尴尬的苹果：董事会秘密物色接班人
|
为苹果公司（Apple）CEO史蒂夫•乔布斯寻找接班人，或许是硅谷最困难的工作之一。但是，无论苹果公司的董事会是否愿意，他们都必须完成这一任务。 最近，《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）援引未透露姓名的消息人士的话称，“苹果公司董事会的一些成员已经就CEO继任问题与猎头公司进行讨论，并至少与一家大型科技公司的负责人进行了接洽。但他们似乎并不是在代表整个董事会来进行这项工作。该报道称，（史蒂夫•乔布斯）在一封电子邮件中写道，“这没有任何意义”，同时称，苹果公司的发言人拒绝置评。 苹果公司董事会目前正处在一个左右为难的尴尬境地。如果董事会还不开始积极寻找CEO接班人，问题将随之而来。但是，如果董事会成员以这种“非正式”的方式寻找接班人，同样也会带来问题。 苹果公司董事会对公司的治理一直是外界关注的焦点。近年来，公司遭遇了包括期权回溯、乔布斯健康状况之谜以及围绕CEO继任计划的疑云等诸多问题。 不过，《华尔街日报》这篇报道引发的问题对任何一家公司的董事会来说都是值得借鉴的。 很显然，从我和董事们的交流可以判断，CEO继任是所有公司董事会面临的最大难题之一。这主要与董事会权利平衡和CEO扮演的角色紧密相关。当CEO同时也是董事会成员时，他的身份会非常微妙：对于既是管理层又是董事会成员的双重身份来说，很难清晰的界定其职责范围（请参阅：默多克将何去何从？）。 试想，如果一个公司的董事会成员企图通过秘密的、未经授权的方式，仅由少数董事私下结成小集团来选择CEO接班人，那么，这只能说这家公司在治理上的存在隐忧。相反，董事会成员应该利用合理的渠道，共同参与制定继任计划。 董事会私下行事恰好说明董事会公开的工作出了问题——说明董事会的流程、权利或特性等方面存在需要解决的问题。在这种情况下，任何董事会都应该努力找出并解决真正的根源问题，而不是采用迂回方式达到目标。 苹果公司的董事会领导结构有些独特，共有两位联席董事。苹果公司网站的信息显示，乔布斯虽然在董事会任职，但他不是董事会主席。其中一位联席董事是雅芳化妆品公司（AVON）的CEO钟彬娴，她同时也是薪酬委员会主席。另一位是生物技术公司基因泰克（Genentech）前CEO亚瑟•列文森，他是提名和治理委员会主席。 苹果公司拒绝对当前董事会的做法置评。不过，苹果公司网站上的公司治理准则中，有一部分题为“管理层评估和继任”，描述了CEO、薪酬委员会和整个董事会在这一过程中应该扮演的角色。 这一准则规定：“薪酬委员会应该对包括CEO在内的所有高管进行年度评价，并与董事会一道将对此进行审议。此外，董事会还要审议CEO的业绩表现评估报告，以确保CEO能有效地领导公司。作为年度评估的一部分，董事会和CEO应对管理层发展和高管继任计划进行年度评估。” 因为寻找CEO的接班人非常困难，所以CEO的参与将不无裨益。不过，除CEO外，董事会的独立董事应该对这一过程拥有清晰的控制权。所有的董事会都应当评估董事会准则和章程，以确保董事会对这一过程拥有控制权——而且，他们应该每年进行评估，制定可靠的继任计划，并找出任何有可能影响工作流程的障碍。 一份有效的CEO继任计划是董事会对公司进行良好治理的头等大事。这对于任何公司来说都是至关重要的，无论公司现有状况如何。事实上，它是董事会对公司和所有利益相关方承担的最重要的职责之一。 对苹果公司来说，最好的局面应该是董事会能以适当的、经过授权的方式来制定CEO继任计划。 本文作者爱丽诺•布洛斯罕是董事会咨询机构价值联盟和公司治理联盟（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance，http://thevaluealliance.com/）的首席执行官。 （翻译 乔树静） |
Lining up a successor to a CEO like Steve Jobs may very well be the least coveted job inSilicon Valley. But it's a task that Apple's board will have to perform, whether they want to or not. The Wall Street Journal recently reported, according to unnamed sources, that "some members of Apple Inc.'s board have discussed CEO succession with executive recruiters and at least one head of a high-profile technology company" and the "directors don't appear to have been acting on behalf of the full board." The Journal reported that "in an email, [Steve Jobs wrote] 'I think it's hogwash' "and "an Apple spokesman declined to comment." For the Apple (AAPL) board, this is a no win situation. If the board isn't actively working on CEO succession, it's a problem. But if board members are working on succession in this "unofficial" way, that's a problem too. The Apple board has been in the spotlight from a governance standpoint for a long time. Over the years, the issues have included stock options backdating, the lack of transparency related to Jobs' health, and questions surrounding a CEO succession plan at the company. But the issues raised by the Journal story offer lessons for any corporate board. When I talk to directors, CEO succession clearly stands out as one of the most difficult issues for their boards. Much of that has to do with the power dynamics in the boardroom and the role of the CEO. When the CEO sits on the board, it can be difficult to create a clear demarcation between the CEO's role as a member of management and what the CEO's role should be as a member of the board (See: What's in store for Rupert Murdoch?). If members of any board are trying to accomplish CEO succession via stealth or unauthorized, small cliques of directors, that is, of course, a very troubling sign for a corporation's governance. Directors should be using their own proper channels to engage in succession planning. Taking the work of the board offline means there is a working problem with the board online -- signaling that a problem with process, power, or personalities at the board level needs to be resolved. It behooves any board in such circumstances to try to address the real source of the difficulty, rather than use alternate means to accomplish a goal. Apple has a somewhat unique board leadership structure, with two co-lead directors. Jobs sits on the board but is not the chair, according to the company's website. One co-lead director is Avon (AVP) CEO Andrea Jung, who also chairs the compensation committee. And the other is former Genentech CEO Arthur Levinson, who also chairs the nominating and governance committee. While Apple declined to offer comment on the current processes of its board, the company's governance guidelines, available on their website, have a section entitled "management review and succession," which outlines a role for the compensation committee and for the full board, including the CEO, in the process. The guidelines state, "The Compensation Committee should conduct, and review with the Board, an annual evaluation of the performance of all executive officers, including the CEO," and "The Board also reviews the CEO performance evaluation to ensure that the CEO is providing effective leadership of the Corporation. As part of the annual evaluation, the Board and the CEO should conduct an annual review of management development and succession planning for senior management, including the CEO." While CEO involvement can be helpful, because the issue of CEO succession can be so difficult, independent members of the board need to establish clear authority over the process apart from the CEO. All boards should review their guidelines and charters to ensure that they actually have authority over this process – and they should review every year the extent to which they have developed a solid succession plan and identify any obstacles preventing a flexible, working process. The effectiveness of CEO succession is a bellwether for good board governance at companies. And it is important at any company, no matter its circumstances. In fact, it represents one of the most important duties a board has to its company -- and to all its stakeholders. The best-case scenario at Apple? A situation where the board is working on CEO succession and using proper, not unauthorized, channels to do so. Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com/), a board advisory firm. |
