巴克莱丑闻可能拔出萝卜带出泥

    伦敦时间周一晚上11时51分，鲍勃•戴蒙德辞去巴克莱（Barclays）首席执行官一职。辞职事实上已不可避免，LIBOR丑闻让政客和监管机构怒不可遏。英国当局近两年一直在重拳整治银行业高管薪酬过高以及银行投资过度冒险等问题，并计划实施远比美国改革更严厉的新条例，包括提议将零售业务“单独圈出”，从投资银行业务中分离出去。

    几年来，戴蒙德的高额收入以及从华尔街转战伦敦金融街的美国佬形象使他成为了头号靶子。但要诋毁戴蒙德并不容易，因为巴克莱不同于劳埃德银行（Lloyds）和苏格兰皇家银行（Royal Bank of Scotland），它无需政府救助就扛过了这次金融危机。戴蒙德用15年的时间将巴克莱从一家沉寂的英国商业银行打造成了一家世界级的投资银行。

    事实上，戴蒙德骄傲地捍卫着自己多年来打造的全能银行模式，结果只能是激化舆论的对立。如今，备受批评的就是这一模式。LIBOR丑闻将使英国的全能银行更难以阻止或者弱化那些限制银行业务范围的极端提议。很可能戴蒙德离开后，他的模式也就到头了。

    随着上周三巴克莱和美国商品期货交易委员会（CFTC）、美国司法部（U.S. Justice Department）和英国金融服务管理局（Financial Services Authority）达成4.53亿美元的和解，英美政界显然希望戴蒙德立刻走人。英国保守党政府力主实施紧缩政策，绝不容许银行业存在这样的过分之举。英国领导人几乎直接点名要求戴蒙德下课。英国财政大臣乔治•奥斯本表示，这一事件“表明，金融体系已将贪婪置于一切之上”，“殃及经济”。奥斯本要求了解“（戴蒙德）当时到底知道哪些情况？什么时候知道的？”英国首相戴维•卡梅伦表示，戴蒙德“需要回答一些重要问题”，英国政府将对丑闻“一查到底”。

    周三，戴蒙德将接受英国议会一个负责LIBOR丑闻调查的委员会的质询。委员会成员必定会盘问他此案最不为外界所知的部分：巴克莱在金融危机期间为阻止倒闭传言，虚构借款成本的做法。

    不得不提的是，伦敦银行同业拆借利率（LIBOR）的古老设定体系早已摇摇欲坠，很容易被人利用。每天早上，汤森路透（Thomson Reuters）会代表行业组织英国银行家协会（British Bankers' Association）对很多银行（2005年至2009年“丑闻发生”期间共有约18家银行）进行调查，获得它们支付的10种货币短期借款利率，期限从隔夜拆借到1年不等。这些数字假定由中立客观的“报价者”提供。汤姆森路拿掉最低和最高的25%，取中间8个计算平均值，得到当天的LIBOR利率定盘价。

    除了最后的平均值，这些银行提供的利率也都是公开信息。每天中午左右，彭博社（Bloomberg）会发布巴克莱、花旗（Citi）、苏格兰皇家银行等银行的数据。

    Bob Diamond's resignation as CEO of Barclays, announced Monday at 11:51 PM London time, was practically inevitable given the rising furor over the LIBOR scandal from politicians and regulators. The British authorities were already bashing its banks for allegedly excessive pay and "casino-style" risk taking, and planning new rules far more draconian than U.S. reforms -- including a proposal to "ring-fence" the retail business by separating it from investment banking.

    For years, Diamond's big pay packages and image as a Yank bringing Wall Street to High Street made him a top target. In fact, vilifying Diamond was always less than logical, since Barclays (BCS), unlike Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), weathered the financial crisis without a government bailout. Diamond also transformed Barclays from a sleepy UK franchise into a world-class investment bank over fifteen years, standing virtually alone in doing it from scratch.

    In fact, Diamond's jaunty defense of the universal banking model he'd spent his career building only heightened the tension. It's precisely that model that is now under siege. And the LIBOR scandal will make it far more difficult for the British universal banks to block or soften the most extreme proposals to limit their scope. It's highly possible that, just as Diamond departs, his dream is dying.

    As soon as the $453 million in settlements with the CFTC, U.S. Justice Department, and Britain's Financial Services Authority were announced last Wednesday, it was clear that politicians of all stripes wanted him out. The conservative government is championing economic austerity, a policy that leaves no room for the perceived excesses of banking. Its leaders came within inches of explicitly demanding Diamond's ouster. Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne states that affair is "symptomatic of a financial system that elevated greed above all" and "brought economy to its knees." Osborne demanded to know "what [Diamond] knew and when did he know it?" Prime Minister David Cameron stated that Diamond had "serious questions to answer" and that the government needed to trace the scandal "all the way to the top of the organization."

    On Wednesday, Diamond will appear before a committee of Parliament investigating the LIBOR scandal. The members are certain to grill him about one of the most mysterious aspects of the case, Barclays policy of falsifying its borrowing costs during the financial crisis to forestall rumors it was failing.

    It's important to understand the rickety, antiquated system for setting the London Interbank Offered Rate, and how that system practically invited abuse. Each morning, Thomson Reuters, on behalf of the industry group the British Bankers' Association, polls a number of banks -- around 18 during the "scandal period" from 2005 to 2009 -- on the interest rate they're paying to borrow short-term, for maturities anywhere from overnight to one year, for ten currencies. The numbers are provided by supposedly neutral, objective "submitters." Thomson Reuters eliminates the 25% highest and lowest numbers, and takes an average of the eight in between. That average fixes the LIBOR rates for the day.

    The rates submitted by all the banks, not just the averages, are public information. They're published on Bloomberg, for Barclays, Citi (C), RBS and the other banks, every day around noon.