拿什么管你，摩根大通

    过去几周，巴克莱（Barclays）首席执行官鲍勃•戴蒙德一直站在舞台（或者审讯室）中央，直到他日薄西山，黯然下台。而即将在本周五举行的长达两小时的季度财报发布会上，摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）首席执行官杰米•戴蒙将会成为公众新的焦点。

    很多人会和证券交易委员会（SEC）一样，仔细审视戴蒙的一言一行。信息披露是资本主义制度的重要基石，但摩根大通最近对巨额交易损失的一系列披露不免让人对这一制度心生疑窦。戴蒙在5月份通报了20亿美元的损失，这和众议员斯宾塞•巴克斯在6月份声称的60亿美元数据大相径庭，而戴蒙当时也在场。现在根据媒体报道，实际损失可能高达90亿美元。

    人们不禁要想，难道是又一个安然（Enron）丑闻吗？不仅仅是摩根大通的表现：在最近的一桩电力价格操纵调查中，他们拒绝移交电子邮件；当前也有很多对该公司行为的调查，包括可能存在的Lobor操纵行为。而且很多资本主义制度的一线防卫就像10年前一样虚弱。更可怕的是，出于种种原因，现在我们似乎厌倦了，甚至不愿去关注、了解实际发生了什么。

    并不是我们忘记了历史，我们记得很清楚。但与此同时，我们并不那么神思清明；我们似乎安于现状，无法采取措施做出应有的改变。

    有机会我们还是会抽时间观看7月13日早晨7:30的季报发布会。除了戴蒙，我还想看看分析师们的表现，他们会像参议员在6月13日的听证会上那样屈从于戴蒙，还是会鼓起勇气，像较真的英国下议院（House of Commons）议员挑战首相那样咄咄逼人。

    其实我们真正想看到的是具有敏锐直觉的分析师，他们往往能嗅出蛛丝马迹，穷追不舍。4月6日的《金融时报》（Financial Times）和彭博社（Bloomberg）都报道了摩根大通“在某个信用违约掉期指数上积累了巨大头寸，大到足以影响市场走势”，而且“扭曲了市场价格”。在现在已经臭名昭著的4月13日季报发布会中，摩根大通的首席财务官道格•布朗斯坦声称首席投资办公室（CIO）投资的是“高等级低风险的证券。”只有一位分析师，美国银行（Bank of America）的盖伊•莫什考斯基就此提问，而提问的开头是这样的：“关于CIO的问题，显然你们已经讨论过，本周也已经获得媒体广泛报道，我可以再问一个问题吗…？”戴蒙的回应就是无须担心，然后就没有下文了。摩根大通的发言人对CIO的最新动态拒绝置评。

    根据彭博社和《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）的报道，其实早在2010年，就有关于CIO的幕后警报。戴蒙后来作证说，3月份CIO达到了其风险限制，4月上旬该行就此向监管部门通报了情况。

    5月10日，戴蒙从其4月13日声明的立场妥协，宣布了20亿美元的损失，并承认在1季度就已经出现了少量损失。

    《财富》杂志（Fortune）的斯蒂芬•甘道尔推测，戴蒙可能曾经给2季度业绩“洗大澡”，那是新上任的首席执行官常用的手段。如果他尽可能地减记损失，推迟一次性的盈利，调整资产价格，或者预留大量的储备金，他就可以彻底放弃这个季度，但为未来的骄人业绩打下基础。甘道尔说，戴蒙也可能反其道而行之，尽量降低损失。这种平滑化的策略也很常见。

    戴蒙可没那么简单。当他接手第一银行（Bank One，后与摩根大通合并——译注）时，他并没有一次性地计入所有损失，而是将其分散到早期的季度中，导致了异乎寻常的盈利震荡。他增加储备金，实施减记，甚至一度停止了信用卡证券化。这些措施都有利于提升未来的盈利。他在5月10日告诉分析师，他们将看到“本季度余下时间和下季度的大幅震荡。”

    For the last couple of weeks, it has been Barclays (BCS) CEO Bob Diamond's moment in the sun (or interrogation lights) -- until he rode off into the sunset, that is. But it will be J.P. Morgan (JPM) CEO Jamie Dimon's turn to take the spotlight on Friday for two hours of quarterly earnings announcements and questions.

    The SEC and plenty others will be watching Dimon carefully. Disclosure is one of the bedrocks of our capitalist system, but J.P. Morgan's recent massive trading loss disclosures are putting our faith in the system to the test. Dimon reported $2 billion in losses in May, which contrasted starkly with the $6 billion figure Congressman Spencer Bachus told other members of Congress in Dimon's presence in June. And the loss could actually be as high as $9 billion according to media reports.

    Part of what is happening feels like Enron all over again. Not just because of J.P. Morgan's refusal to turn over emails in an energy pricing manipulation investigation, or that there are so many ongoing investigations into the company's behavior -- including the possibility of Libor manipulation investigations -- but because many of the frontline safeguards for our capitalist system are as weak now as they were a decade ago. Worse, we seem tired, somehow, and even less willing now to focus our attention and really get a hold of what is going on.

    It's not that we don't remember the past. We remember our history all right, but, at the same time, we are not fully aware; we seem stuck and unable to take action to change our course.

    Given the opportunity, however, we should take a moment to observe the July 13 7:30 am call. In addition to seeing what Dimon has to say, I'll be looking to see whether the analysts are as subservient as the senators were during their June 13 session with Dimon -- or whether the analysts will pull up their suspenders and ask questions like earnest members of the House of Commons might ask the UK prime minister.

    Intuitive analysts who can spot a scent and follow it would be welcome indeed. On April 6, theFinancial Times and Bloomberg reported that J.P. Morgan "had amassed a big position in an index of credit default swaps, sufficient in size to move the markets," and that it was "distorting prices." J.P. Morgan CFO Doug Braunstein on the now infamous April 13 call said the chief investment office (CIO) invested "in high-grade, low-risk securities." But only one analyst, Bank of America's Guy Moszkowski, raised a question in response: "On the CIO question, which obviously you've addressed and has gotten so much attention in the press this week, can I just ask one further question…?" he began. In response to his questions, all Dimon had to do was say there was nothing to worry about and the matter was dropped. A spokesperson for J.P. Morgan declined to comment on the CIO update.

    Behind the scenes in 2010, there had been warnings about the CIO, according to Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal reports. In March, the CIO risk limits had been hit, and in early April, the bank had notified regulators of the situation, Dimon later testified.

    Dimon backtracked from his April 13 statements on May 10 and announced the $2 billion in losses, noting there had been smaller, less substantial losses in the first quarter.

    Fortune's Stephen Gandel has speculated that Dimon could kitchen sink the second quarter, as some new CEOs are inclined to do. If he writes off all he can, delays one-time gains, adjusts pricing, or sets up large reserves, he could trash the quarter but set himself up to look like a hero later on. Or, Gandel suggests, he could do the opposite to minimize the loss. That is a familiar tactic called smoothing.

    Dimon, however, might be more subtle than that. When he took over at Bank One, he didn't take all the hits to earnings at once. He spaced them over the early quarters, which created an unusually volatile earnings pattern. He built reserves, did write-offs, and even stopped credit card securitizations for a time, which made it easier to boost earnings later on. On May 10, he told analysts they could expect that "volatility for the rest of this quarter and next quarter or so will be high."