benefiting from these funds have indicated that they were ready to go through unprecedented fiscal consolidation efforts, accompanied by deep and painful structural reforms, in order to maintain their membership in the common currency. As a result, some substantial progress has been accomplished, including new instruments of governance, economic and fiscal consolidation, as well as increased surveillance by certain macroeconomic indicators, such as the current account balance, real exchange rate, and housing prices. Furthermore, important steps have been achieved in increasing the resilience of the Eurozone by strengthening the supervisory role of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) in the newly created banking union.

Despite the progress made during the crisis, though, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is still fragile, as some of its underlying challenges remain unresolved. In this context, economic and political developments in 2017 could well determine the future of the euro. Here are three reasons why:

Banks' troubles could destabilize the Eurozone

In the banking sector, non-performing loans are reaching worrying levels in some member states, especially in Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, casting doubts over the resilience of Europe's banking sector. Speculations about the possible failings of European banks (such as Deutsche Bank or Monte Dei Paschi di Siena) and the political turmoil in individual member states, like Italy, the Netherlands, and possibly France, combined with the looming prospect of Brexit, indicate that the crisis could re-escalate.

On the fiscal side, the severe debt overhang—both in the public and the private sector—and the increasing share of countries with excessive macroeconomic imbalances—Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Italy, and Portugal—are also a possible cause of concern, as they could have detrimental effects on other member states. Finally, sovereign debtors and their national banking systems remain closely linked so that the destabilization of either one could still increase the vulnerability of the other. As long as this vicious circle remains, the euro will remain exposed to financial speculation on the ability of its member states to preserve the integrity of the euro area.

Uneven growth persists

While the financial and banking crisis pushed the EU and its members to address some of the shortcomings of the EMU, its lasting impact on low levels of growth and investment and high levels of unemployment indeed lead to increasing disparities across the continent. Today, the EMU is divided geographically—between North-South and East-West asymmetries—and socially—with an increasing discrepancy in development and inequality levels within and between countries.

At the same time, while most of the decisions taken during the crisis have had direct impact on the everyday realities of numerous Europeans, these decisions have failed to be matched with higher involvement of citizens in the decision-making process (by increasing the accountability of institutions such as the ECB, the ESM, or the European Investment Bank, for example). These social and political anxieties have fueled Eurosceptic tendencies across Europe, which could, in turn, threaten the political acceptability of the euro project. In this context, the greatest challenge facing the euro today lies in its member states' ability to agree on a collective response to the sense of social and political urgency in some member states.

It’s a big election year for Europe

Next year will be marked by elections in the Netherlands, France, Germany, and most likely, Italy. Will this provide a more or less favorable environment for the euro governance to address these political and social challenges?

The populations' growing concerns about migration and security issues have pushed economic and fiscal reforms further down the political agenda. Furthermore, as the more favorable conjuncture (low interest rates, favorable exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S., falling oil prices, etc.) has considerably reduced the sense of emergency created by the financial and economic crisis, it seems highly unlikely that policymakers will introduce long-term reforms with high, short-term political costs before the elections.

In the current political context, 'populist' parties, which have identified the euro as one of their main targets, are expected to see their influence and representation increase in these four member states. Assuming that none of these parties manages to ensure enough seats to form a government on its own, the future of the euro's faith could lie in the way in which mainstream parties will decide to respond to this trend after the election.

On the one hand, the rise of populist forces could push newly elected governments to follow trends toward national retrenchment. On the other hand, progressive leaders may consider that they can no longer afford to wait before engaging the necessary reforms, precisely because they see the danger of rising nationalism becoming more real.

In the first scenario, the temptation to bend to pressures in favor of increased protectionism would not only affect the EU's ability to achieve a consensus on how to reform the euro, but could also potentially undermine the achievements of the 25-year euro construction project. In the second scenario, though, the post-elections period in four of the six EU founding members could help build a momentum for EMU reform.

The history of the euro has shown that reforms of the common currency first required consensus between France and Germany on which way to go forward. All eyes should now be turned on their (newly elected) leaders' ability to reconcile the euro with its political maturity.